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Abstract 
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 The Barbary Wars, fought against Tripoli from 1801-05 and Algiers in 1815, were among 
the first overseas operations for the young United States Navy.  Historians have explored the 
combat that took place and chronicled the daring deeds of some of America‟s first military 
heroes.  Also heavily explored are the impact of these conflicts on both the navy and the nation‟s 
place in the world.  Inadequate attention, however, has been paid to how the wars were managed 
and won, and that is the focus of this study.   
 Commanders‟ decisions outside combat proved far more important than any heroics they 
displayed in battle.  The commodores had a wide range of duties and significant latitude in the 
direction of their squadrons.  The lack of previous naval operations in the Mediterranean and the 
long time required for cross ocean communications necessitated this.  In a war with few actual 
engagements, commanders made their most important decisions away from the battlefield. 
Each year of the conflict, a new commodore relieved the old.  Comparing the success of 
each with that of his predecessor and successor allows an evaluation of each commodore.  From 
the miserable tenure of Richard Morris to the brilliant victory of Stephen Decatur Jr., each 
commodore demonstrated that good decision-making in areas such as supply, fleet disposition 
and negotiation outweighed the importance of heroics in battle.
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INTRODUCTION 
 Before the thirteen colonies broke with Great Britain, ships owned in America conducted 
a significant overseas trade.  After the United States achieved independence, its merchants 
quickly began to re-expand their commercial operations around the world.  Their ships became 
pawns, however, in the European wars of Britain and France.  The heavy-handed practices of 
both of these nations sparked open conflict with the United States.  The War of 1812 against 
Britain and the Quasi-War with France both sprang from this source.  The piratical North African 
states of Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, and Algiers, collectively referred to as the Barbary States, also 
preyed on American merchant vessels.   
With the exception of Morocco, geography largely confined the Barbary raiders to the 
Mediterranean, as their ports bordered the southern shore of that sea.  The Pre-Independence 
trade of the Americans to that sea itself, however, was still a significant part of the whole.  
“Eighty to one hundred ships, annually, of twenty thousand tons, navigated by about twelve 
hundred seamen,” carried American wheat, flour, fish, and rice through the Straits of Gibraltar.1  
This trade languished in the days immediately following the revolution because of the Barbary 
nations‟ depredations.  Pirates captured three vessels before the Americans had even ratified the 
Constitution: the Betsy by Morocco, and the Maria and Dauphin by Algiers.
2
  The only Barbary 
state with Atlantic ports, Morocco, signed a treaty of peace with the United States on 28 June 
1786, which Congress ratified 18 July of that same year.
3
  Morocco promptly released the 
Betsey, and American trade outside the Mediterranean gained a measure of safety.  Hopes were 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Jefferson, Mediterranean Trade: Report of Secretary of State to the Congress of the United States, in 
Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers, 1785-1801, U.S. Office of Naval 
Records and Library (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 1: 22. 
2
 Thomas Jefferson, American Prisoners at Algiers: Report of Secretary of State to the President or the United 
States, in Naval Documents, 1: 18. 
3
 U.S. Department of State, “Treaty with Morocco,” 18 July 1787, in Naval Documents, 1: 6. 
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high that the United States could reach a similar agreement with Algiers, strongest of the 
Mediterranean Barbary powers.  These efforts largely failed, and only the Portuguese, also at war 
with Algiers, prevented continued serious losses to American shipping by closing the Straits of 
Gibraltar to pirate cruisers.  The British, however, engineered a twelve-month truce between 
Portugal and Algiers in 1793.
4
  Though this did not grow to a lasting peace, Algerian vessels 
were still able to escape to the Atlantic where they inflicted severe depredations on American 
ships, capturing eleven vessels in less than two months.
5
 
This presented a crisis, forcing the government of the United States to act.  Congress took 
steps to appease Algiers with money and naval stores.  There was recognition, however, that 
force would eventually be necessary.  On 27 March 1794, therefore, Congress approved the 
creation of an American navy for the express purpose of protecting trade from the “depredations 
committed by the Algerine corsairs.”6  Because of the Quasi-War with France, the Navy was 
unable to act in the Mediterranean until 1801.  Though the United States had secured treaties 
with all of the Barbary States, those with Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis demanded large sums of 
money, and the ruler of each constantly threatened war, demanding more payment.  When the 
United States finally decided that the good “faith of Pirates … [was] but a feeble dependence” on 
which to place the stake of American commerce and international respect, they were forced to 
resort to war.
7
  The Barbary wars that followed, fought between 1801 and 1805 with a brief 
resumption of hostilities in 1815, were filled with the heroism of the new United States Navy and 
Marine Corps.  This is how historians usually remember them.   
                                                 
4
 Edward Church, Circular to Citizens of the United States, in Naval Documents, 1: 50.  
5
 James Simpson to Thomas Jefferson, 25 Nov. 1793, in Naval Documents, 1: 55.  
6
 U.S. Congress, An Act to provide a Naval Armament, 27 Mar. 1794, in Naval Documents, 1: 69.  
7
 Edward Church to Thomas Jefferson, 22 Sep. 1793, in Naval Documents, 1: 45. 
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 Many authors have already examined the Barbary Wars, a topic that has inspired 
numerous books.  These works generally focus on one or both of two main themes: terrorism or 
the birth of the U.S. Navy.  Because the 200
th
 anniversary of the start of this conflict occurred 
simultaneously with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, several recently published works 
examine the Barbary conflicts with the goal of comparing them to the modern day.  “In the wake 
of the 2001 terrorist attacks … the United States found itself in a new war much like the one two 
centuries earlier. … In truth the Barbary War was America‟s first war on terror.”8  These works 
are largely concerned with the response of the nation to the pirates, comparing them to modern 
terrorists.  “The nation was forced to confront, for the first time, the vital question of … whether 
to give in to or actively fight against terrorism.”9  These authors draw the parallels of religious 
animosity, racial tension, government authority to wage war, and power projection problems 
overseas between the Barbary Wars and the modern conflicts faced by the United States.  Even 
those works written before the modern War on Terror use language such as “holy war of 
Muslims against the infidel invader” and “dictators ruling in the name of Allah” to 
overemphasize the religious aspects of the war.
10
 
 A second group of books uses the Barbary Wars to examine the birth of the U.S. Navy 
and the growing pains of the young United States.  They see the conflict as “an extension of 
America‟s War of Independence.”11 After winning their independence at home, at a time “when 
the nation‟s future prosperity was very much in doubt,” Americans began to assert their rights 
overseas and made a statement “to the rest of the world that the United States was not a country 
                                                 
8
 Joseph Wheelan, Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror 1801-1805 (New York: Carroll & Graf 
Publishers, 2003), xvii. 
9
 Joshua E. London, Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and 
Built a Nation (Hoboken, New Jersey:  John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 11. 
10
 A.B.C. Whipple, To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 1991), 5. 
11
 Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2005), 8. 
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to be mocked or bullied.”12  When the United States deemed war necessary, the “confrontation 
with Barbary pirates would give birth to the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps.”13  “Thus, a little 
band of petty despots along the Barbary Coast were in large part responsible for the formation of 
the United States Navy and Marine Corps, and not least for weaning a new nation from infancy 
to adolescence.”14  Some of these works focus on the military, and others on the situation of the 
United States in the world, but all embrace the theme of coming of age, whether they mean the 
United States as a whole or the nation‟s naval service. 
Many of those authors who argue that the Barbary Wars were a precursor to modern wars 
on terror go too far.  The actions of the Barbary States were more akin to piracy than to Jihad, 
motivated as much by secular calculations like economics and politics as by religion.  One author 
even goes so far as to call William Eaton‟s march across the desert “America‟s first covert 
military op overseas” and attempts comparisons with modern CIA operations.15  Books that 
focus on the trouble with the Barbary Nations as the reason for the birth of the U.S. Navy are 
closer to the mark.  Some, however, partially ignore the importance of the antagonistic actions of 
France and England at sea and Spain on the Mississippi River as an additional impetus for this 
action. 
All of these books, from best to worst, offer the same narrower interpretation of the 
historical events.  For many of these authors, the Americans gained victory by simply deciding to 
go to war, with the military actions representing an opportunity to exercise America‟s new 
martial prowess.  While some of these works acknowledge the importance of the actions of the 
                                                 
12
 Richard Zacks, The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805 (New 
York: Hyperion, 2005), 10. 
13
 London, 11. 
14
 Whipple, 6. 
15
 Zacks, 10. 
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American naval officers outside of combat, none primarily focus on this subject or adequately 
explore the importance of this crucial factor in playing the decisive role in victory.  They are far 
more eager to discuss the heroics of Eaton and Preble and to expound upon the virtue of paying, 
“Millions for defense, but not a penny for tribute.”  It is necessary, then, to fill this gap by 
detailing how the eventual American victory in the Barbary Wars was attributable to the 
successful actions of the American commanders, especially those duties outside of military 
operations. 
American victory was far from assured simply because Congress and the Jefferson 
administration roused themselves and sent a squadron to the Mediterranean.  The naval forces 
sent to deal with the Barbary pirates operated far from home, without any established American 
base nearby.  The commodores of each American squadron were responsible for finding much of 
the food, water, and other supplies their squadrons needed.  To accomplish this, they had to 
negotiate with neutral powers and use neutral ports for reprovisioning and repair.  In addition to 
those responsibilities, naval captains of the day, when on foreign station, represented the interests 
of their countries and were sometimes accorded great responsibility in these matters.  This 
resulted from the significant lag time for any communications that had to cross the Atlantic.  For 
example, a letter sent by John Adams in London to John Jay on 25 April arrived on 7 July, with 
the reply returning to Europe on the last day of that same month: a not a-typical round trip of 
more than ninety days.
16
  For a commander on foreign station to wait that length of time for 
direction as new situations arose was wholly impossible.  In short, “naval commanders … 
                                                 
16
 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 31 July 1786, in Naval Documents 1: 12. 
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assumed responsibility, exercised discretion, and decided their own problems often without 
suggestion or interference from the government.”17 
 Each American squadron sailed for the Mediterranean under the command of the 
squadron‟s senior captain.  This captain was addressed as commodore, a title that unlike admiral, 
was not a permanent rank, and could shift from one captain to another as more senior officers 
arrived or departed from the theater of war.  Because of the small size of the American navy at 
the time, even relatively junior officers could find themselves styled commodores if they were 
the senior officer on station.  Despite the largely ceremonial nature of the title, bickering between 
captains because of questions of seniority was commonplace.  Another point of pride for many 
officers appointed commodore was the presence of a flag captain.  A flag captain commanded 
the vessel in which the commodore sailed, releasing the senior officer from the day-to-day 
business required in running the ship.  With a flag captain, the commodore‟s duties were more 
analogous to those of the admirals in foreign navies, and most officers believed the presence of a 
flag captain bestowed more prestige on the rank of commodore even though this was not the case 
officially.  
Commodore Richard Dale, commander of the first U.S. Mediterranean Squadron, set sail 
without knowing that the ruler of Tripoli had already declared war.  His orders contained detailed 
directions for showing the naval force at his disposal around the entire Mediterranean should he 
find relative peace in those seas.  In the case of war with a Barbary Nation, his orders directed 
Dale to “place [his] ships in a position to chastise them … by sinking, burning, or destroying 
their ships and vessels,” leaving the specifics for the commodore to determine.18  Later 
commanders sent from the United States, because of the constantly changing military situation, 
                                                 
17
 Charles Oscar Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers: 1778-1883  (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1912), 59. 
18
 Samuel Smith to Captain Richard Dale, 20 May 1801, in Naval Documents, 1: 466-7. 
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were little more informed than Dale when they set sail.  Morris, Preble, and Barron each faced 
the reality or likelihood of war with Morocco and Tunis in addition to Tripoli.  Like Dale, they 
had to find new bases and sources of supply and adapt to the constantly changing situation.  Each 
commander was also responsible for a singular balancing act.  They had to weigh the requests of 
the Mediterranean merchants against the advice of American diplomatic personnel and the 
objectives given by their orders as well as the military necessities of each situation.  Using ships 
for convoying merchantmen, for example, reduced the force and effectiveness of any blockade.  
Only those commanders capable of combining these necessities into a coherent plan could 
succeed.   
In addition, many naval officers were involved in actual diplomatic negotiations with the 
enemy.  They both assisted the envoys and consuls stationed around the Mediterranean and often 
played key roles in negotiation.  Dale, for example, communicated directly with the bashaw of 
Tripoli, the bey of Tunis, and the dey of Algiers, as well as with the American consuls in those 
countries.  Morris, Preble, and Decatur received official power to participate in negotiating 
treaties; Preble, Barron, and Decatur commanded squadrons during treaty negotiations.  The 
American Commodores‟ efforts in the two Barbary Wars were largely concentrated outside of 
actual combat.  Their success in these roles, both logistic and diplomatic, determined the 
outcome of the Barbary Wars. Their decisions in these areas provide a method for assessing the 
effectiveness of each commodore. 
No less than the commodores themselves, the men who wrote their orders, the various 
secretaries of the navy in service at the time, had to walk a fine line.  If their orders contained 
instructions too detailed and limiting, they could force a commodore to act in a way that had no 
bearing on the situation at hand.  Despite a secretary‟s desire to dictate the actions of his 
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squadrons, it was impossible to draft a set of orders that would cover every eventuality, forcing 
them to delegate these duties.  If the orders contained too much leeway, however, a commodore 
could do whatever he wanted, regardless of the actual intent of the government at home.  Both of 
these situations arose during the Barbary Wars.  In evaluating the performance of the 
commodores, therefore, it is also important to examine the authority they received in their orders.  
The secretary of the navy was also ultimately responsible for the composition of each squadron, 
both in men and in vessels.  The overall fighting power of each squadron, the types of vessels 
making up the squadron, and even whether the squadrons sailed together or piecemeal greatly 
influenced each commodore‟s actions as well. 
Though the American navy was still less than a decade old, the squadrons dispatched to 
the Mediterranean were not the force‟s first overseas efforts.  During the Quasi-War with France, 
the prevailing winds and northerly course of the Gulf Stream meant that the voyage to the 
Caribbean from America‟s large Eastern seaports could be just as long, in terms of sailing days, 
as a journey to the Mediterranean.  Additionally, the long sweep of the Greater and Lesser 
Antilles meant that the scope of the Quasi-War was similar to that of the Barbary Wars, which 
ranged across most of the northern coast of Africa.  Benjamin Stoddert, secretary of the navy 
during the Quasi-War, faced challenges similar to those his successors faced.  His system of 
assuring supply by sending store-ships from the United States and having local consuls act to 
provide for any deficit was essentially the one adopted in the Barbary Wars.
19
 
Each chapter that follows will deal with one commodore who served during the Barbary 
Wars.  Examining the results produced by the squadrons of Richard Dale, Richard Morris, 
Edward Preble, Samuel Barron, and Stephen Decatur provides an idea of their individual 
                                                 
19
 Michael A. Palmer.  Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801  (1987; 
repr., Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Institute Press, 2000), 85-87. 
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success.  Accounting for the different situation into which each commander sailed, the 
differences in the fleets they commanded, and the orders of each commander allow a 
measurement of the commodores against their own possible success as well as each other 
commodore.  The bulk, then, of each chapter consists of description of each commodore‟s 
actions and an evaluation of those decisions.  Each chapter ends with an overall summation and 
assessment of that officer‟s performance.  In a war largely lacking in actual engagements, the 
commodores‟ actions in the more mundane spheres of their responsibility determined their 
individual success and the ultimate outcome of the conflict itself.
  
 
 
CHAPTER 1: RICHARD DALE 
As an American representative in France, Thomas Jefferson was as close as any of his 
countrymen to the Barbary States during the nation‟s troubles with the pirates soon after the 
Revolution.  In 1786, Jefferson wrote, “War, on the fairest prospects, is still exposed to 
uncertainties, I weigh against this, the greater uncertainty of the duration of a peace bought with 
money.”1  Despite the choice of the intervening administrations to pay tribute to the Barbary 
States, Jefferson carried his earlier opinion with him to the presidency.  Soon after taking office 
in the spring of 1801, Jefferson decided to send a squadron of ships to the Mediterranean to 
uphold American interests.   
The nation‟s most distinguished naval officer of the time, and the logical choice for 
command of the Mediterranean venture, was Captain Thomas Truxtun.  Commander of the 
Constellation during the Quasi-War with France, Truxton bested two French frigates in combat, 
a combat record unmatched by any other American captain.  Truxton had also exercised 
command of an entire squadron, proving he had the strategic and administrative talent required 
for such a position.  Like most officers of the day, Truxton could be touchy about matters of 
precedence within the navy, and during the Quasi-War this touchiness devolved into argument 
with Captain Richard Dale. 
Dale, a Virginian who had captained merchant vessels, served on both sides during the 
Revolutionary War before finally settling on the American cause in time to commit several acts 
of singular bravery.  Imprisoned by the British no less than three times, he escaped twice: once 
by tunnel and once by obtaining a British uniform and strolling out.  He sailed as a lieutenant 
with John Paul Jones on the Bonhomme Richard and, during the engagement with the Serapis, 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, July 11, 1786 in Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the 
Barbary Powers, 1785-1801, U.S. Office of Naval Records and Library (Washington, DC: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1939), 1: 10. 
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actually swung across to the enemy‟s deck on a rope.  Having made up for his initial support of 
the British cause, Dale oversaw construction of the frigate Chesapeake after Congress authorized 
construction of the new vessels in 1794.2  At the onset of the Quasi-War with France, Dale 
quickly prepared for action and, before any of the new frigates were ready, his ship, the Ganges, 
took the first war-time cruise of any U.S. Navy vessel.3 
As more vessels put to sea, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert found himself a 
mediator in captains‟ disputes over seniority.  When he begun construction of the Chesapeake, 
Dale was the fourth highest-ranking captain in the navy, while the junior Truxtun began building 
the Constellation.4  But while the Constellation continued smoothly to completion, Congress 
halted Chesapeake‟s construction after achieving peace with Algiers, depriving Dale of an active 
position.5  Now that Stoddert had to assign captains to vessels and appoint squadron 
commanders, Truxtun argued that his years of active service, while Dale was without a naval 
command, rendered Truxtun the senior officer.  With Truxtun already established in command of 
the Constellation and no more frigates in need of commanders, Dale opted to take a leave of 
absence until a frigate was available rather than retaining command of the smaller Ganges.6  
Though Dale did not put to sea again in a vessel he judged beneath his rank, or indeed serve at 
all for the rest of the war, his leave was a tacit admission of Truxtun‟s seniority. 
Truxtun, though, declined command of the Mediterranean squadron.  The new secretary 
of the navy, Robert Smith, drafted orders that Truxtun considered too confining in the light of his 
earlier service; Truxtun later declined command of a second squadron also, when no captain was 
                                                 
2
 Glenn Tucker, Dawn Like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the U.S. Navy (Indianapolis, Indiana: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1963), 133-4. 
3
 Leonard Guttridge and Jay Smith, The Commodores (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 22. 
4
 Tucker, Dawn Like Thunder, 133-4. 
5
 Michael A. Palmer.  Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801  (1987; 
repr., Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Institute Press, 2000), 79. 
6
 Ibid., 80-81. 
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available to serve under him on the flagship.7  Command of the squadron passed to Dale.  
Though in the view of historian Glenn Tucker Dale possessed “both the experience and resolute 
character required of a fleet commander,” Dale received command by virtue of his seniority and 
availability.8  Dale‟s leave of absence during the Quasi-War deprived him not only of the chance 
to distinguish himself in combat, but also the experience of squadron command.  These 
constituted a heavy price to pay for personal honor, and perhaps demonstrated that Dale‟s 
character was not resolute enough. 
Dale received his orders informing him of his appointment on 28 April 1801 and final 
orders on 20
 
May after taking his position with the squadron.  These orders contained 
instructions to instruct his junior officers in seamanship, to maintain discipline among his men, 
to resist insults to his squadron by other nations (but also to be respectful of other foreign powers 
to maintain peace with them), and to keep proper records of expenditures.9  Further instructions 
specifically concerning the Barbary States themselves followed.  Dale was instructed to 
determine, on his arrival in Gibraltar, if any of the Barbary States had declared war on the United 
States.  The different contingencies, ranging from peace with all of the Barbary States, to war 
with one, a combination, or all of those nations were covered in his instructions.10 
In other words, Dale received much responsibility, but also limitations in his actions by 
the very specific instructions provided for each situation.  Additionally, his orders contain a good 
deal of chastening language, reminding him repeatedly to give no offense to anyone and to be 
careful not to overstep his boundaries for fear of insulting a trading partner or military power.  
The orders were as limiting as possible considering the autonomy required by an overseas 
                                                 
7
 Tucker, Dawn Like Thunder, 151. 
8
 Tucker, Dawn Like Thunder, 135. 
9
 Samuel Smith to Richard Dale, 20 May 1801, in Naval Documents I: 463-4. 
10
 Ibid., 465-9. 
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commander who would be in very tenuous contact with the authorities in Washington.  The tone 
of these orders may be indicative of the low station accorded the secretary of the navy in 
Jefferson‟s cabinet.  Benjamin Stoddart, the first secretary of the navy, was a competent and 
energetic administrator who led the navy to success during the Quasi-War under the navy-
friendly Adams administration.  Jefferson‟s first three selections for Stoddart‟s replacement 
turned the job down, however, and the office was levied onto the brother of a senator from 
Jefferson‟s Republican party.11  Robert Smith was certainly no incompetent, but in the thrifty 
Republican cabinet he was overshadowed by Albert Gallatin, economical secretary of the 
Treasury, and much of Smith‟s time had to be devoted to parrying cost-cutting measures and 
defending the value of a national navy. 
From the President, Dale disseminated these orders to the other ship commanders in his 
squadron: Captain Samuel Barron of the Philadelphia, Captain William Bainbridge of the Essex, 
and Lieutenant Andrew Sterett, commander of the schooner Enterprize.  The squadron then 
unmoored at three o‟clock in the afternoon on 31 May, bound for Gibraltar.12  On 2 July, after a 
passage during which “no perticular Occurrences worth relating took place,” the three frigates 
arrived in Gibraltar, the Enterprize having beaten them there by five days.13  Here Dale faced the 
first test of his command, for in the harbor were two vessels of Tripoli‟s navy.  Though the 
commander of these vessels, the Tripolitan high admiral, asserted otherwise, Dale rightly 
assumed that their presence meant war with Tripoli, and that these vessels were bound for the 
Atlantic to prey on American merchantmen.  Dale‟s orders in the case of war with Tripoli 
instructed him:   
                                                 
11
 Guttridge and Smith, The Commodores, 61. 
12
 Log of USS Essex, Captain William Bainbridge Commanding, 31 May 1801, in Naval Documents I:480.  
13
 Richard Dale to Secretary of the Navy, 2 July 1801, in Naval Documents I: 497. 
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You will proceed direct to that Port, where you will lay your ships in such a position as 
effectually to prevent any of their Vessels from going in or out.  The Essex and 
Enterprize by cruising well on towards Tunis, will have it in their power to intercept any 
vessels which they may have captured, by disguising your ships, it will be some weeks 
before they will know that the Squadron is cruising in the Mediterranean – and give you a 
fair chance of punishing them.14 
 
 In light of the situation he immediately faced, Dale largely ignored these instructions, as 
indeed the situation seemed to dictate.  He ordered the Philadelphia to remain off Gibraltar to 
bottle up the two pirate vessels there.  He further ordered the Essex to convoy a ship containing 
tribute for the bey of Tunis to that nation.  Dale then proceeded with his flagship, the President, 
and the Enterprize to Algiers, to deliver the tribute goods that his squadron was carrying.15 
Secretary of the Navy Smith chartered a merchant ship to carry supplies for the squadron 
to the Mediterranean.  Because of a shortage of water at the port of Gibraltar, Dale left orders for 
this ship, which was to leave America after the squadron, to deposit its stores at Malaga instead.  
His orders in this regard instructed him to lay in stores where he thought most convenient, and 
suggested Gibraltar; but because supplies were being brought on a ship, Dale could direct this 
vessel wherever he chose.  Later, reversing his earlier decision, the commodore wrote a letter to 
the governor of Gibraltar asking permission to deposit supplies there.16   
 Hindsight suggests Commodore Dale‟s decisions at Gibraltar were mixed.  Certainly, 
though his orders contain nothing about detaching a frigate at Gibraltar, it would have been 
unwise to allow two Tripolitan vessels access to the Atlantic where they could have wreaked 
havoc on American shipping.  Similarly, abandoning Gibraltar as the primary base of supply was 
wise in view of the water shortage there.  Without question, however, Dale‟s orders dictated 
more offensive actions than he actually pursued.  Malaga is barely closer to Tripoli than is 
                                                 
14
 Samuel Smith to Richard Dale, 20 May 1801, in Naval Documents I: 461.  
15
 Richard Dale to Secretary of the Navy, 2 July 1801, in Naval Documents, I: 499.  
16
 Richard Dale to General O‟Hara, 3 July 1801, in Naval Documents I: 499. 
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Gibraltar itself.  When it was apparent that the supply port recommended in his orders would be 
impractical, it would have been wise to move to a location more central in the Mediterranean.  
Dale‟s orders also listed Malta and various Italian ports as possible re-supply areas, and he 
eventually used them for rewatering, recognizing their usefulness.  These ports were more 
conveniently situated to Tripoli, and it would have been easy to instruct the supply ship to meet 
the squadron there.  Perhaps Dale was concerned that the vessel might be intercepted by the 
Tripolitans, or perhaps he wanted to view those more convenient ports before committing 
himself.  Whatever his thoughts, Gibraltar remained the fleet‟s main base, even beyond his own 
tenure, to the detriment of fleet operations. 
Dispatching the Essex to guard the tribute vessel may have been prudent, but resulted in 
further reduction of the force Dale could put to an offensive use.  Additionally, while the section 
of the orders concerning peace with all the Barbary States included the delivery of the tribute on 
board, his orders stated that, in case of war with Tripoli, Dale was to “proceed direct” to 
Tripoli.17  While he was certainly not wrong to ensure the safe arrival of the money entrusted to 
him, a more aggressive interpretation of his orders would have led him to sail directly for Tripoli.  
Transferring the tribute to the Essex, which he detached to escort another tribute vessel, would 
have been a possible compromise.  This action would have allowed two American vessels to 
proceed immediately to Tripoli and still ensure delivery of tribute to both Algiers and Tunis. 
Perhaps Dale did not expect to find a war on his arrival, and the presence of the 
Tripolitan warships surprised him at Gibraltar.  Whatever the reason, Dale elected to carry out a 
strategy that fit more closely with the orders he received upon the contingency of peace with all 
the Barbary States.  Sure to cover all his bases, Dale secured the safety of the supply ship, the 
tribute, and Mediterranean merchants at the same time, but at the cost of delaying offensive 
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actions.  During the rest of the conflict, Dale‟s actions were largely focused on three areas: 
giving orders regarding the dispositions of his squadron, maintaining relations with foreign 
powers (including establishing points of supply), and negotiating with the Barbary States. 
 Upon arriving in Algiers, Dale found the conditions incorrect to unload any of the money 
he carried on board.  He sent a letter ashore informing the dey of Algiers of the presence of the 
American squadron in the Mediterranean and then left that harbor for Tunis.18  There, he sent a 
letter ashore for the bey and left directions for the Essex, which arrived after escorting the very 
slow, tribute-carrying store ship, Grand Turk, to proceed to the port of Barcelona to convoy any 
American merchantmen there safely out of the Mediterranean, gathering other Americans in the 
ports along the way.19  In this same letter, Dale clearly demonstrated that he did not believe it 
possible to afford protection to every merchant vessel when he wrote, “you are not to understand, 
that you are to go about convoying one two or three vessels … when we have objects of more 
consequence in View.”20  Yet Bainbridge still received permission to escort merchants as far as 
11° west, well into the Atlantic Ocean, put in at Lisbon, and escort Americans waiting in-bound 
at Gibraltar as far as Leghorn, Italy.  When the Essex was finally ready to rejoin the squadron, 
Bainbridge was to look first off Tripoli, but Dale wrote that the squadron might be at Malta 
getting water, “It being the most handy place for that purpose.”21  If the squadron ran out of food, 
however, he still expected return to Gibraltar. 
In light of the letters he wrote to the rulers of Algiers and Tunis, Dale may have been 
trying to impress these leaders by visiting their ports with his warships.  If this was his object and 
if either of these nations planned an attack, then these efforts were largely successful, as both 
                                                 
18
 Richard Dale to Dey of Algiers, 21 May 1801, in Naval Documents I: 470-1. 
19
 Richard Dale to William Bainbridge, 17 July 1801, in Naval Documents I: 515. 
20
 Ibid., 516. 
21
 Ibid. 
  
17 
 
Algiers and Tunis elected to stay out of the war despite a general dissatisfaction with the lateness 
of American tribute payments.22  Again, however, Dale tempered the government‟s more 
aggressive ideas for his squadron with his own caution.  Though his orders called for the entire 
squadron to lie off Tripoli (two ships on close blockade, the other two more distant) Dale had 
effectively cut his blockading force in half.  Additionally, he fully expected to remove those 
ships from their station while they sailed half the length of the Mediterranean to replenish their 
food stocks.  In fact, the American displaying the most initiative was William Eaton, American 
consul in Tunis.  On hearing of a shortage of bread in Tripoli, he took it upon himself to declare 
a naval blockade of that port from Tunis, sending letters to foreign powers and American consuls 
throughout the Mediterranean.23  A blockade could only be legal if issued by a power that had 
enough naval units in place to actually inhibit the vessels of other powers from entering.  Even 
so, by refusing to issue passes for Tunisian grain merchants bound for Tripoli, Eaton created a 
sort of “paper blockade.”  This action may have been more effective at keeping supplies from 
reaching Tripoli at the beginning of the war than the squadron itself. 
 Upon reaching Tripoli himself, Commodore Dale began a brisk correspondence with both 
the bashaw and Danish Consul Nicholas Nissen, who had agreed to act in the interest of the 
United States after American Consul James Cathcart departed.  In these letters, Dale announced 
his intention to commence hostilities unless the bashaw would explain his reasons for declaring 
war, express a willingness to declare a truce, and prove willing to forge a peace.24   After 
receiving no satisfactory answer, Dale began a blockade.  The schooner Enterprize, however, 
with less capacity for carrying stores, was growing short of water, so Dale dispatched it to Malta.   
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He sent with its captain, Lt. Andrew Sterett, a letter to the governor of Malta, asking for 
permission to use that port as a watering station.25  Dale took care to warn Sterett to keep a tight 
reign on his ship‟s crew when ashore, not wanting to incite any animosity with British officials 
there.  Also included in the letter were specific instructions concerning the eventuality of 
meeting with any vessel of Tripoli, and these instructions were put to use when, on 1 August, the 
Enterprize met and captured the Tripoli, a Tripolitan cruiser. 
 Dale‟s orders to the Enterprize were clear: no prizes were to be taken.  If Sterett were to 
fall in with a corsair he could handle he should “leave him In a situation, that he can Just make 
out to get into some Port.”26  President Jefferson himself supported this decision, and explained 
that to perpetrate offensive action against Tripoli, Congress must vote to recognize a state of war, 
which occured only on 6 February, 1802, after Dale left the Mediterranean.27  In this case, it 
seems that Dale understood and carried out his instructions to the letter and made sure his 
subordinates did the same.  Had Dale ordered this vessel taken as a prize, there could be little 
doubt about the legality of the capture.  Again, the commodore was careful not to overstep the 
bounds of his orders, interpreting them in the most cautious way. 
As it limped back to Tripoli, the Tripoli met the President cruising outside the harbor.  
The captain told the Americans that he was a Tunisian and his vessel battered by a French 
warship, which excuse was good enough for Dale to let him pass.28  Though the captain and 
vessel could have been a powerful bargaining chip, their final escape made this American victory 
no less complete.  This incident is also proof of the actual combat prowess of the American navy.  
Though the Tripoli carried more guns and men than the Enterprize, it suffered more than twenty 
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dead and thirty wounded, against not a single American even scratched.  In even an equal 
military contest, the Americans had a clear advantage, and during Dale‟s tenure they never 
fought a battle they were in danger of losing.  In these conditions, the commodore‟s skills in 
combat were barely tested; victory rested on his decisions outside combat. 
 Things so far were going well for the Americans and Commodore Dale.  Consul Cathcart, 
who had fled Tripoli for Leghorn, wrote to Dale offering his services and a useful summation of 
the action thus far: “we have not lost One Single Ship, we have their Admiral in our power [at 
Gibraltar] and our operations are not impeded by the contemplation of having a number of our 
fellow Citizens in Captivity.”29  Furthermore, Cathcart urged Dale not to push for peace until the 
bashaw had learned his lesson by suffering.  Along with the news of Sterett‟s victory, in his next 
letter to Washington Dale requested a larger force, so that at least four ships could maintain the 
blockade of Tripoli at all times.30  Dale replied to Cathcart‟s letter with confidence that, even 
though the President would have to make for Gibraltar for more food soon, the requested 
reinforcements from the United States could soon humble the bashaw. 
 Dale‟s situation in the area of supply still had not improved.  Because the Enterprize 
could not carry any quantity of water outside its own requirements, this ship could not keep the 
President on station by ferrying supplies as Dale‟s orders instructed.  When the President was 
forced to water at Malta, there were no other supplies to be had there.  Dale dispatched the 
Enterprize to Sicily to determine if supplies were available there.  Without a local supply he 
would be forced to quit his station by 10 September, little more than a month since arriving off 
Tripoli, and return to Gibraltar.31   
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Dale also wrote to representatives of the banking firm that the United States had 
employed to hold funds for the squadron.  Asking them to make arrangements with bankers in 
Toulon, Cartagena, and Syracuse (on the island of Sicily), Dale ensured that each of the captains 
in his widely dispersed squadron would be able to access those funds when needed.32  This action 
was certainly prudent, but it also suggests that Dale did not intend to consolidate his squadron off 
Tripoli in the near future, but rather considered it likely that it would remain dispersed 
throughout the Mediterranean.   
 Dale also attempted a bit of negotiation with the bashaw during his time on station off 
Tripoli.  Upon stopping a vessel that was trying to enter the harbor, Dale found on board a 
number of Tripolitans including merchants and soldiers.  Through Danish Consul Nissen, Dale 
tried to establish a rate of exchange for prisoners: those he just took for any Americans taken in 
the future.33  The bashaw‟s response was to propose opening discussions of a truce.  Dale, with 
no orders to make a truce, and having not picked up Consul Cathcart in Leghorn, refused, citing 
his lack of orders to make a truce.34  The bashaw, upon hearing this, declared he had little use for 
any of those men the Americans had captured, but later negotiations fixed the release of three 
Americans for the twenty-one Tripolitans.  Dale sent all the prisoners ashore along with a note 
which stated that the bashaw should not consider this a “President [sic] in any futer 
negoatiation.”35  Obtaining this rate of exchange was certainly not a victory for Dale.  Indeed, his 
early acquiescence to the bashaw‟s unequal proposal probably resulted from the shortage of food 
and lengthening sick list on his ship and his lack of patience with diplomatic matters. 
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 As the Enterprize and President ran out of stores, sickness spread among the crews.  On 2
 
September, Dale dispatched the Enterprize to Gibraltar by way of Malta, where Sterett was to 
pick up any American merchant vessels and escort them westward.36  The President left the next 
day “for want of Provisions, and Having Upwards of one Hundred men in the Doctors List.”37  
On his own way back to Gibraltar Dale stopped in Tunis.  There he left a message for Captains 
Bainbridge and Barron of the Essex and Philadelphia, requiring them, too, to proceed to the 
Rock, stopping in Leghorn to convoy waiting merchantmen.38  Meeting, on the way westward, 
the Enterprize, Dale sent the schooner into Algiers to pick up the dispatches of Consul O‟Brien 
there. 
 The Enterprize and President heading westward missed the Essex and Philadelphia 
heading to the east.  The two Tripolitan vessels in the harbor of Gibraltar had been running out of 
supplies.  Having been deprived of supplies by the British, the corsairs deserted in droves, and 
their leader, the high admiral of Tripoli, smuggled himself out of the port leaving his derelict 
vessels behind.  Captain Barron, considering his job to be finished since the enemy vessels were 
in no condition to leave port, sailed towards Tripoli.39  The Essex, which had finished convoying 
almost thirty merchantmen through the straits into the Atlantic, joined the Philadelphia on the 
journey east.  These two ships reached Tripoli on the morning of 28 September, one day after 
Dale anchored at Gibraltar, and left only two days later, not finding the commodore and supplies 
and sickness becoming a concern.40  It had taken eighty-seven days since arriving in the 
Mediterranean before these ships took up stations off Tripoli, and they stayed there for only two. 
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 Throughout his time in the Mediterranean, Commodore Dale walked a fine line in his 
dealings with foreign countries.  Several times Dale diffused situations or made decisions 
involving U.S. relations with European powers.  Off Gibraltar, Dale learned of a tense situation 
in the Spanish port of Algeciras.  Because the Spanish were at war with England, they took a dim 
view of any vessels putting in at Gibraltar.  Spanish gunboats and privateers, operating from 
Algeciras directly opposite Gibraltar, intercepted a number of American merchantmen intending 
to wait for convoy into the Mediterranean.41  Dale immediately wrote to the Spanish governor 
protesting against this treatment.  This letter predicted a negative response when Dale sent the 
news to the United States, which he warned he “shall lose no time in doeing.”42  Dale also wrote 
to the U.S. minister to Madrid, informing him of the incident, attributing it to Spanish frustration 
at the English blockade and that “the Governor has a particular Interest in the Privateers.”43  The 
Spanish even detained the ship chartered by the U.S. government to carry supplies for the 
squadron to Gibraltar for eleven days before releasing it.  Dale personally assured the Spanish 
governor that the ship carried nothing except supplies for the American squadron.44 
 This was not the end of the problems with the Spanish, however.  The privateers persisted 
in bringing in Americans bound through the strait on the pretext that they might stop in Gibraltar.  
Dale grew more and more impatient and continued to write letters to the U.S. minister to Madrid 
and to the Spanish officials.  He described the plight of Americans: 
Every encouragement is given to the Privatiersmen to bring into this place Every 
American Vessel they can capture.  When a Vessel is brought in here, there is no 
possibility of her getting away again, under one month: when the Governours Privatiers 
brings in any Vessels he is the Chief Judge of the Cause. … I think such conduct is a 
Direct Insult to the United States.45 
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 In his letters to the governor of Algeciras, Dale threatened to send news of these incidents 
both to Madrid and to the United States.  He also sought help from his counterparts in the 
Spanish Navy.  Spanish Captain John Atonio de Espino presided over the case of the detained 
supply ship, and Dale thanked him for his sense of justice in that case.46 
 In addition to detaining American ships, twice in the month of October a Spanish fort 
fired upon American merchantmen.  On 27 October, the fort hit a merchant brig twice, damaging 
its rudder.   A shot from the fort on an earlier occasion killed a seaman in similar circumstances.  
Dale‟s rage was clear in his letter to the governor, and concludes with a warning that, the next 
time, fire will be returned from his squadron, “let the consiquence be what it may.”47  After the 
governor reprimanded the commander of the Spanish fort, Dale wrote a more conciliatory letter, 
seeking to qualify an unfortunate use of the word savage as only applying to the men of the fort, 
and not to the whole Spanish nation.48  While none can fault Dale in this instance for getting 
angry, it was certainly unwise to compose a hasty and potentially insulting a letter to a Spanish 
governor.  With the ability of Spanish privateers and gunboats to effectively close the straits to 
Americans, the consequences of Dale retaliating as he threatened may have been more severe 
than he contemplated.  Temper aside, this incident illustrated Dale‟s pride in his own country.  
He later wrote, “I can never submit to see the flag of my Country Insulted in that way without 
resenting it,” a clear statement of his nationalism and determination.49 
Across the bay in Gibraltar, conflict nearly broke out with the English as well.  An 
American seaman deserted from the ship by swimming ashore.  When found and brought back in 
irons, he bribed the sentry watching over him and swam to shore again.  There he ran into two 
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American midshipmen on shore leave who recognized him.  Angry at being again apprehended, 
he began loudly berating one of them, John Trippe.  Suitably provoked, Trippe stabbed the 
seaman twice with his sword to subdue him.  The commotion attracted the guard, and the seaman 
then claimed to be a British sailor seeking protection.50  After the seaman was back on board, 
Dale reprimanded Trippe for his conduct and hoped that the situation would soon blow over.  It 
did not.  The senior British officer at Gibraltar demanded the seaman as a British subject, and 
when Dale refused, a small altercation took place.  After leaving Gibraltar, the seaman died, 
resulting in Trippe‟s arrest pending a court martial.51  Though Trippe was later acquitted, his 
actions, and those of Commodore Dale, could have caused serious repercussions.  While Dale 
does not elaborate on the small altercation that erupted, it may be imagined that his nationalistic 
temper was again aroused, and with a similar result.   
In a later incident, Dale behaved quite a bit better.  After receiving rumors that the 
Tripolitans had purchased several small armed vessels in Minorca, Dale headed there with the 
President.  His letter of inquiry to the governor focused on the positive relations of the two 
countries that the squadron had previously enjoyed, and his hope that there was no such 
transaction.52  Tunisians proved to be the purchasers of one large vessel, and the governor 
assured Dale that the British had sold no vessels to the state of Tripoli.53  This situation, like the 
earlier problems Dale faced, could have erupted into further difficulty considering the tenor that 
Dale used in some of his correspondence.  As the rumors proved unfounded, this situation 
proved less serious than those he encountered in the strait, but Dale did learn from his earlier 
struggles and improved his conduct.   
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Tripoli was, at this time, also at war with Sweden; Swedish citizens, hearing of the 
American squadron, desired cooperation.  Charles Iggestrom, a Swedish merchant, wrote to 
Commodore Dale asking if the Americans would look after his ships “and see the same, if 
possible or convenient to you, safe to their ports of destination, knowing that you command a 
sufficient Force to cruise all over those parts.”54  Dale certainly did not command a sufficient 
force to cruise the entire Mediterranean, or see each of Iggestrom‟s vessels safe to their ports, but 
some cooperation with Sweden, which had its own naval force en route to the Mediterranean, 
presented an opportunity to give the Americans more resources to fight Tripoli.  James Cathcart, 
evicted U.S. consul to Tripoli, had a negative opinion of cooperation with other powers, 
however.  “Our aim is to establish a National character, which we must do, without the 
assistance of any of the powers of Europe.”55  Dale seemed less high minded, and more mindful 
of the fact that one good turn may deserve another, when he expressed his willingness to “give 
Every protection in my power to the Sweedish Merchants Vessels, that I may meet with.”56   
Earlier, upon the squadron‟s first entry into the Mediterranean, when Dale ordered the 
Essex on convoy duty, he instructed Captain Bainbridge to convoy no vessels save Americans.57  
Captain Bainbridge, however, disobeyed this order and allowed a Swedish ship to sail in convoy 
from the port of Barcelona.58  Later during that cruise, another Swede and a Dane took advantage 
of the same convoy. 59  Bainbridge‟s actions may have violated Dale‟s instructions, but did not 
violate the spirit of the orders of the secretary of the navy who stressed that the squadron was to 
act in a friendly manner toward vessels of all nations, and that the United States wished 
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continued peace and harmony with everyone.60  Dale‟s reversal of opinion on this issue, one of 
the only in which he exceeded his orders, is a sign of his competence.  His own forces were too 
weak to turn down the possibility of gaining an ally; it would have been fool-hardy to do so, 
despite Cathcart‟s objections. 
In fact, Sweden dispatched a force of frigates to the Mediterranean after the king of 
Sweden refused to ratify the initial draft of a treaty worked out with Tripoli.61  They arrived in 
the Mediterranean after Dale and sent word through Consul Eaton that they intended to act in 
concert with the American squadron.62  Upon hearing this news, Dale excitedly agreed to the 
advantages of combined operations.  Planning to leave the Mediterranean before the winter as 
per his orders, Dale resolved to leave the Philadelphia and Essex on station until the next 
American squadron arrived.  The orders to Captains Bainbridge and Barron contained passages 
instructing them to include Swedish merchant vessels in their convoys, and Dale wrote that 
should he meet the Swedish commander: “I shall settle a plan of Co-operation with him, in such 
a way, that there will be little danger of the Merchant Vessels of either Nation being taken by the 
Tripoline Corsairs.”63  
Late in Dale‟s tenure as squadron commander, his earlier preparations in securing 
friendly relations with other ports became important.  The President, after striking a rock, put 
into Toulon.  Once there, it was a relatively simple matter of writing to his previous contacts in 
southern France to arrange for the vessel‟s repairs.64  Dale was so impressed with the help he 
received that he wrote to the firm controlling the squadron‟s finances thanking them for their 
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agents‟ actions.65  The ships that Dale left behind also benefited from these arrangements.  While 
Dale still intended to have the squadron‟s supplies deposited in Gibraltar, his efforts to secure 
friendly relations in a wide variety of ports provided valuable assistance to U.S. fleets throughout 
the Tripolitan War. 
While Dale‟s arrangements with financial and supply organizations were quite favorable, 
his relations with port officials in Toulon were no better than they were with those in Algeciras 
or Gibraltar.  The French imposed a quarantine of fifteen days, considered short and 
accommodating by those on shore, on the President.  Two officials, described by Dale as guards, 
came on board to enforce quarantine rules.  Dale refused to accept them, considering their 
presence an insult, and sent them ashore, only receiving them back when French naval officers 
came along-side to reassure him it was a common practice.66 Before this, however, Dale had 
already written a number of angry letters to various French and American officials in the 
neighborhood complaining of this mistreatment.   
Dale‟s orders, which instructed him to start for home by 1 December, did not allow him 
to spend his time worrying about other nations.  Now October, Dale had to make winter plans for 
the rest of his squadron.  He dispatched the Enterprize home early to deliver the summer‟s news 
to Washington.67  Included in the packet of dispatches entrusted to Lieutenant Sterett was Dale‟s 
recommendation to the secretary of the navy that both the Essex and Philadelphia should stay in 
the Mediterranean.68   Intending to finish the business of the tribute he was carrying for Algiers, 
Dale left Gibraltar for that port and left orders for each of the other frigates.  Contemplating little 
activity from the Tripolitans, Dale did not intend for the two frigates to relieve each other off 
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Tripoli, ensuring a constant presence off that harbor.  Instead, he ordered the Philadelphia to 
patrol off Tripoli, stopping frequently in Tunis, using Malta and Syracuse, Sicily, as points of 
supply.69  Dale instructed Essex to ply the waters around Gibraltar, offering the protection of 
convoy to American and Swedish merchant vessels in the western Mediterranean.70  Though with 
two frigates some amount of continuous blockade would be possible, Dale again chose a more 
passive course.   
While this may be another example of Dale‟s preference for defensive rather than 
offensive action, he noted in many different letters that he expected no trouble from Tripoli over 
the winter.  The winter weather made it difficult to safely maintain a blockade, as well as for the 
corsairs of Tripoli to patrol the seas.  Captain Alexander Murray, a member of the second 
squadron, confirmed this, later writing of the Tripolitan navy: “In the Winter Season they seldom 
venture out nor will it be safe for us to be on this station [off Tripoli] on that Season.”71  The 
summer‟s gentler winds not only gained strength, but also turned to blow out of the north.  
Freshening winds from that quarter threatened to blow blockading ships ashore rather than safely 
out to sea.  Dale finalized these orders, but before their news reached the United States, the 
secretary of the navy ordered Dale to sail for home and keep only two frigates in the 
Mediterranean.72  These orders seem to largely validate Dale‟s decision and reflect that no one 
contemplated danger from Tripolitan vessels for the duration of the winter.   
As has been mentioned previously, Dale chose to err on the side of caution in most of his 
decisions.  The exceptions, when Dale‟s impatience led him to dispatch flurries of nasty letters, 
he generally tempered in a few days.  Though cautious, Dale‟s actions were largely successful, 
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and advanced the American cause.  Dale was most cautious in his decisions on positioning his 
vessels.  He never committed all of his forces to a single course of action.  While this allowed the 
squadron to be active in many different roles, it prevented them from doing any one job, most 
notably the continuous blockade of Tripoli, completely.  Though this may seem overly timid, a 
scorecard of his successes suggests that this strategy was largely successful.  The Philadelphia’s 
presence forced the abandonment of Tripoli‟s two largest raiders in Gibraltar.  Enterprize bested 
another cruiser, the Tripoli, and sent it home a useless wreck.  The blockade, both the real one 
and Eaton‟s paper blockade which Dale eventually endorsed, caused shortages in Tripoli.  
Perhaps most impressively, the Tripolitans failed to capture a single American ship during Dale‟s 
tenure.  The best indicators of his effectiveness were the invitations by the bashaw of Tripoli to 
begin negotiating a treaty for peace.  With a few more ships, Dale certainly could have, and 
certainly would have, carried out a more complete blockade of Tripoli and undertaken all the 
other tasks as well. 
  In the area of supply, Dale‟s results were mixed.  Dale‟s use of the port of Gibraltar as a 
main supply base was not ideal for operations around Tripoli.  But because many of Dale‟s 
operations did not take place around Tripoli, Gibraltar was well suited as a port for much of his 
squadron.  In light of the conservative dispositions Dale chose for the squadron, the 
arrangements he made were quite good.  He visited both Malta and Syracuse, the ports most 
convenient to Tripoli, and established them as watering stations at least, also making contacts 
ashore.  Dale also established a line of credit for each of his ships that they could draw upon in 
numerous ports.  This system proved especially useful when the President struck a rock and 
required repairs.  Dale had simply to enter the nearest convenient port, call upon those persons he 
had prearranged to help the squadron, and the work on the ship began quickly. 
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While Dale refused to begin treaty negotiations with Tripoli, he did carry out negotiations 
of a more limited scope with numerous other nations.  Dale was certainly quick to anger when he 
felt the honor of the United States was being in any way impugned, and this is reflected in his 
correspondence.  The numerous issues with the Spanish, the incident of the deserter at Gibraltar, 
and the French quarantine all sparked some angry comment from Dale.  While his actions in 
these cases could be dismissed as those of a sailor who does not have the patience or subtlety 
required for negotiation, it must be remembered that all of these incidents resulted in Dale 
gaining his point.  The Spanish released the supply-ship and cashiered the commander of the fort 
who fired on the American merchants; the British did not force Dale to give up the American 
deserter or his assailant, and the fleet retained the ability to use Gibraltar; the French shortened 
the President’s quarantine from thirty days to fifteen.  Though luck undoubtedly assisted him in 
these situations, the simple sailor Dale acquitted himself well in these diplomatic situations. 
Of all the foreign powers that Dale dealt with, his most level-headed discourse concerned 
Sweden.  This was also the area of Dale‟s greatest success.  Beginning with a letter from a 
Swedish merchant, the relationship between the Americans and Swedes grew to a point where, 
by the time Dale left the Mediterranean, Swedish warships cooperated with the American 
squadron in convoying the merchant ships of both nations.  Dale even acted against the advice of 
Consul Cathcart in this instance, after considering the advantages to the squadron and American 
merchants outweighed the negative arguments.  Perhaps Dale‟s biggest miscue in the area of 
diplomacy was his failure to meet with Cathcart in Leghorn.  As the long-time American 
representative in Tripoli and a government representative authorized to begin treaty negotiations, 
Cathcart could certainly have been useful during the commodore‟s time off Tripoli. 
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 In all, Dale effectively carried the war with Tripoli forward during his time in command.  
This is in spite of the fact that Dale‟s ship, the President, did not engage the enemy.  
Commodore Dale‟s prudent judgment in his duties outside of combat, while not nearly as 
appreciated as the later military victories, was the most important factor in starting the United 
States down the road to victory in the Barbary Wars.  Many historians, however, lump Dale with 
his infamous successor, Richard Morris, as timid and ineffectual.73  To put Dale‟s service in the 
proper perspective it is important to remember that Dale sailed on a peaceful mission and arrived 
in a war zone.  The presence of the two Tripolitan vessels in Gibraltar immediately rendered his 
orders moot, even those sections which addressed war with Tripoli.  That Dale chose one of the 
more conservative paths available to him is true, but to suppose that this rendered his command 
ineffectual is not.  His record, considering his limiting orders and the small size of his squadron, 
was very favorable. 
With the President repaired, Dale sailed for the United States, reaching Norfolk on 14 
April 1802.74  Dale‟s efforts were widely recognized in his own time.  After a short rest at home 
Dale received an offer to command the next squadron, an offer he refused, instead tendering his 
resignation to retire on the revenue of his previous voyages as a merchant captain.75  Dale was 
the first naval officer in American history to command a squadron in the Mediterranean.  
Naturally for this capacity, his energies were devoted almost completely to pursuits outside of 
combat.  He corresponded with governors, diplomats, officers, and rulers in nearly every nation 
bordering the western Mediterranean.  He acted at all times for the good of his country and in the 
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interests of its people.  While some later commodores accomplished more, several did far less 
despite having larger forces, and no other commodore was so limited in his power.  Though he 
will always be rightly overshadowed by the actions of Preble and Decatur, Commodore Dale 
fully earned the epitaph that would be inscribed on his monument, “an honest man, an 
incorruptible patriot.”76
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CHAPTER 2: RICHARD MORRIS 
 As had been true of the first American squadron that entered the Mediterranean, the 
secretary of the navy offered command of the second to Thomas Truxtun, naval hero of the 
Quasi-War with France.  Accordingly, he took command of Chesapeake, one of the ships fitting 
out for the squadron.
1
  That same day, Richard Valentine Morris received orders to command the 
Constitution, a 44-gun frigate and sister to the President, Dale‟s flagship of the first squadron.2  
The Navy Department had earlier attempted to remove the conflicts of seniority that kept 
Truxtun from accepting duty with the first squadron.  A letter confirming him as fifth most 
senior of the ten captains then on the list expressed not only the hope of adding more officers, to 
maintain one as captain on a commodore‟s flagship, but also the hope that “the Rank of the 
respective Captains being now permanently arranged, … all will serve harmonously with and 
under each other when they shall be Called into actuate service.”3  Unfortunately, this hope 
proved to be in vain. 
 President Jefferson decided to dispatch a stronger force to the Mediterranean.  The 
second squadron was to be as large as possible, so large that it would require all of the captains 
currently on duty, leaving no one available to serve onboard a Commodore‟s ship.4  This second 
captain, called a flag captain, would be responsible for the daily operation of the ship, leaving the 
Commodore to concentrate on matters concerning the squadron.  The situation worsened when 
Captain Edward Preble, commander of the Adams, took ill and had to relinquish his command.
5
  
When Truxtun suspected he would probably lack a flag captain, he complained of having “much 
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trouble in organizing a squadron and at the same time attending all the duty in detail on board my 
own Ship.”6  Perhaps because of this sense of duty, or more likely because he was conscious of 
“having a reputation to lose,” Truxtun offered his resignation if he did not sail with a flag 
captain.
7
  It seems likely that Truxtun‟s intention was not to resign, but rather to gain his point, 
and he later accused President Jefferson of forcing him out of the service.
8
  Whether Truxtun 
meant it or not, Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith took Truxtun at his word, accepted his 
resignation, and appointed Morris in his place.  Morris took command of the Chesapeake, the 
new squadron‟s flagship, and assumed the rank of commodore.9 
 Richard Valentine Morris was from a politically active New York family.  Morris was 
not present on the list of ten captains earlier sent to Truxtun to clarify issues of rank, despite 
serving as captain of both the Adams and the New York during the Quasi-War.
10
 Though Morris‟s 
orders came from Secretary of the Navy Smith, the secretary was sufficiently lacking in power 
that the decision could well have come from Jefferson himself.  Whoever made the decision, it 
may have been politically influenced, because Morris had had an uneventful and short career in 
the navy thus far.  Morris‟s family was prominent Federalists, in opposition to Jefferson, but his 
brother Lewis Morris was one of the congressmen who abstained from voting against Jefferson 
in the House of Representatives during the disputed election of 1800.
11
  This action won 
Jefferson the election over Aaron Burr and presumably won the Morris family his esteem, 
though whether it is this that won Richard Morris the job is not at all certain.  Morris‟s previous 
naval experience consisted of command of the small frigate Adams and a small squadron during 
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the Quasi-War.  Though his squadron‟s record of captures was good, he received criticism from 
then Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert for a failure to communicate with his superiors 
and for his habit of too often calling his entire squadron to rendezvous in port.
12
 
 Morris was certainly not expecting to assume command of the entire squadron on short 
notice and must have been taken aback, if only momentarily.  He did, however, benefit from 
Dale‟s experience in the Mediterranean in significant ways.  First, the Jefferson government, on 
the strength of Dale‟s recommendation for reinforcement, decided to make an all out effort 
against Tripoli, bestowing both a reasonably large force and ample powers on Morris.  During 
his time in the Mediterranean, Dale felt his powers so limited that he had ordered his captains not 
to take prizes, with the result that, when the Enterprise captured a Tripolitan corsair, it was set 
free after being disarmed.  Congress, at the behest of the President, undertook to extend the next 
commodore‟s power beyond protecting American commerce.  Accordingly, on 6 February 1802, 
Congress gave Jefferson all the power necessary to prosecute an offensive war against Tripoli.
13
  
The act made it lawful for the president not only to employ the navy to take action to protect 
commerce, but also to allow the navy to “subdue, seize and make prize of all vessels, goods and 
effects,” of Tripoli.14  The president exercised this power, and sent new orders to the 
Mediterranean, changing Dale‟s original orders and expanding his powers.  Though these orders 
contained the usual caveats discouraging the commodore from offending any other nation, as 
well as the additional unhelpful requirements that prize vessels be sent to the United States and 
that prisoners of war not be retained (due to the expense), the American squadron was now fully 
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empowered to take prizes.
15
  The new directives arrived too late to assist Dale; Morris received 
these powers from the outset of his campaign. 
 Morris‟s orders also contained specific instructions outlining the goals of his campaign, 
and suggesting the most appropriate method: 
To effectuate the great object of maintaining a squadron in the Mediterranean, which is 
the protection of our commerce, we must use our best exertions to keep the enemy‟s 
vessels in port, to blockade the places out of which they issue, and prevent as far as 
possible their coming out or going in.… Convoy must be given to our vessels as far as it 
can be done consistently with the plan of blockading.
16
 
 
In stark contrast to the rambling instructions given to Dale, Morris‟s orders were direct.  The 
squadron‟s goal was commerce protection, but Secretary Smith made it clear that Morris should 
aggressively blockade Tripoli rather than provide escort for merchant convoys.  Indeed, Morris 
was only to guard convoys with vessels that were superfluous to the blockade.  If a blockade 
were tight enough, convoy protection itself would be superfluous, for no raiders could escape.  In 
a later letter, Secretary Smith put his instructions even more bluntly.  Morris‟s orders were “to 
proceed with the whole squadron under your command and lay off against Tripoli,” a very clear 
statement, indeed.
17
  Morris could have had no doubt at all about the mission given to his 
squadron: blockade Tripoli. 
 Of course, there were other considerations that would occupy some of the new 
commodore‟s time, the first of them financial.  In addition to the same London firm that handled 
the finances of Dale‟s squadron, Smith also gained a contact with a firm in the port of Leghorn 
(Livorno), Italy.
18
  These banks handled the large-scale financial dealings of the squadron, but 
each vessel‟s captain also had discretionary funds for any smaller expenses.  Though this seemed 
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a good system, the frigate Constellation received more than its share, and Morris was 
accountable for retaining this excess, some $4,800.
19
  As during Dale‟s tenure, Morris‟s supply 
ships received orders that sent them first to Gibraltar, where Morris could direct them to a more 
convenient port if he thought it prudent.  Learning from Dale‟s voyage, Secretary Smith advised 
Morris that both “economy and humanity” recommend “the establishment of a Hospital” for 
wounded or sick crewmen of the American squadron, the European establishments having a poor 
track record of successful recuperation.
20
  The location of the hospital, or even to establish one at 
all, he left to Morris‟s discretion as well. 
Morris also received orders concerning the negotiation of possible peace with Tripoli.  
The bashaw had evicted James Leander Cathcart, American consul to Tripoli, at the onset of war.  
Dale largely ignored Cathcart, but Morris was ordered to seek him out in Leghorn, and engage 
his services, as “the President conceives that the period has arrived when negotiations for peace” 
could begin.
21
  While Morris himself had no powers to negotiate personally, he and Cathcart 
were to engage to cooperate as much as possible.  It was thought that, by bringing both the fleet 
and a negotiator before Tripoli, in effect “Holding out the olive Branch in one hand and 
displaying in the other the means of offensive operations, may produce a peaceful disposition” in 
the bashaw.
22
  James Madison, as secretary of state for Jefferson, relayed these orders to 
Cathcart.  Madison instructed Cathcart that opening negotiations before Tripoli was humbled 
militarily would be injurious, especially if it involved payment.  “To buy peace of Tripoli is to 
bid for War with Tunis,” he explained, and perhaps Algiers in turn as well.23  So, in addition to 
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having orders that should force the bashaw to the bargaining table, Morris was also given, in 
Cathcart, the tool he needed to end the war completely, an advantage Dale lacked. 
 Though his orders seemed straightforward enough, Morris, of necessity for a commander 
on distant station, also received more than enough rope to hang himself.  “I shall not point out to 
you,” wrote Secretary Smith, “the ground you are to occupy in the execution of these 
instructions,” for “circumstances may arise to induce a frequent change in your position.”24  A 
reminder that the nation‟s merchants were in dire need of the squadron‟s protection accompanied 
this instruction.  Though Secretary Smith asserted blockade was the surest way to protect 
commerce, he did not repeat those instructions in this letter.  It is unfortunate that his final 
instructions did not contain a reiteration of the main task of his squadron, but Morris could still 
hardly fail to realize that blockade must be his object.  Smith also pointed out the second 
advantage that Morris would enjoy over Dale: the knowledge of Dale himself.  Smith believed 
that Dale‟s advice on all points relating to the first cruise “may serve you essentially in your 
future operations.”25 
In his letters to his successor, Dale outlined not only the current dispositions of his forces 
in the region, but also offered some very sound advice concerning military and extra-military 
affairs.  Foremost on the military side, Dale insisted that “it will be absolutely Necessary” for 
Morris to procure several gunboats and a bomb vessel.
26
  These small craft would have numerous 
benefits, especially in protecting the squadron from the enemy‟s own gunboats in a calm (when 
their oars could propel them while the lack of wind would render large vessels immobile).  
Additionally, Dale particularly suggested their use to tighten the blockade, which had previously 
failed to stop small coastal vessels that the larger American ships could not chase near shore.  In 
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light of the gunboats intended use inshore, and his assumption that the squadron would resume 
the blockade after the winter squall season, Dale also suggested that Morris find and hire a good 
pilot who knew the enemy coast.
27
 
 The rest of Dale‟s letter dealt with the extra-military functions that had engaged so much 
of his time in the Mediterranean.  He first recommended that Morris seek the service of Danish 
Consul Nicholas Nissen in Tripoli, who represented the Americans at the bashaw‟s court in 
Cathcart‟s absence.  Despite this recommendation, he had much less to say about negotiations 
with Tripoli directly, perhaps remembering the bashaw‟s obstinacy in his own talks.  Next, Dale 
apprised Morris that the United States had gained an ally, advising Morris to cooperate with the 
Swedes, especially for convoying the two countries‟ merchant vessels.28  Finally, Dale relayed 
the dispositions of the fleet then in the Mediterranean.  The Boston, just arrived from the United 
States, Dale instructed to patrol off Tripoli.  Both the Philadelphia and the George Washington 
would return home after the completion of one more round of convoy duty.  Last, the Essex, 
under Captain Bainbridge, would guard the two Tripolitan vessels still blockaded in Gibraltar 
until relieved by vessels of the second squadron.  Dale, who spent the winter in Marseille for 
repairs, sailed for home when “the President’s bottom [was] … fully as strong as before the 
accident.”29  Though he arrived before Morris‟ departure, inexplicably, the two never met.30  
Certainly Dale should bear some of the blame for this, but it is completely incredible that Morris 
forsook this opportunity to learn as much as he could before he assumed command. 
When Dale stopped at Gibraltar on his way home, he discovered another Barbary nation 
making war-like moves.  The emperor of Morocco sent a request to Dale through James 
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Simpson, American consul to Tangiers, to lift the blockade of the two Tripolitan vessels in 
Gibraltar Bay.
31
  The emperor wished to send the vessels back to Tripoli, disarmed but loaded 
with wheat for sale.
32
  Certainly, none of this was in the American interest, and Dale denied the 
request, explaining that Tripoli had brought this war upon itself, and that in any case the 
president needed to sign off on such a move.
33
  Dale even went so far as to suggest the consul 
personally visit the emperor to explain the situation because, he reasoned, the Moroccans “can do 
us more Injury than all the other powers put togeather,” for their ports opened straight to the 
Atlantic, facing the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar.
34
   
In the emperor‟s request, Dale saw impending trouble, and wrote to the secretary of the 
navy that “war with him is to be apprehended.”35  Enclosing copies of his correspondence on the 
subject to Morris, Dale suggested making every exertion to keep peace with Morocco, repeating 
his earlier warnings.
36
  Secretary Smith forwarded this correspondence, along with a letter 
supporting Dale‟s actions and sentiments, to Morris on 13 April.37  Upon returning home, Dale 
wrote that he had passed “every infermation in [his] possession,” to Morris.38  This information 
should have constituted a great advantage, especially considering the increased powers that 
Morris enjoyed.  After learning from the partial success of the first squadron, the United States 
now sent a commander with the knowledge, the military force, and orders empowering enough to 
win the Tripolitan War. 
Richard Valentine Morris‟s first action, nevertheless, lacked military zeal. Morris 
requested, and received, permission to carry Mrs. Morris on board his flagship, hardly an 
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indication that he intended to sail directly into action.
39
  Morris‟s flagship, Chesapeake, was the 
slowest of the squadron in preparing for sea, a process that each ship‟s captain undertook 
autonomously.  While Edward Preble recovered enough to assist in manning and fitting out the 
Adams, a recurrence of his illness left him unable to command it on an overseas cruise.
40
  
Captain Hugh Campbell replaced Preble, receiving his sailing instructions on 23 April.
41
  The 
other two vessels that initially made up the second squadron had already departed.  The 
Enterprise, victor over the Tripoli, returned home from Dale‟s squadron with dispatches and set 
sail to return to the Mediterranean, still under Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett‟s command, on 12 
February.
42
  Enterprise arrived at Gibraltar on 31 March where it encountered the Essex, still 
guarding the two enemy vessels in that harbor.
43
  The frigate Constellation, Captain Alexander 
Murray, left the United States in the middle of March, arriving in Gibraltar on 28 April, the day 
after Morris set sail from the United States.
44
  There Murray encountered both the Essex and 
Philadelphia, which was transiting the strait in the other direction.
45
  The core of Morris‟s 
squadron was thus roughly equal to that of the first: three frigates (Chesapeake, Constellation 
and Adams) and the schooner Enterprise. 
There were two other American vessels in the Mediterranean at this time worth 
mentioning, however.  After the winter storms closed in on Tripoli and made blockade nearly 
impossible, Dale‟s squadron proceeded homeward piecemeal.  The small frigate Boston, Captain 
Daniel McNeill, arrived in the Mediterranean to maintain the American presence there over the 
winter.  Upon meeting in Toulon, Dale ordered McNeill to patrol off Tripoli after stopping in 
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Tunis to carry dispatches to William Eaton, the consul there.
46
  Though McNeill did eventually 
arrive off Tripoli, his journey was not without some irregularity.  Upon arriving in the 
Mediterranean, McNeill left Malaga, Spain, so precipitously as to leave “behind his third and 
Fourth Lieut., Lieut. of Marines, Purser, Pursur‟s Steward, Wardroom Steward, and two Boys.”47  
As if to prove this earlier misadventure was no fluke, the Boston departed Toulon with three 
French dinner guests aboard, who later had to hire return passage back from Tunis.
48
  John 
Johnson, a marine officer aboard Boston, confirmed McNeill‟s interesting character.  In addition 
to having his men call him commodore, rather than captain, McNeill‟s “regulations and orders 
are different from any I have ever heard of,” Johnson wrote.49  Morris‟s orders allowed him to 
retain one vessel of the first squadron if he felt it necessary.
50
  The periods of enlistment for the 
crews of Dale‟s original vessels were running short, making Boston the logical choice.  Despite 
this, and in keeping with the character of Captain McNeill, he never attempted to make contact 
with Morris, and made only incidental contact with any ship of the second squadron.
51
  
 Boston shared its winter patrol off Tripoli with the Gloria, a private ship hired by Consul 
Eaton.  Despite having neither the authority nor the money to do so, Eaton hired Gloria to cruise 
in the government‟s service, sending it off to McNeil on 24 March.52  The Gloria, while 
prosecuting Eaton‟s private (though publicly funded) war, did later bump into Captain Murray 
and the Constellation at Gibraltar.  Murray promptly put an end to Gloria’s cruise, telling its 
captain to go his own way, and that Gloria was “no longer to be considered as on public 
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expences.”53  Despite the questionable legality of Eaton‟s hiring a vessel into public service, it is 
unfortunate that Murray so precipitately ended Gloria’s naval career because Morris had both the 
funds and the authorization to obtain the small vessels needed to maintain a tight blockade.  
Though the loss of the services of the Boston and the Gloria represent an opportunity missed, the 
fault could hardly lie with Morris. 
Despite Captain McNeill‟s shortcomings in the areas of communicating with his 
superiors and misplacing dinner guests, he did proceed to Tripoli and remained there until forced 
away by a lack of supplies.    Boston captured four small coasting vessels carrying grain into the 
harbor, which the bey of Tunis later claimed as Tunisian.
54
 The Enterprise, first vessel of the 
second squadron to arrive, also appeared off Tripoli. Sterrett accompanied the Swedish vessels 
still patrolling those waters, helping to deny the entry of at least one other Tunisian vessel.
55
  
Enterprise also assisted Boston and the Swedes in driving a Tripolitan vessel ashore and 
exchanged shots with Tripolitan gunboats when they ventured out of the harbor.
56
  After running 
short of supplies, however, Sterrett too left Tripoli. The squadron‟s staggered departure and the 
gap between Dale‟s departure and Morris‟s arrival left the Americans without a coherent 
presence or plan.  With no relief available, Enterprise left the blockade to the Swedes.
57
 
The Constellation, the first heavy ship of the second squadron to arrive at Gibraltar, 
needed supply before assuming its station.  Crews of the home-bound Philadelphia and Essex 
assisted in watering, while Captain Murray bustled back and forth across Gibraltar Bay asking 
both the Spanish and British for anchors to replace the two he had lost in transit.
58
  Meeting with 
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no success, Murray instead borrowed one from the Philadelphia.
59
  By 11 May, the Constellation 
was ready to proceed east, and did so.
60
  Stopping at both Algiers and Majorca on his way, 
Captain Murray arrived in Tunis on 28 May to top off his supplies and gain the latest news from 
Tripoli.  In Tunis, Murray met the Enterprise, which he sent west to convoy merchantmen.
61
  Off 
Tripoli, Constellation briefly joined Boston before both ships again departed to resupply.  
Captain Murray turned Constellation toward Malta and ordered Captain McNeill to seek the rest 
of the squadron.
62
  Instead, McNeill shaped a circuitous course around the Mediterranean and 
eventually back to the United States without meeting Commodore Morris. 
After resupplying, Constellation maintained an off and on blockade of Tripoli throughout 
the summer of 1802.  Alone, save for intermittent Swedish assistance, this effort at single-ship 
blockade proved to be as ineffective as Dale‟s.  Several times, as on 22 July, Captain Murray 
chased gunboats back into harbor, but captured or destroyed none.
63
  Despite Murray‟s claim to 
have maintained a “close blockade,” the barrier proved porous enough that Murray even 
contradicted himself in the same report when he stated, “We cannot keep those small Galleys in 
Port.”64  In fact, the situation was worse than Murray suspected.  The gunboat action of 22 July 
distracted Murray from a corsair escorting the first American prize of the war into Tripoli harbor.  
The Tripolitans had captured the American brig Franklin in June and stopped in both Algiers and 
Tunis before entering Tripoli, “in view of a Swedish and American Frigate, who never made the 
least effort to obstruct” the path into the harbor.65  As proved by the first squadron, and feared by 
the planners of the second, one or two ships on blockade were insufficient to keep Tripoli at bay. 
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Not even Morris‟s outbound voyage went as planned.  The Chesapeake, mainmast sprung 
and ballast inefficiently stowed, made a laborious and uncomfortable voyage that ended in 
Gibraltar on 25 May.
66
  Commodore Morris encountered more Moroccan ire while dockworkers 
replaced Chesapeake’s mast.  The emperor of Morocco declared again that he had purchased the 
Tripolitan vessels blockaded in Gibraltar and wished to use them to transport surplus grain to 
Tripoli.  James Simpson, the American consul in Tangiers, rejected this plan as “pointedly 
opposite to the law of nations.”67  Though Chesapeake was ready to sail within two weeks, 
Morris elected to remain at Gibraltar and watch the Moroccan situation. 
Without news of any other members of his squadron, Morris relieved the Essex of 
blockade duty, dispatching that ship back to the United States.  Along with the Essex, a perfectly 
capable warship that already happened to be on station, Morris sent a letter requesting 
reinforcements.
68
  Staying in Gibraltar was clearly outside the spirit of Morris‟s orders, which 
instructed him to push on to Tripoli.  If he regarded the Moroccan situation as serious enough to 
do that, then surely he could have used that same extenuating circumstance to retain the Essex at 
least until the arrival of the Adams.  This would have afforded Morris the ability to take 
Chesapeake to Tangiers where he could negotiate directly with Simpson and the Moroccans.  
Instead, he blockaded a deserted and disarmed Tripolitan squadron while he contemplated the 
possibility of war with Morocco, a nation which at the time possessed not a single ocean-going 
vessel of war.
69
  Two weeks later, the Moroccans evicted Simpson and declared war, forcing 
Morris into convoying American vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar, guarding them against 
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Moroccan gunboats.
70
  The fortuitous arrival of the Enterprise from the east and the Adams from 
the west allowed for some concentration of American force by the end of July, just as the 
Moroccans finished outfitting ocean-going raiders, and facilitated the return of Simpson to 
Morocco to begin negotiations.
71
  The presence of the American squadron, and the additional 
promise of one hundred gun carriages as a gift, were enough to persuade the emperor that peace 
was the preferable option.  He sent word of the peace to Consul Simpson on 6 August.
72
 
Since arriving in Europe, Morris had spent two weeks repairing his vessel, two weeks 
blockading Gibraltar as American relations with Morocco teetered on the edge, and two weeks 
convoying American vessels.  Upon the Adams’s arrival, Morris left Gibraltar unguarded, and 
the presence of these two frigates was enough to bring Morocco to heel.  A force of two frigates, 
the Chesapeake and Essex, was available weeks before and could, perhaps, have averted the 
whole crisis.  Then, when war did finally erupt, rather than proceeding direct to Tangiers, Morris 
chose to establish a convoy system, the very measure that his orders labeled as unsuited for 
success.  Referring to the slow pace of diplomatic correspondence with the United States, the 
emperor, in his offer of peace wrote, “what has happen‟d to you now, has been occasioned by 
your own tardiness and neglect.”73  He could have, however, just as reasonably been describing 
the Morris‟s actions.  The brief Moroccan war did lead to one positive result: the dispatch from 
America of another frigate, the New York, under the command of James Barron, veteran of the 
first squadron.
74
 
With the end of the Moroccan scuffle, and in accordance with his orders, Morris finally 
headed toward Tripoli.  Against the advice of those orders, however, Morris left Adams behind at 
                                                 
70
 Richard Morris to Secretary of the Navy, 26 June 1802, in Naval Documents II: 185. 
71
 James Simpson to Secretary of State, 27 July 1802, in Naval Documents II: 211. 
72
 Mohamet Ben Absalem Selawy to James Simpson, 6 Aug. 1802, in Naval Documents II: 226. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Secretary of the Navy to Richard Morris, 13 Aug. 1802, in Naval Documents II: 232. 
  
47 
 
Gibraltar to watch the Tripolitan vessels there, taking only the Enterprise.
75
  Captain Murray of 
the Constellation, having experienced the blockade himself, awaited the commodore at Malta, 
unsatisfied with the way things were going.  Like Dale, Murray had been frustrated while on 
station by the lack of “small Brigs, & Schooners, that can lay close in with the Land.”76  Of 
additional concern was the onset of winter, which last year had rendered blockade on the 
Tripolitan coast impossible.  In addition, while at Malta, Murray attended an interesting meeting 
with Hamet Karamanli, the deposed former ruler of Tripoli, elder brother of Bashaw Yusef.  
Cooperation with Hamet, in Murray‟s eyes “the Legal Bashaw of Tripoli,” was “certainly a 
desirable object,” especially considering Hamet‟s promise to raise a large army in the Tripolitan 
hinterlands that could march on the capital.
77
 
Murray was certainly not the first American to take notice of the divided house of 
Karamanli or the potential of reinstalling a friendlier leader in Tripoli.  Hamet had become, and 
would remain, the pet project of William Eaton, consul to Tunis.  Eaton, pondering the 
usefulness of Hamet concluded “that we may use him as an instrument of pacification at 
Tripoli,” for “his subjects desire his restoration.”78  James Cathcart, former consul at Tripoli, 
agreed with Eaton enthusiastically.  Securing Hamet‟s help, thought Cathcart, “will not only be 
the means of our concluding peace upon our own terms but will in a great measure insure its 
permanency.”79  Both Eaton and Cathcart plotted not to simply support Hamet as a bargaining 
chip, but rather to depose Bashaw Yusef, inserting Hamet in his place.  Accordingly, Eaton 
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persuaded Hamet in the spring of 1802 to move to Malta rather than to accept a position offered 
by Yusef in the city of Derne, Tripoli‟s largest eastern port.80   
Eaton wrote to both Morris and Secretary of State James Madison, expounding the 
virtues of his plan in language often excessive and sometimes vitriolic.  Declaring Hamet the 
solution to American problems and criticizing the navy, he preserved his choicest phrases for 
Captain Murray of the Constellation: “Government may as well send out Quaker meeting-houses 
to float about this sea as frigates with Murrays in command.”81  While criticizing the excessive 
expenditures and lazy lifestyles of the American squadron, Eaton did not hesitate to provide 
Hamet with significant funds drawn on the credit of the United States government.
82
  When 
finally apprised of Eaton‟s plan, Madison allowed the scheme to go forward.  In letters to 
Cathcart and Eaton the secretary of state wrote that “although it does not accord with the general 
sentiments or views of the United States, … it cannot be unfair.”83  While wishing Eaton success 
in his scheme, Madison remitted no money for its prosecution.   
While waiting for Morris‟s arrival in the central Mediterranean, both Eaton and Cathcart 
dispatched critical letters to the United States.  Though he certainly knew his letters to the United 
States could not return in so short a time, and was apprised of the problems with Morocco, 
Eaton‟s tone grew histrionic:  “My exile is become insupportable here.  Abandoned by my 
countrymen in command; no advice from government to regulate my conduct; … I am left 
subject, though not yet submissive, to the most intolerable abuse and personal vexation.”84  
Cathcart, trying to escape naval influence, wrote a letter on the same subject that, while more 
blunt, was at least less filled with self-righteousness and self-pity.  He requested that Madison 
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provide a dividing line between the duties of the consuls and the naval officers, to save the 
consul‟s power from “the caprice of every gentleman who may command our vessels of War.”85   
The secretary of state, however, at this same time saw the issue differently.  Not only did 
Madison refuse to provide Eaton with funding, leaving Morris the only American with a 
discretionary budget in the Mediterranean, but he also conferred even more power on the 
commodore.  Through the secretary of the navy, Morris gained the power to negotiate personally 
with the bashaw.  This put him on an equal footing with Cathcart in diplomatic power and ahead 
of Eaton, whom Secretary Smith listed as not “an authorized agent of the government.”86  This 
same letter provided the good news that in addition to the New York, another small frigate, the 
John Adams (not to be confused with the Adams) would also join the squadron.  Morris, off to a 
rocky start, now had a chance to heed his original orders and start on a path toward success.  
Inhibited by the staggered sailing times of his squadron, Morris was unable to unite his vessels.  
Now, however, the Chesapeake and Enterprise were bound east to rendezvous with 
Constellation, a reasonable collection of force.   
The lateness of the season dictated that to exploit his new powers and newly combined 
squadron, these advantages would have to be pressed immediately.  Morris hesitated again.  With 
the stormy winter season approaching, when sailing to Tripolitan shores became impractical and 
keeping station off the port impossible, Morris took no decisive action.  Squandering his 
concentration of force, Morris dispatched the Constellation to Gibraltar on escort duty via 
Toulon for minor repairs.
87
  Despite this, in a report to the secretary of the navy, Morris still 
wrote that “a formidable force is the only means by which peace can be procured with Tripoli,” 
and planned to wait for his reinforcements, and through the winter season, before taking the 
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offensive.
88
  Squandering the possibility of using Hamet to his advantage, Morris told the ex-
bashaw that he lacked the authorization for even a meeting, though he would certainly forward 
Hamet‟s requests to the United States.89  Hamet, succumbing to pressure from Tripoli, accepted 
the post as governor of Derne, leaving Malta and the reach of the American squadron.
90
  Another 
advantage slipped away during this period as well.  Just before the winter squalls set in, the 
Swedes concluded a separate treaty with Tripoli, ending the possibility of cooperation.
91
  Even 
Morris‟s only real success of his first summer in command, pacifying Morocco, unraveled as his 
squadron sat in port. 
To ease American relations with Morocco after the brief hostility, Consul Simpson 
finally agreed to grant a passport for the former Tripolitan vessel Meshouda, in port at 
Gibraltar.
92
  Though the passport still denied the Meshouda the right to enter Tripoli itself, it left 
the ship free to leave Gibraltar, and certainly rendered the American blockade of Gibraltar 
unnecessary.  Despite this, Captain Campbell and the Adams remained on station though he was 
aware of Meshouda’s passport.93  There the Adams would remain to the detriment of Moroccan 
relations.  Meshouda’s commander, believing the Adams would try to capture him, refused to 
leave port, instead writing to the Moroccan secretary of state, who in turn sent complaints to 
Consul Simpson.  This caused enough new tension that Simpson requested that a navy vessel 
remain on station continuously.
94
  In this way, the unnecessary presence of the Adams created 
new tension, necessitating the frigate‟s continued presence in the straits and away from the rest 
of the squadron. 
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Relations among the men in the fleet were deteriorating as well.  As the squadron sat in 
port, boredom set in.  Even Morris himself, in one of his infrequent reports, admitted that 
“nothing of importance has transpired in this quarter.”95  Even eighteen year old Midshipman 
Henry Wadsworth ran out of things to do on shore, writing in his diary, “we left Livonine with as 
much pleasure as we enter‟d it, for 20, or 30 days will generally satiate us with any place.”96  
Before leaving Italy for Gibraltar, the Constellation sustained numerous desertions, and would 
suffer an even greater loss.
97
  Captain McKnight, commander of Constellation’s marines, had 
long been feuding with naval Lieutenant Richard Lawson.  The two fought a duel ashore in 
Leghorn, resulting in McKnight‟s death, and Lawson‟s return to the United States under arrest.98  
This was not the last the squadron saw of dueling.  At the end of the long winter, the newly 
arrived New York was waiting for the squadron to assemble in Malta.  One of its midshipmen 
fought a duel with an Englishman on shore there, resulting in the Englishman‟s death and a 
worsening of relations with Malta‟s governor.99  Later in spring, two more of New York’s junior 
officers engaged in a duel that resulted in the death of one.
100
  In the absence of even attempting 
a blockade, Morris should have had the squadron busy preparing for service the next summer 
with drills and exercises at least.  Morris did not cause these deadly arguments, but he certainly 
provided the young officers of his squadron with enough time to pursue their arguments. 
The relations between the American diplomats in the Barbary ports were also 
deteriorating.  After the capture of their ship, the crew of the Franklin awaited release in Tripoli.  
Both Cathcart, still consul to Tripoli though evicted, and Eaton, closest to Tripoli in Tunis, 
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sought the crew‟s release.  Foreign diplomats secured the first successes, however, the British 
forcing the release of three Irish crewmen and the French obtaining the freedom of two more 
crewmen who claimed to be Frenchmen.
101
  Richard O‟Brien, American consul to Algiers, also 
applied for the freedom of the rest of the crew with the help of the Algerine government.  Eaton 
believed that the Americans should settle their dispute without foreign assistance, and actually 
wrote to the bashaw of Tripoli in an attempt to scupper O‟Brien‟s plan: 
The Dey of Algiers has ordered your Ex‟y [Excellency] to give up the Americans, and 
that your Ex‟y dare not disobey the order.  But as we remember your Ex‟y complained of 
the intervention of that Dey in our treaty of peace ... we cannot suppose the Dey‟s 
interference in the present case can be pleasing ... it would suit better both ... of the 
parties that all our negociations should be direct and without the intervention of any other 
power.
102
 
 
Cathcart also preferred a different avenue to release the prisoners.  He reminded both Morris and 
his contacts in Tripoli that the bashaw had agreed to release the first prisoners he captured as an 
exchange for Tripolitan prisoners already released by Dale.
103
  Nevertheless, it was the Algerines 
at the behest of O‟Brien who achieved success.104  Cathcart believed that this action, because 
O‟Brien made a payment to grease the wheels of the transaction, “only served to Embarrass our 
affairs.”105  Apprised of the captive‟s release, Eaton fumed that he was out of the loop, learning 
from a Jewish merchant rather than a fellow consul, “the information comes to him by express – 
I receive no letters!”106 
  More unfortunately, waiting through the winter cost Morris nearly half of his squadron.  
In late October 1802, the secretary of the navy required the return of both Constellation and 
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Chesapeake, requiring Morris to choose one of the newly arrived frigates for a new flagship.
107
  
The message arrived at Gibraltar with the John Adams just after the Constellation arrived from 
the east.
108
  Morris began concentrating his force in Malta at this time, and had requested that 
Murray meet him there with as many supplies as he could carry.
109
  After learning that his ship 
had orders for home, however, Murray set out to the west and, instead of supplies, sent only his 
regards to the Commodore‟s wife.110 
American relations with Tunis worsened as the winter wore on.  The bey, in person to 
Eaton and in a letter to President Jefferson, renewed an earlier request for a warship as a part of 
his tribute.
111
  This was the last straw for Eaton, who demanded relief, citing his weariness of 
“exile and fruitless exertion.”112  Perhaps the only bright spot for the squadron early in the year 
of 1803 was the capture of a prize, once again by Andrew Sterett and the Enterprise.
113
  
Unfortunately, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the bey claimed the small 
merchantman was Tunisian and denied that the vessel, though headed to Tripoli, was subject to 
the American blockade.  The Tunisians applied to Eaton for redress which led to further 
paroxysms of complaint from Eaton, who requested an American naval presence to quiet the 
bey‟s protests.114  Like Morocco the year before, it appeared that Tunis would vie for Morris‟s 
attention to the detriment of the effort against Tripoli. 
At the end of January, with the storms beginning to abate, Morris dispatched the 
Enterprise to Tunis to announce the squadron‟s imminent arrival as the rest of the squadron 
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shaped course for Tripoli for the first time.
115
  The event proved to be so memorable for its 
uniqueness that Midshipman Wadsworth (indeed everyone) disregarded the fact that the most 
useful ship in the squadron for shallow-water blockade was headed elsewhere, instead writing, 
“ye Tripolitans beware, for the Chesapeak, Newyork & John Adams are coming towards ye in 
battle array.”116  The gales, however, still proved strong enough to make the squadron‟s stay off 
Tripoli short and unproductive, at which point they turned toward Tunis.  There, Commodore 
Morris engaged in his first real attempt at diplomacy with a Barbary nation.  In Morocco, Consul 
Simpson had taken the lead, but the Tunisian court‟s conviction that Eaton was mad forced 
Morris to take charge. 
Morris‟s first move was suitably naive.  In his first letter to the bey, Morris wrote, “when 
Your Excellency is made acquainted with the facts relative to that capture, You will acquiesce,” 
and “will see the propriety of cautioning your Subjects from having any mercantile transactions 
with the Enemies of the United States.”117  The bey, whose economy relied upon taking money 
from foreign powers, apparently lacked the propriety to acquiesce, and demanded that a Tunisian 
court ascertain the validity of the prize.
118
  After agreeing to this request and providing a gift of 
gunpowder (to a nation threatening to declare war on the United States), Morris reported ashore 
with the prize‟s papers to make his case.119  The court, consisting of the bey and his ministers, 
ruled that most of the ship‟s property was Tunisian.  Disgusted with the process but feeling 
unable to do more, Morris guaranteed the return of the cargo in question and prepared to leave. 
Not wanting to let such an easy mark escape, the bey found another charge to add to the 
bill.  Morris was unable to understand that his earlier concession simply “paved the way for ... 
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additional demands,” illustrating his want of skill and experience.120  Eaton had finally decided 
to leave, but the bey declared that his debt, more than $30,000, all of which he had borrowed in 
the name of the United States, must be paid before Eaton departed.
121
  More troubling, the bey 
detained the commodore himself, as a representative of the United States, on shore until the debt 
was settled.  Even after selling all his property, Eaton still owed a balance of $22,000, and 
Morris left Cathcart and Captain John Rodgers of the John Adams ashore as insurance while he 
returned to the Chesapeake to arrange payment.
122
  Morris paid the debt, collected Captain 
Rodgers and the consuls, and left Tunis on 10 March, thoroughly bested.
123
 
Morris next sailed to Algiers, where Consul O‟Brien also wished to retire.  Secretary of 
State Madison appointed Cathcart to that post, but the Algerines refused to have him.
124
  The 
Algerines would accept no accommodation, for which Cathcart blamed O‟Brien, and the fleet 
left Algiers for Gibraltar.
125
  Morris transferred his flag to New York and sent the Chesapeake 
home, dispatching the Adams and John Adams on convoy duty.
126
  Once more, with his forces 
united, Morris chose to break them up, this time on convoy duty around the Mediterranean, 
against his orders.  He set out himself, with the New York and Enterprise, toward Tripoli.
127
  
Now authorized to negotiate personally, Morris transferred Cathcart to the Adams, which carried 
him back to Italy.  While one can imagine that his strong convictions may have made him a poor 
companion, Cathcart, who explained the situation by claiming, “my presence at the negotiation 
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might diminish his [Morris‟s] share of the glory,” could have provided some of the negotiating 
experience that Morris so prominently lacked.
128
 
Another unfortunate accident, however, meant that negotiations, at least for a short while, 
were unlikely.  Sailing to the eastward, some of the New York’s store of gunpowder exploded on 
the morning of 25 April.
129
  In light of the resulting damage, the death of the gunner and the 
commodore‟s secretary and clerk, Morris decided to head once again for Malta.130  After 
fulfilling his convoy duties, Captain John Rodgers of the John Adams arrived at Tripoli in 
expectation of finding the commodore.  Despite the squadron‟s absence, the more energetic 
Rodgers elected to remain on station, frequently exchanging shots with the Tripolitan gunboats 
and out-lying batteries.
131
  Like each of the one-frigate blockades of the past, John Adams was 
unable to close the port or even to closely engage the main fortifications.  The blockade did 
produce one prize, which turned out to be a familiar old foe, the Meshouda, bound into Tripoli 
from Gibraltar.
132
  With their prize in company, the John Adams met the rest of the squadron in 
Malta where close examination found “a number of Guns Cutlashes Hemp & other contraband 
articles” hidden on board Meshouda.133  Commodore Morris, though he did write to Consul 
Simpson, correctly decided that with three vessels of the squadron gathered, the moment was 
right to proceed to Tripoli. 
The blockade was far from uneventful.  Indeed, on the first day the squadron arrived, 22 
May, they succeeded in running an enemy ship on shore as it attempted to gain access to the 
harbor.
134
  Soon the Adams arrived too, uniting the full squadron off Tripoli.
135
  Skirmishes 
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between the squadron and Tripolitan gunboats and shore batteries continued, but Morris sought 
to end the war more quickly.  He took advantage of Dale‟s contacts with Danish Consul Nissen 
to initiate negotiations.
136
  Even the negotiations for the truce to start real negotiations went 
poorly; Morris conceded that any negotiations would take place ashore, and even guaranteed the 
safety of any raiders that returned during the talks.
137
  The bashaw‟s demands proved so onerous 
that, after only one night on shore, the Commodore returned to the fleet.
138
  Soon afterward, and 
after only nineteen days on station, the New York sailed north to Malta, leaving the John Adams 
to carry on another stint of solo blockade.
139
  Though his orders required him to humble the 
enemy before negotiating a peace, Morris chose to begin without any offensive action, ensuring 
his failure.  There can be no acceptable explanation for Morris leaving the blockade after such a 
short time.  Thwarted in his efforts to negotiate a peace, Morris abandoned the blockade without 
undertaking any of the sort of offensive action that could have rendered the bashaw more 
compliant.   
Appropriately, it was as Morris was sitting idly in Malta that Secretary Smith drafted the 
order for his recall.  The orders instructed Morris to transfer to the Adams to return home, 
leaving command of the squadron to Captain Rodgers, though it would be months before this 
news reached the squadron.
140
  The more aggressive Rodgers remained off Tripoli until he ran 
out of supplies, destroying a large Tripolitan cruiser during this time.
141
  The squadron re-united 
at Malta at the end of June, taking the rest of the summer to convoy American merchantman up 
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the Italian coast.
 142
 Not only did Morris use the entire squadron to accomplish what a single ship 
could have, he left Tripoli unguarded.  The squadron spent the remainder of the summer 
occupied with similar operations until Morris finally received his notice of recall in Gibraltar.
143
  
In accordance with those orders, Morris sailed for home in the Adams, putting an end to the 
longest and most unproductive tenure of any American commodore in the Barbary Wars. 
Surprisingly, Morris‟s recall shocked some of those serving under him.  While recording 
that there were some “discontented officers under his [Morris‟s] command,” Midshipman 
Wadsworth exclaimed, “damnation! could they treat a Malefactor worse: had he basely fled from 
Battle: had he cowardly shrunk from fight – could they have taken a step more mortifying, 
condemn him unheard, unseen.”144  Others, slightly further removed, still sought to excuse some 
of Morris‟s actions.  James Fennimore Cooper, in his history of the early navy, recorded that the 
commodore‟s recall and later dismissal “has generally been considered high-handed and 
unjust.”145  Nevertheless, after returning home, Morris‟s explanations of his conduct proved 
unsatisfactory to Secretary Smith, who convened a court of inquiry that ended in his official 
censure.  President Jefferson himself dismissed Morris from the service.
146
 
While this action may have been extreme, it was certainly not unjustified.  Upon first 
arriving in the Mediterranean Morris, like Dale, faced numerous challenges: the staggered 
arrivals of his ships, problems with Morocco, missing the Boston, and his slow start is almost 
excusable.  Though he had, and missed, a few chances to deal with the Moroccan situation 
quickly, he was not remiss in securing his supply line against the Moroccans.  In fact, this 
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initiation to the theater excused Morris‟s inaction that first summer in Cooper‟s eyes, who 
instead believed the fault “rested more with those who directed the preparations at home.”147  
Despite the staggered arrival of the squadron, at the end of the summer of 1802, Morris did have 
his initial force concentrated in Italy.  With reinforcements already in the Mediterranean and 
weeks of good sailing weather ahead, Morris blatantly disobeyed his orders, dispatching his 
squadron piecemeal on blockade duty.  The blame for this action can fall on no shoulders other 
than Morris‟s. 
Whether his actions that first summer were defensible or not, his actions during the 
sailing season of 1803 were inexcusable.  The combined squadron spent only nineteen days in 
front of Tripoli.  Of that short span, Morris wasted six of those days under truce during fruitless 
negotiations that could have had no hope of success.  The business preceding the squadron‟s stint 
off Tripoli was hardly more credible: fruitless negotiations with Tunis and an out of the way trip 
to Gibraltar.  Even when he was on station, Morris‟s blockade was porous.  Though authorized to 
purchase or hire smaller vessels that could operate inshore and tighten the blockade, Morris 
failed to do so.  This illustrates not only Morris‟s ineffectiveness, but also the importance all the 
time Morris wasted during the stormy season.  Morris sat in port most of the winter and failed to 
arrange gunboats for the squadron‟s use, failed to have supplies brought to a forward port, and 
failed to address the diplomatic situation in Tunis before he should have been off Tripoli.   
There is little question that, if any of the squadron encountered the enemy, victory would 
have resulted.  The superior training and force of the Americans, who certainly did not lack for 
bravery, made the outcome of any even-matched combat almost certain.  Indeed, few seem to 
have doubted even the commodore‟s courage, and he even maintained the loyalty of his officers.  
But any success in battle is contingent on battle being waged at all, and the end result of Morris‟s 
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inaction in his duties outside of combat was to render action unlikely.  Those successful actions, 
such as the destruction of the grain ships and Tripolitan corsair and the capture of the Meshouda, 
resulted from luck and the individual actions of commanders such as Captain Rodgers and 
Lieutenant Sterrett. 
Many chroniclers of the United States Navy, and even the Barbary Wars, reduce Morris‟s 
time in the Mediterranean to a sentence or two, condemning him as useless.  This view is just as 
biased with misunderstanding as that of Morris‟s officers who defended him.  Suggesting that 
Morris spent “more time ... at dances and balls at various European ports than in the choppy 
waters off Tripoli,” or that he took a “languid tour of Southern European ports,” is exaggerated, 
certainly, but not entirely false.
 148
  Not false, but it does illustrate the lack of regard that modern 
historians have for the necessary, but mundane, duties of a commodore, many of which could be 
accomplished while not on station.   
The clear truth is that Morris failed because of his inability to take decisive and 
aggressive action in duties ranging from hiring gunboats to finding supplies east of Gibraltar.  
What‟s more, he failed despite the advantages of wide-ranging powers and a force that, at some 
points during his command, was considerably stronger than Dale‟s.  Secretary of the Navy 
Robert Smith wrote perhaps the most appropriate critique of Morris‟s actions.  His will be the 
final words, for they neatly assess Morris‟s time in the Mediterranean.  Morris‟s failure “is to be 
ascribed, not to any deficiency in personal courage on the part of the commodore, but to his 
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indolence, and want of capacity.  He might have acquitted himself well in command of a single 
ship, under the orders of a superior, but he was not competent to the command of a squadron.”149
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CHAPTER 3: EDWARD PREBLE 
 The progress of the Tripolitan War to the spring of 1803 was a gross disappointment to 
the Jefferson administration.  Morris‟s vacillation led to his recall, but the secretary of the navy 
understood that the faults were not Morris‟s alone.  Secretary Smith and the Navy Department 
gleaned some important lessons from their Mediterranean operations.  Even before deciding to 
recall Morris, the department considered significant changes that reflected the realities of the 
distant war with Tripoli. 
 The most prominent change was the addition of vessels smaller than frigates to the fleet.  
Enterprize‟s success, combined with reports of the impossibility of maintaining close blockade 
with frigates, induced the navy to contemplate using more smaller vessels.  The navy solicited 
the opinions of veterans of the first squadron “with respect to the size … the fashion of rigging & 
arming” of any small vessels to be procured.1  Fixing upon a broadside of between fourteen and 
sixteen guns, Smith asked Congress to authorize the construction or the purchase of four suitable 
vessels in January 1803, leaving just enough time for them to be built and sent to the 
Mediterranean late that summer.
2
  The bill authorizing the navy to build or purchase the 
requested vessels passed through Congress a month later, appropriating $96,000 for the purpose.
3
 
 This was not the only sort of smaller vessel that Secretary Smith considered.  He also 
took a keen interest in gunboats, the small, oared craft used by Tripoli, and nearly every other 
Mediterranean nation, to defend their harbors.  Though less common in American service, 
makeshift gunboats served in the American Revolution and Quasi-War.  The same bill 
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authorizing the small ships also allowed the construction of several gunboats, and Secretary 
Smith wanted more knowledge of the modern gunboats then in use. To obtain this information, 
the secretary asked John Gavino, U.S. consul in Gibraltar, to “procure a Model of one of the 
most approved Gun-Boats … and send it to me by the first safe opportunity.”4   
Because gunboat construction was slow to start, Smith had already authorized 
Commodore Morris to procure several, particularly to deal with the possibility of Moroccan 
gunboats operating in the Strait of Gibraltar.
5
  Former consul to Tripoli James Cathcart highly 
recommended gunboats and bomb (mortar) vessels for bombardments, as had Commodore 
Dale.
6
  Morris, however, failed to obtain any, writing that he believed gunboats would be 
impossible to obtain, despite the fact that Cathcart had inserted himself into the diplomatic 
circles of the Italian peninsula, allowing him to communicate with several nations that owned 
and operated gunboat squadrons.
7
  The next squadron that entered the Mediterranean, then, 
would have the benefit of a force of brigs and schooners, but could not count on the support of 
gunboats or bomb vessels unless the new commander achieved more diplomatic success than 
Morris. 
The identity of Morris‟s successor was not at all certain.  At first, the new squadron was 
proposed as a further reinforcement of Commodore Morris to replace the ships he currently had 
on station.  After his recall, however, a new commander was required.  The nod first went to 
Richard Dale, commander of the first squadron, but his orders indicated that there would be no 
possibility of his flagship having a captain aboard.
8
  This was the situation Dale had enjoyed 
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during his first squadron, so the lack of a flag-captain in the future squadron could be considered 
a demotion.  Apparently, Dale so construed it, for a second letter from Secretary Smith not only 
reiterated that no captain would be appointed under him, but also that the navy had no plans to 
create a rank of admiral.
9
  Refusing to serve in such a capacity, Dale‟s resignation was tendered 
and accepted.
10
 
The next candidate called upon was the aging John Barry.  Barry was the navy‟s senior 
captain, a hero of the Revolution and active during the Quasi-War, but was suffering from an 
illness that killed him later that year.
11
  Barry‟s infirmity, the resignations of Truxtun and Dale, 
and Morris‟s expulsion left the navy with a dearth of senior officers.  Eventually, command of 
the squadron devolved upon Edward Preble, a captain who had not yet been deployed to the 
Mediterranean because of health issues, but who had an active reputation.  In Preble‟s 
appointment, Secretary Smith wrote, “to a Gentleman of your activity and Zeal … to command 
your most strenuous exertions, I need only inform you that your Country requires them.”12  
Politically speaking, Preble‟s relationships with Charles Goldsborough, chief clerk of the Navy 
Department, and Henry Dearborn, secretary of war, both old friends from Maine, presumably 
outweighed his moderate Federalist political stance.
13
 
Though he certainly did not lack for connections, Preble had rendered solid service to the 
navy.  Bored with the family farm outside Portland, Maine, his quick temper compelled him to 
run away to the sea in 1778.
14
  Service in the Massachusetts State Navy during the Revolution, 
and as master of numerous merchant vessels thereafter, was enough to gain Preble the berth of 
                                                 
9
 Secretary of the Navy to Richard Dale, 10 Dec. 1802, in Naval Documents II: 330. 
10
 Secretary of the Navy to Richard Dale, 21 Dec. 1802, in Naval Documents II: 336-7. 
11
 James Fennimore Cooper, The History of the Navy of the United States of America, 2nd ed. (1846; repr., 
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001),  164. 
12
 Secretary of the Navy to Edward Preble, 21 May 1803, in Naval Documents II: 411. 
13
 Christopher McKee, Edward Preble: A Naval Biography (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1972), 82, 
89. 
14
 Ibid., 8. 
  
65 
 
first lieutenant of the new frigate Constitution at the start of the Quasi-War with France.
15
  
Promoted to captain in 1799, Preble assumed command of the frigate Essex and made the U.S. 
Navy‟s first foray into the Indian Ocean, but at the expense of his health which faltered in the 
tropics and never fully recovered.
16
  This disease rendered him unable to command a frigate in 
Morris‟s squadron, but he was able to undertake some duties at home.  Preble served as an 
advisor for the construction of the brig Argus in Boston.
17
  As work on this vessel progressed, 
Preble also received the duty of readying his old ship, Constitution, for Mediterranean service 
even before he became commodore.
18
 
During his earlier service, Preble developed a reputation for professionalism and 
aggressiveness, traits lacking in Morris‟s squadron and thus appealing to the administration.  
Preble expected much from both the officers and men under his command, and disciplined both 
harshly: the crew with the lash, the officers with bullying and coerced resignations.
19
  Another 
feature of Preble‟s character made him even more suited for command of a squadron of war.  
More, certainly than Morris, but also than Dale and many other senior officers in the service, 
Preble desired glory not just for the United States, though he certainly wanted to raise his 
nation‟s stature, but for himself. 20  “The whole service was one of amateurs, on a somewhat 
shaky foundation,” believed historian Fletcher Pratt, and behaved as such under Morris‟s 
command.
21
  Preble‟s professionalism and discipline provided the needed foundation for the 
squadron under his command and his aggressiveness led it on the offensive.  Whether the naval 
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administration of the time realized it or not, the combination of these traits made Edward Preble 
the perfect choice for reversing the trend of timidity established by Morris. 
Several negative factors combined to offset the advantages Preble gained from his 
character and the favorable composition of his fleet for blockade.  First, perhaps most serious, 
was that President Jefferson no longer seemed convinced that Tripoli could be brought to its 
knees. The naval squadron‟s mission in the Mediterranean was now “to secure our commerce in 
that sea with the smallest force competent” rather than offensive action.22  This decision meant 
that the extra frigates sent to Morris over the winter of 1802-3 were replacements rather than 
reinforcements, and also that Preble‟s squadron was fitted out for blockade rather than 
bombardment.  In addition to the small vessels, Preble only had two frigates, enough to have one 
heavy vessel off Tripoli at all times.
23
  The schooners and brigs were excellent for blockade 
work, but they carried either light long guns, which could do little damage to heavy 
fortifications, or carronades, which threw heavy shot, but only a short distance and so were 
equally useless against shore batteries.  Thankfully at least, the two frigates provided, 
Constitution and Philadelphia, carried heavy long guns, unlike many of the smaller frigates, such 
as the previously dispatched Adams and New York.  These had smaller guns “that were nearly 
useless in a bombardment, while they could not command the shore,” because of their deep 
draught, and had “no other quality particularly suited to the warfare” encountered in the 
Mediterranean.
24
  Additionally, when a frigate shepherded a convoy or showed the flag off a 
port, the squadron lost a large portion of its firepower, while the smaller vessels could perform 
the same duty without costing the squadron one of its large vessels.  Preble‟s squadron of five 
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smaller vessels and two frigates was ideally suited to blockade Tripoli and protect American 
commerce, the role to which it was assigned, but not to offensive operations. 
The squadron‟s vessels presented other challenges for Preble as well.  Conscious either of 
the cost of maintaining a squadron or the terms of enlistment of the crews of Morris‟s squadron, 
the secretary of the navy required the vessels already in the Mediterranean to return home 
immediately.
25
  To facilitate this, each ship would leave its separate home port as it was ready, 
arriving in the Mediterranean singly, exactly the situation that plagued Commodore Morris the 
previous summer.  To make matters worse, the vessels of Preble‟s squadron lagged behind 
schedule in readying themselves for service.  This included not only the new brigs and 
schooners, but, most seriously, Preble‟s flagship, Constitution.  Preble assumed command in 
May, but the frigate, after years of little use, needed careening to clean and repair its bottom, to 
have much of its equipment replaced, and to be manned.
26
  The delay lasted so long that Preble 
even felt compelled to write: “I have done all in my power to equip and man her, would to 
heaven I could have done more!”27  He even wrote to the secretary of war, his friend Henry 
Dearborn, explaining that “more than has been done here, cannot be done in the same time with 
the same number of men in any Port,” so that the secretary “may have it in [his] power on proper 
grounds to defend me from any improper reflections on the tardiness of this equipment.”28  This 
trouble kept Preble and the Constitution in Boston harbor until the middle of August, leaving 
little of the summer season to operate against Tripoli.
29
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A group of officers that included men who would eventually lead the navy to numerous 
victories in the War of 1812 manned the vessels of Preble‟s squadron.  At this point, however, 
they were undisciplined, untested, and unknown to Preble.  During Morris‟s tenure, the younger 
officers had taken to indiscipline marked by numerous duels.  Those who had not previously 
served with a hard captain such as Truxtun or Rodgers initially resented the stern discipline.
30
  
Preble‟s fear that the slow pace of fitting out the Constitution would reflect poorly on him made 
him keep his officers and crew working hard, for long hours, even before leaving port.  Preble‟s 
relative obscurity within the service compounded the situation.  While most of the officers were 
in one of the Caribbean squadrons during the Quasi-war, Preble was on detached service, and his 
convalescence since then had kept him out of contact with his fellow officers.
31
  Those he had 
not met professionally, he had not met socially either, as (excepting Isaac Hull) the commanders 
of his squadron‟s vessels came largely from the mid-Atlantic states, and New England officers 
were sparse in the rest of the ranks as well.
32
 
Preble‟s orders reflected the softening of offensive objectives settled on by Jefferson.  
Like Morris, Secretary Smith authorized Preble “to subdue, seize, and make prize of all Vessels, 
Goods and Effects belonging to the Bey of Tripoli,” as allowed by Congress in 1802.33  Also like 
Morris, Smith instructed Preble to blockade Tripoli as the best way to provide protection for 
American commerce, but instead of concentrating his squadron for a potential bombardment, 
Smith suggested laying part of the squadron off Cape Bon (a natural landfall between Tripoli and 
the western Mediterranean) to intercept Tripoline corsairs.
34
  To make sure that Preble‟s 
blockade would be tighter than Morris‟s, Smith also included the admonition that “no place is to 
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be considered by you in a state of blockade which is not actually besieged.”35  The financial and 
supply arrangements were identical to those made for Morris and Dale.  Money was available 
from firms in London and Leghorn; supplies were sent to Gibraltar and redirected at Preble‟s 
discretion.
36
  In addition, Preble received some discretionary funds: $30,000 loaded on board 
Argus to avoid drawing money in Europe at a poor rate of exchange.
37
  The orders also contained 
the inevitable direction about prisoners, dealing with other friendly nations, and the training of 
the men and officers. 
Preble‟s orders reflected Morris‟s failure, as the secretary of the navy strove to ensure 
there would be no repeat of that fiasco.  Despite the displeasure with Morris‟s conduct, Smith 
still required Preble to communicate with him, so that Preble could “make a more skilful and 
advantageious disposition of the force under your direction.”38  Perhaps because of repeated 
Tunisian and Moroccan accusations that Morris had unfairly captured their vessels (leading to 
greatly increased tension with those nations), Smith wrote that he would “scrupulously and 
without indulgence examine that conduct which shall bring us into collision with any other 
power.”39  This warning was so forcefully stated, especially with the shadow that Morris‟s recall 
cast over the situation, that Preble felt compelled to ask if the restrictions even applied to foreign 
ships running the American blockade.
40
  The answer, “that the besieging party has a right to 
prohibit entirely all commerce with a besieged Town,” made it clear that though other nations 
need be respected, the blockade still maintained priority in the secretary‟s mind.41 
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The tensions created, or at least left unresolved, with Tunis and Morocco led Secretary 
Smith to order that Preble “keep a vigilant Eye” on those nations and to communicate frequently 
with the American consuls there.
42
  Further distancing Preble from negotiations, and ensuring 
that a professional diplomat would be involved, the secretary of the navy did not authorize him 
to negotiate directly with Tripoli.  Because of Consul Eaton‟s expulsion from Tunis, and because 
Consul O‟Brien of Algiers wished to retire, the government appointed a new diplomat, Tobias 
Lear, to take up the position in Algiers and he alone was authorized to negotiate peace.
43
  In an 
outstanding show of restraint, however, Secretary Smith refused to take all discretion away from 
his commander observing that, “the varying aspects of our affairs in the Mediterranean … render 
it improper for the government to prescribe to you any particular course of conduct.”44  Instead, 
Smith confined himself to stating his confidence that Preble would “maintain the dignity of your 
station and that the FLAG of your country will not be dishonored in your hands.”45 
Preble began planning even before he left port, and his ideas were certainly not confined 
to blockade.  He requested permission to hire local vessels, even smaller than the brigs and 
schooners of his squadron, which could patrol the coast without suspicion.  Manned by disguised 
Americans, these vessels could perform reconnaissance and help stifle the coasting trade.
46
  
While the secretary allowed Preble to borrow additional vessels, the manning levels of American 
warships were congressionally mandated, and he could not allow the enlistment of extra officers 
and men.
47
  Whatever additions Preble made to his fleet would have to be manned from his other 
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vessels.  While this situation was slightly less encouraging than Preble probably hoped, the 
permission to hire additional vessels constituted an important part of his future strategy. 
It is difficult to establish firmly the net effect of the advantages and disadvantages that 
Preble had in comparison with previous American commodores.  Preble‟s orders were certainly 
more limited than those of Morris, but the fleet at Preble‟s command was better suited to 
accomplish those orders.  While the lack of many heavy ships could keep Preble from exceeding 
his orders, his permission to hire extra vessels, if used liberally, would allow to him undertake an 
attack if he wished.  Preble‟s greatest disadvantage was the situation he inherited in the 
Mediterranean.  Morris had not settled the Moroccan issue, and tension grew over the capture of 
the Meshouda.  Tripoli had barely been blockaded, and the bashaw certainly no longer feared the 
U.S. Navy, if ever he did previously.  The Tunisians, rather than being assuaged by Morris‟s 
payment, were emboldened, and after Eaton‟s expulsion no proper diplomat was present with 
that nation.  To cap a grim situation, war between the French and English loomed, and when 
resumed, it would create more problems for Preble‟s squadron.  Into this maelstrom sailed 
Preble, whose greatest advantage was his own conviction to “hazard much to deprive the 
Barbarians of the means of carrying on a predatory naval War, by destroying their vessels in 
port, If I cannot meet them at Sea.”48 
Preble‟s cruise began much like that of Morris: his squadron proceeded piecemeal to the 
Mediterranean and encountered unexpected tension in that region.  Immediately after he received 
word of Meshouda’s capture, Consul Simpson in Tangiers wrote to Commodore Morris making 
it clear that he required word on the exact circumstances of the event in order to “substantiate the 
necessary proofs … to be laid before His Majesty [the emperor of Morocco] in Justification.”49  
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News of the capture arrived in June.  Still waiting for a reply the next month Simpson, warned 
that an American warship would soon become a necessity to keep the peace as “the Emperours 
Cruizers are so nearly ready for Service.”50  Soon afterward, the Moroccans demanded passports 
for their vessels, which were to set sail with sealed orders, an action which “shews a stroke 
against some Nation is determined upon,” though their target was unknown.51  Despite his fears, 
with no proof of intended attacks on the United States, Consul Simpson could raise no official 
objection and issued passports for the Mirboka, an old vessel of 22 guns, as well as the brand 
new 30-gun frigate Maimona.
52
  Despite its age, Mirboka had more than enough force to detain 
any merchant vessel, but the Maimona was a much more considerable threat, with the size and 
speed to range far into the Atlantic Ocean where American merchants had previously been quite 
safe. 
The two Moroccans sailed just before Preble himself left the United States on 14 
August.
53
  Captain William Bainbridge in the frigate Philadelphia arrived at Gibraltar ten days 
later, the first of Preble‟s squadron to arrive.54  Hearing rumors of Tripolitan vessels cruising to 
the eastward (but not any news of the Moroccan trouble), Bainbridge cruised in that direction. 
He found, instead of Tripolines, the Mirboka in the company of an American merchant vessel.  
Suspicious of this odd couple, Bainbridge armed a boarding party that forced its way aboard the 
Mirboka and found the American crew held captive.
55
  Every commanding officer of the second 
squadron received orders from Secretary Smith authorizing them to make prizes of the vessels of 
Tripoli as well as the same admonishment to respect the vessels of other nations, but without any 
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of the leeway given to Preble.
56
  Thankfully, Bainbridge did not hesitate to take possession of the 
Mirboka, and escorted both it and the recaptured American safely into Gibraltar, though he did 
feel compelled to write to Secretary Smith expressing his hope “that you will do me justice in 
believeing that no pecuniary motives influenced me but was solely actuated by the Honor … of 
the American Flag.”57  It was even more to his credit that Bainbridge, unlike Morris with the 
Meshouda, then sent both Mirboka’s papers and assurances that “my officers and self have made 
it a Markd point to treat the Prisoners … with particular attention of Civility,” to Consul 
Simpson at Tangiers.
58
  After the Moroccan captain admitted having orders to detain American 
ships, Bainbridge sent this unfortunate news to both Preble and Consul Simpson and headed into 
the Atlantic in search of Maimona.
59
 
It was Preble, however, not Bainbridge who encountered Maimona at sea.  After Preble 
stopped the vessel, he carefully examined Maimona’s papers.60  Consul Simpson‟s passport was 
present, but Preble‟s suspicions were aroused when he discovered that the passport dated from 
two months earlier, far more than enough time for the short journey to Maimona‟s stated 
destination of Lisbon.  Accordingly, Tobias Lear, carried as a passenger, went on board to 
examine the papers further, but found them in order, even recognizing Simpson‟s handwriting 
and signature.
61
  In Lear‟s judgment, the “Passports appear so clear & correct that, according to 
our Treaty with the Emperor of Morocco, I should not conceive it advisable to Detain the 
Ship.”62  Preble agreed and parted ways, sailing for Tangiers to pay Consul Simpson a visit.  
While off the town, the Constitution “fired a gun and hoisted [the] colors,” but the arranged 
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signal being not returned from shore, Preble sailed on to Gibraltar.
63
  His simultaneous arrival 
and revelation of the apparent state of war between the United States and Morocco certainly 
provided a sharp shock. 
Meanwhile, tensions in Tangiers continued to mount.  The Moroccans off the Mirboka 
informed Bainbridge that Alcayde Hashash, governor of Tangiers, was solely responsible for 
issuing the orders to attack Americans, forcing Bainbridge to conclude that Hashash “is much 
disposed for Hostilities with the US.”64  Evidently Simpson agreed, for his next letters of 
complaint he sent not to Hashash, but to the emperor himself, requesting an explanation and a re-
establishment of peace.
65
  Hashash did not take kindly to this tactic, however, and he summoned 
the American Consul and assured him that Mirboka was not “authorized by him or any other 
person to capture American Vessels.”66  After Simpson argued evidence to the contrary, Hashash 
locked him up, and he remained imprisoned while Preble called off Tangiers.
67
  Simpson only 
gained release after an appeal to the emperor by the consuls of all the other nations represented at 
Tangiers.
68
  The emperor wrote to Simpson denying responsibility for ordering the capture of 
Americans, asking that the parties involved be delivered to Tangiers “and when the truth shall be 
made manifest, affairs shall go in their proper Channel.”69  Despite the emperor‟s word, while 
the hostilities against Americans had initially appeared to be confined to Hashash, word that the 
governor of Mogadore, another Moroccan port, detained the crew and cargo of an American 
merchant, seemed to indicate that the emperor must be involved.
70
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Though they released Simpson from his detention, the Moroccans continued to harden 
their stance, denying any declaration of war, and demanding the return of both the Mirboka and 
Meshouda.  The Moroccan secretary of state sent Simpson a singularly patronizing letter which 
began: “Receive the paper herewith – pay attention to it, and see what you have done to the Flag 
of Our Master [the Emperor] whom God preserve.”71  It continued, explaining the situation, 
though still failing to assume responsibility for it, “A Ship of Our Masters [Mirboka] intending to 
bring a Vessel of yours and detain her until the Tripoline [Meshouda] should be returned, and 
you know what happen‟d.”72  Though this explained the Moroccans‟ reasoning, why the 
Americans should return a Tripolitan vessel to anyone, let alone Morocco, was unexplainable.  
Nevertheless, the letter warned, if “matters remain as they are, or Our Masters Ship be not sent 
… we cannot say what he may then do, for this reason we have admonished and advised you.”73  
Despite this, Simpson still believed that the emperor may have been ignorant of Hashash‟s orders 
and that any negotiation should be carried out with the emperor himself, rather than Hashash, an 
opportunity provided by the emperor‟s imminent arrival in Tangiers.74  Preble, after Maimona 
slipped through his grasp, was in no mood for the subtle negotiations encouraged by Simpson 
and would certainly not be swayed by any bluster on the part of the emperor.  “You may 
acquaint the Emperor from me,” wrote Preble to Simpson, that the actions of the Mirboka 
“justify my giving Orders … to capture and bring into port all vessels belonging to the Emperor 
of Morocco.”75  And, should the emperor persist in not taking credit for the actions of his 
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captains and insist they acted alone, then “it is my intention in future to sink every such vessel as 
a Pirate.”76   
A fortunate concentration of force at Gibraltar, with Morris‟s squadron coming in from 
the east and Preble‟s from the west, gave Preble the military force to back his strong words.  First 
to join the Constitution was the Philadelphia, which had been unable to find Maimona, and the 
schooner Vixen, fresh from the United States.
77
  Next, after separately convoying American 
merchants from the east, both Morris in the New York and Rodgers in the John Adams, made 
port.
78
  Soon afterward, the Adams also arrived, making a force of five frigates and a schooner, 
with more small vessels expected to arrive at any time.
79
  It was not a foregone conclusion that 
the ships would be able to cooperate, however.  Morris, now relieved of duty as commodore, had 
orders to proceed home immediately, while newly appointed Commodore Rodgers was running 
short of food and water on his remaining vessels.  Even so, Preble grasped the opportunity given 
him by chance and “thought it prudent notwithstanding our Morocco business to dispatch the 
Philadelphia and Vixen” to Tripoli, using Rodgers‟s ships to deal with Morocco while Morris 
sailed for home in Adams, the ship longest on station.
80
  This well-considered action was 
certainly the best course open to Preble at the time.  John Adams, New York, Constitution, and 
the various small vessels represented enough force to deal with the Moroccans, who now had 
only one warship, and even the cursory blockade that two ships could provide to Tripoli was 
preferable to no blockade at all. 
At this crucial moment, however, personal jealousies threatened to rob Preble of his 
advantage.  John Rodgers, though Preble‟s junior in years, was his senior by one spot on the 
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captains list by virtue of his early promotion as a reward for his service as first lieutenant on 
board the Constellation when it captured L’Insurgente during the Quasi-War.81  As the senior 
officer on station, Rodgers felt slighted that Preble continued to fly a commodore‟s pennant on 
the Constitution, a signal that Preble considered himself in command despite Rodgers‟s seniority.  
Preble‟s reply declared that the pennant was “not hoisted for the purpose of injuring your 
feelings … but to designate that I command a Squadron … independent of any other 
squadron.”82  In other words, Preble considered his command separate and himself entitled to the 
honor of a commodore‟s pennant.  Rodgers insisted that “if the date of your Commission is 
subsequent to mine, that it is not in the power (Even) of the Government, to place you … in a 
situation which could afford an opportunity of treating me with Disrespect.”83  Thankfully, both 
men agreed to temporarily set aside the dispute in order to finish the Moroccan business.  Both 
officers, therefore, flew their pennants, and each of them signed dispatches to Consul Simpson.  
This stop-gap measure, however awkward, allowed the necessary cooperation to bring Morocco 
to terms. 
Now, when the Americans were most ready, the situation forced them to wait.  Preble 
sent the smaller vessels of his squadron down Morocco‟s coast, hoping to catch Maimona or any 
prizes taken by that vessel before they returned to port.
84
  Maimona, however, warned of the 
American presence by the encounter with Constitution, took refuge in Lisbon where it remained 
for the rest of the conflict.
85
  The diplomatic situation mirrored the lack of action on the naval 
front.  Consul Simpson believed that Alcayde Hashash was too hostile for negotiation, and the 
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emperor himself agreed to talk with the Americans.
86
  The emperor, however, could not or would 
not change the itinerary of his national tour to proceed direct to Tangiers, but Consul Simpson 
was able to open talks with Moroccan Secretary of State Mohammed Selawy.
87
  In the mean-
time, during numerous delays that kept the emperor from Tangiers, both sides worked out their 
strategies.  In 1786, the United States had negotiated and ratified a very liberal treaty with 
Morocco and the current emperor‟s father.  The stipulations included favorable trading measures 
and no tribute, and the reaffirmation of this treaty became the goal of Preble and Simpson.
88
  The 
Moroccans, on their part, obviously coveted the return of both the Meshouda and Mirboka as 
well as the crews of each, with Selawy even going so far as to suggest that the presence of these 
vessels in Tangier was a precondition for the opening of negotiations.
89
 
When the emperor finally did arrive, Preble proved once again his good sense by closely 
following Consul Simpson‟s advice.  When Simpson suggested that the release of the Mirboka, 
especially, would help negotiations, Preble agreed to surrender that vessel.
90
 This allowed 
Simpson to offer the lure of Mirboka’s return “as a proof of the sincere desire of the American 
Nation,” and to push the emperor to “Ratify the Treaty made between the United States and his 
Father.”91  Though giving up the ship was certainly a concession on Preble‟s part, the condition 
of that vessel was poor enough to inspire him to write: “I do not believe we have an Officer in 
our service that would be willing to attempt to cross the Atlantic in her for ten times the 
Value.”92  Further, because negotiations would take place in Tangiers, Simpson recommended 
that Preble come into the bay with as much force as he could muster, firing a salute to impress on 
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the Moroccans the foolishness of fighting a full-scale war.
93
  Preble agreed to the measure, 
replying, “I shall salute him & dress ship, and if he is not disposed to be pacific I will salute him 
again,” presumably with loaded cannon.94  When the emperor finally arrived on 6 October, 
Preble in the Constitution, along with the New York and John Adams, fired salutes of twenty-one 
guns, a potent display of naval force.
95
  The emperor, apparently impressed, sent a present of 
livestock to the squadron, but still there was waiting to be done, this time for the arrival of 
Muhammad Selawy, before the negotiations could begin.
96
 
When all the pieces for negotiation were finally in place, the process was suitably quick 
and satisfactory for each side.  Before Preble even went ashore, the emperor issued a declaration 
of peace with the United States, ordering the American merchant vessel at Mogadore released.
97
  
This declaration only mentioned the earlier treaty largely as an afterthought, rather than giving it 
the import that the Americans thought necessary.  To gain this concession, Preble not only 
consented to give up Mirboka, but also persuaded Rodgers to release the Meshouda, though only 
after the Moroccans reaffirmed the treaty.
98
  On 10 October, Commodore Preble, Consul Lear, 
and a small staff went ashore to proceed with Consul Simpson to meet the emperor.
99
  Expecting 
formality and splendor, they instead found “a small man, wrapped up in a woolen haik or cloak 
sitting upon the stone steps of an old castle in the middle of the streets.”100  Despite his mean 
appearance, the emperor‟s words were anything but; by the end of the day, the Americans had 
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gained the reaffirmation of the Treaty of 1786.
101
  This satisfactory solution to a situation with so 
much potential for danger was all the more exemplary because Preble accomplished it “without 
the payment of a cent for tribute or presents.”102   
With peace reestablished, Commodore Rodgers shaped a course for the United States, 
while Commodore Preble gathered his squadron at Gibraltar.
103
  This lull in the action also 
provides a good opportunity for an analysis of Preble‟s decisions thus far.  Preble found himself 
in a position very similar to Morris upon his arrival off Morroco.  When fortuitously given 
enough force to deal with the problem, Morris squandered the advantage while Preble seized it, 
economizing his force so as to both blockade Tripoli and assist Consul Simpson in Morocco.  
Consul Lear wrote, in the middle of the Moroccan crisis, “the Zeal activity and intelligence of 
Com
e
 Preble must afford satisfaction to our Government.”104  The government agreed; James 
Madison wrote to Preble, “the terms of the peace, and the honorable manner in which it was 
restored, have equally impressed.”105  The composition of Preble‟s squadron also proved of 
assistance in the situation.  With the force split between numerous small vessels, instead of 
concentrated in fewer frigates, Preble was able to watch each of Morocco‟s major ports with a 
brig or schooner, while retaining enough force in Tangiers to facilitate negotiation.  Similarly, 
both Dale and Morris had been compelled to leave a frigate, almost a third of their firepower, in 
the Straits of Gibraltar to watch the Moroccans, but Preble was able to leave the Argus, only one 
of his six small vessels, leaving him plenty of force to deal with Tripoli.  Despite his solid 
performance, Preble had still to contend with the Mediterranean weather.  Already October, his 
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first summer of fair weather, the only time suitable for offensive operations, had ended, and 
further complications would affect Preble‟s operations even more. 
Many of these difficulties resulted from the recent resumption of war between England 
and France.  In the first place, supplies, which had once been easy to obtain in the 
Mediterranean, became scarce.  Rations especially, Preble directed, “should be sent out from the 
United States as they cannot, in consequence of the War between England and France be 
purchased in Gibralter.”106  Even firewood was in short supply and Preble requested that wood 
and coal for the galley fires should join the list of supplies sent out.
107
  Engaged in a war that 
threatened their nation, the British, who had earlier behaved excellently towards the Americans, 
were now less inclined to be accommodating.  While Preble dealt with the Moroccan situation, 
the Meshouda remained in Gibraltar, serving as quarters for the Moroccan prisoners from both 
captures.  Assigned to guard them was a small crew of Americans, a few of whom took the 
opportunity to desert months before working off the signing bonus they received in the United 
States.
108
  As the nearest refuge, these experienced sailors found Captain John Gore, of the HMS 
Medusa, to be more than willing to engage their services and hide them from American officers.  
When seen on board his vessel, Gore refused to return them to the Americans as he deemed the 
deserters “subjects of his Britanic Majesty and … finding now that their Sovereign is engaged in 
a serious War with an inveterate Foe, wish to return, to their own Flag.”109  Lieutenant Charles 
Stewart, senior American in Gibraltar, fired back that the seamen had volunteered despite 
already knowing Great Britain was at war, and that Gore did, “by detaining those men whom I 
have demanded as Deserters & Fellons assume the Violating hand,” denying the United States 
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the justice of international law.
110
  Captain Gore responded, not only asserting that the men 
would not be surrendered, but also demanding the release of two more American seamen, “being 
Subjects of his Britanic Majesty and wishing to return to their Duty and Allegiance,” implying 
that they were held against their will.
111
  Lieutenant Stewart, realizing that he could make no 
headway, referred the matter to Preble. 
Edward Preble, of course, was not a man to be cowed by the threats of anyone, especially 
since, as a former merchant captain and life-long patriot, he bore a deep-seated resentment of the 
British practice of impressment.  Preble joined the exchange of letters with gusto.  The deserters 
were, Preble contested, subjects not of the English king, but instead of the United States, by 
virtue of taking an oath of allegiance to that nation, and therefore Preble denied that there was 
any “such person as a British Subject, on board of any the Ships of the Squadron” but they were 
rather “Citizens of the United States.”112  Captain Gore departed Gibraltar before answering, but 
another British ship, the frigate Amphion, provided yet another refuge for American deserters.  
Preble addressed letters to both Captain Sutton of the Amphion and Captain George Hart, senior 
British officer afloat in Gibraltar at the time.  He reminded the British of the deserters‟ oaths to 
the United States, and provided evidence that some of these men had remitted part of their pay to 
families in the United States.
113
  Captain Hart, too, refused to release the deserters, stating “that it 
is the Orders & Instructions of our Government, on our meeting with Ships of any foreign Nation 
whatever to demand all such British Seamen.”114  Captain Preble again asserted that his seamen 
were all American citizens, making delivery of British seamen to the Royal Navy impossible.  “I 
have not encreased my compliment by impressing Englishmen, or receiving Deserters,” wrote 
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Preble almost mockingly echoing the tone of his English counterpart, “although I am ready to 
receive any Americans who have not voluntarily entered your service.”115  While this did not 
return any of the deserters to the American ships, it did induce Captain Hart to pass Preble‟s 
complaint to Admiral Nelson, then commanding the Mediterranean fleet.
116
  Finally, in addition 
to the problems in Gibraltar, the earlier actions of members of the squadron in Malta, the port 
closest to Tripoli, rendered that base less enticing.  An American midshipman, seconded by 
Lieutenant Decatur, commander of Enterprize, killed a British citizen there in a duel, resulting in 
the issuing of warrants for their arrest.
117
 
Though he would never receive satisfaction for the loss of his sailors, Preble did hit on a 
way to keep it from happening again.  While Preble was in the straits, he called only at the still 
neutral Spanish ports of Cadiz or Malaga, instead of Gibraltar, and when operating off Tripoli, 
Preble based the fleet out of Syracuse rather than British Malta.
118
  The Syracusans welcomed 
the squadron, believing that its presence would deter raids by the other Barbary States, and gave 
Preble free use of the port‟s warehouses and magazines.119  To facilitate his operations, Preble 
sought out American merchants in both Syracuse and Malta and appointed them navy agents, 
with powers to purchase and house squadron supplies at each of those ports.
120
   
Preble recommended that all future supply ships from the United States be sent directly to 
Syracuse rather than stopping at Gibraltar, and that they be armed, so that no squadron vessel 
need be pulled away from the blockade for escort.
121
  Additionally, if this vessel could be 
chartered permanently, Preble believed it would serve well by replenishing the squadron at sea, 
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facilitating a tighter blockade, and by functioning as a floating hospital from which the men 
could not desert when they recovered.
122
  Preble also wanted further reinforcement beyond a 
single storeship, because “experience has taught us that, implicit faith cannot be placed in 
Treaties with any of the Barbary States,” and he wanted at least the reinforcement of a small 
frigate to guard against a resumption of hostilities from Morocco after the main squadron had 
passed to the east.
123
  In the mean-time, Preble allotted the newly arrived Argus, now under Isaac 
Hull‟s command, to watch the straits.124  With Morocco and his supply situation settled, Preble‟s 
final act at Gibraltar was to write a circular announcement to all Mediterranean nations declaring 
the port of Tripoli under official blockade, legally establishing his right to exclude neutral 
vessels from that port.
125
 
As earlier noted, when he was assured of Rodgers‟s cooperation, Preble dispatched 
Philadelphia and Vixen to assume a blockade of Tripoli to keep at least larger vessels from 
entering or leaving that port.  Preble‟s orders gave Philadelphia’s Captain Bainbridge command, 
ordering him to check every known corsair cruising ground and rendezvous, using the Vixen to 
scout inshore on the way to Tripoli, “and maintain … an effectual Blockade of that place as can 
be done with the force you have.”126  At this time the Tripolitan navy consisted of only seven 
sea-going vessels, each of only enough force to take a merchantmen, and Bainbridge‟s vessels 
could at least keep these larger ships blockaded.
127
  The two ships watered at Malta and sailed 
immediately to Tripoli on 4 October, just as serious negotiations began in Tangiers.
128
  When 
some of the known Tripolitan fleet appeared to be missing, Bainbridge dispatched the Vixen 
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north to Cape Bon, hoping to intercept them at that prominent land-fall.
129
  Soon after, 
Philadelphia spotted a small vessel attempting to sneak along the shore into Tripoli.  This was 
exactly the sort of situation in which Vixen would have excelled, but in its absence, Bainbridge 
decided to give chase with the Philadelphia, a chase which ended with the frigate hard aground 
on an uncharted reef.
130
  The Tripolitan gunboat fleet rowed out, took up a position where the 
Philadelphia could not return fire, and commenced a bombardment which induced Bainbridge to 
surrender.
131
  The worth of the smaller vessels was proved even in their absence, for if the Vixen 
had been present it could have fought off the gunboats or assisted in refloating the frigate.  Better 
still, it could have taken up the chase itself, relieving the more cumbersome and deep-draughted 
frigate from that duty.
132
  To make matters worse, Philadelphia‟s crew failed to disable the ship 
before the surrender.  Within two days, the Tripolines freed the ship and began repairs.
133
 
The difficulties in Preble‟s new position were numerous.  Preble sailed eastward by way 
of Algiers, where he dropped Consul Lear to take up his new post, and shortly afterward met the 
English frigate Amazon, which told him of Philadelphia‟s capture.134  Some of his first reactions 
are contained in his letters and diary entries on and directly after 24 November, the day he 
learned of the disaster.  “If it should not involve us in a war with Tunis and Algiers in 
consequence of the weakness of our squadron,” Preble reasoned, “yet still it will protract the war 
with Tripoly.”135  Things did appear peaceful in Algiers, where Preble had just left, but there was 
no telling whether this victory would increase that court‟s demands on America.  Tunisian 
relations were in a further state of turmoil, with Consul Eaton expelled and Consul Cathcart 
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rejected by Algiers, Secretary of State Madison decided to shift Cathcart‟s posting to Tunis.  
That regency was suitably insulted that a man unfit for Algiers should be their Consul, and 
rejected him as well, though not before “the extravagant passions of Mr. Cathcart, his folly, … 
has hurried us to the brink of a war.”136  Even without declarations of war by either of these 
nations, the prospects of a quick end to the Tripolitan war were bleak.   
The Philadelphia‟s loss effectively halved the squadron‟s complement of heavy guns. 
While this did not render Constitution unable to perform some bombardment of Tripoli, it meant 
that the Preble had to use the ship cautiously to prevent any further accident, leaving the 
squadron entirely without heavy vessels.  Preble recognized this, and amended his earlier plan of 
maintaining a tight blockade throughout the winter as it would be “hazarding too much; for 
should any accident happen to this ship [Constitution] … the consequences may be dreadful.”137  
All hopes for a quick peace with Tripoli were gone, not because Preble was now incapable of 
offensive action, but because the bashaw now held too many cards for a fruitful negotiation.  The 
Philadelphia itself, though too large for the Tripolines to use, could have either been sold to 
another Barbary power or ransomed back to the United States, either way adding to Tripoline 
demands.
138
  Preble resolved immediately to “hazard much to destroy her [Philadelphia],” and so 
informed Secretary Smith in the same letter which apprised Smith of the Philadelphia‟s 
capture.
139
  The more serious situation, however, because Preble was powerless to fix it, was the 
capture of Philadelphia’s crew.  First, though the prisoners were not extremely abused, the threat 
of retaliation against the prisoners could curb American actions, and second, a large ransom 
would be expected for each man, significantly increasing the cost of any peace.  Consul Lear 
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learned that soon after the capture, the bashaw expected to make $1000 dollars per man, though 
he often had settled with other nations at half that cost.
140
  At either price, the cost for this 
ransom alone exceeded any previous demand for a price of peace.  The only method available to 
Preble to lower the price was to take offensive action against Tripoli and this he resolved to 
do.
141
 
Preble now had several options.  His first was to maintain his original plan of blockade.  
Despite the difficulties of the winter weather, Constitution and Enterprise set out in December to 
do just that.
142
  While it was unlikely that a blockade that was necessarily porous because of the 
weather would immediately reduce the ransom, Preble could hardly allow Tripoli to go 
unwatched, and perhaps score another victory.  As it turned out, the blockade opened new 
possibilities for Commodore Preble, when on the 23 December he captured a small vessel 
attempting to leave the harbor.
143
  The master of this vessel Mastico represented it as belonging 
to the Ottoman Empire, but after a witness testified that it actively participated in the boarding 
and looting of the Philadelphia a month before, the Syracusan courts condemned the vessel as a 
lawful prize.
144
  Renamed Intrepid, it exactly fit the description of the type of local craft that 
Preble had earlier requested permission to hire.  William Bainbridge, detained in Tripoli, had 
also conceived a use for such a vessel.  He believed that by sending a disguised vessel into 
Tripoli, it could get close enough to the Philadelphia to come along side and destroy it.
145
  The 
heavy squalls of winter soon forced Preble back to Syracuse, where he continued his planning. 
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While Preble did not abandon the blockade for long, he used his time in port wisely, 
making sure the pieces for a successful summer campaign were in place.  First, Preble cultivated 
relationships with Richard Farquhar and Salvador Bufuttil, men in the service of Hamet 
Karamanli, William Eaton‟s former ally and deposed ruler of Tripoli.  Hamet had taken his post 
in Derna, the second largest city in Tripoli, reportedly won a military victory there over his 
brother‟s forces, and renewed his requests for American help for an offensive on Tripoli itself.146  
Though Hamet‟s requests exceeded Preble‟s resources, Preble pledged what he had available to 
“assist him against Tripoly.”147  After losing the Philadelphia, Preble‟s ability to help diminished 
even further, and boosted the bashaw‟s fortunes enough that Bufuttil decided to press Preble for 
a pledge of certain support.
148
 Preble‟s inability to provide a binding pledge, and renewed attacks 
by his brother‟s forces, convinced Hamet to withdraw from Derna to Alexandria, Egypt, where 
he continued his pleas to the Americans.  Preble, in light of Hamet‟s seeming willingness, 
expressed his “wish that earlier notice had been taken of this man,” certain that a land assault 
could crack Tripoli in only a few months.
149
  Captain Bainbridge, after viewing the Bashaw‟s 
preparations for assault from the sea, agreed that a land siege would be the most productive way 
to bring Tripoli to terms.
150
  Though he continued to receive letters from Hamet‟s supporters, and 
continued to express his desire to help him, Preble never considered himself in possession of 
enough force to dispatch a vessel to Hamet‟s aid.151  This convinced Hamet that, like Morris, 
Preble would never lend wholesale support, and he redirected his pleas to President Jefferson, 
pleas that would remain unanswered until after Preble‟s tenure in the Mediterranean expired.152  
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In the light of later events, allowing his cooperation with Hamet to lapse was certainly a poor 
decision.   
Preble was also busy re-opening the channels of negotiation with Tripoli that Morris had 
ignored.  Consul Nissen of Denmark was extremely helpful to Dale and assisted Philadelphia’s 
crew in their captivity and in a letter of thanks for that kindness, Preble also expressed a wish for 
a meeting.
153
  The bashaw removed this method of negotiation, however, who insisted in a new 
treaty with Denmark that Consul Nissen refrain from assisting any nation but his own in 
negotiations.
154
  Even as this avenue closed, however, another opened.  Upon hearing of the 
Philadelphia’s capture, Robert Livingston, American Ambassador to France, applied to First 
Consul Napoleon Bonaparte and his foreign minister Talleyrand for help in gaining the release of 
the American prisoners.
155
  Apparently, when Napoleon contemplated the American prisoners, 
he was “touched with the most lively commiseration for their misfortune,” and ordered his 
Consul in Tripoli, Bonaventure Beaussier, to work with the United States in freeing them and 
negotiating a peace.
156
 
In addition to contacts within Tripoli, Preble was also in communication with the 
Tripolitan consul to Malta, who represented himself as authorized to negotiate for peace.  He 
offered various proposals including a truce, which Preble rejected, and an offer to ransom the 
prisoners at $500 each, about $120,000 for the whole.
157
  While this was half of the bashaw‟s 
earlier asking price, Preble still rejected it out of hand, and declared the Americans “never would 
consent to pay a cent for Peace or Tribute.”158  Despite this, when Tripolitan representative 
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Gaetano Schembri later visited Tripoli, he assured the bashaw that the Americans would agree to 
any price for peace and the ransom.
159
  When he learned of Schembri‟s lie, Preble exploded.  
“Insolent Medlar!” he wrote, “Have you sagacity enough to calculate the pernicious consequence 
of your Duplicity?”160  Preble, furious that the bashaw might now expect more from the 
Americans even then before, concluded that the answer to his question was a simple “No.”161  
When Preble arrived off Tripoli, the damage that Schembri had done to the American position 
was plain.  Schembri‟s dishonesty, combined with the recent large ransoms paid by other 
nations, encouraged the bashaw to start negotiations at $500,000, a far larger sum than had 
earlier been put forward.
162
 
Another impediment to a successful negotiation the following summer was the absence of 
the only empowered American negotiator.  After dealing with Morocco, the season was late 
enough that significant operations off Tripoli were not feasible.  Accordingly, Consul Lear took 
up his position in Algiers rather than remain with Preble through the winter.
163
  When the spring 
arrived, Preble sent a vessel to Algiers to embark Lear and bring him to Tripoli to begin 
negotiations.
164
  Additionally, Preble wondered whether former Consul O‟Brien, replaced in 
Algiers by Lear, could also assist, for, by virtue of spending a decade imprisoned in Algiers, 
O‟Brien knew the language and ways of Barbary as well as, or perhaps better than, anyone.165  
Lear, however, judged the moment inopportune to leave Algiers, as the dey was unhappy that 
American tribute was a year behind schedule.
166
  He did, however, persuade O‟Brien to assist in 
negotiation and told Preble that he would authorize any payment up to $600 a man for ransom, 
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assuming that there would be no additional payment for peace or an annual tribute.
167
  With 
O‟Brien‟s help, and essentially empowered to negotiate by himself through the French consul, 
Preble had the tools he needed to reach a settlement with Tripoli.  He still lacked, however, the 
desire to settle without first trying military action, and more martial preparations took place 
simultaneously to those above. 
Preble‟s first order of business was to neutralize the threat of the Philadelphia.  Then, 
fortuitously, came to hand the local craft Mastico, and an opportunity was born.  Numerous 
letters from Bainbridge to Preble mention the possibility of destroying the Philadelphia.  If 
attempted in the winter, Bainbridge mentioned, the Tripolitan gun-boats would be hauled up on 
the shore to escape storm-damage, leaving an opening for attack.
168
  He proposed that “a few 
boats prepared with combustibles,” could be launched from a vessel that arrived off shore “about 
sun-set so as to prevent her being seen from the shore” and thereby “get into the harbour 
unnoticed.”169  Whether Preble adopted these ideas, or whether a similar plan occurred to him 
near the same time, the final plan was similar to that proposed by Bainbridge, substituting the 
prize vessel for the ship‟s boats that Bainbridge suggested.  Captain Decatur of the Enterprise 
was in company with the Constitution, both when Preble learned of Philadephia’s capture and 
when the Mastico was captured, and volunteered himself to lead the effort.
170
  Decatur manned 
the Intrepid, filled it with combustibles, and set out for Tripoli in the company of the brig Siren, 
which shepherded the smaller vessel through the winter storms.
171
  Facing danger from both the 
weather and the enemy, Decatur succeeded famously, torching the Philadelphia and escaping the 
harbor without the loss of a man.  While Decatur deserves the credit for carrying out this exploit, 
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and Bainbridge seems to have had a hand in its planning, there is plenty of praise left for Preble 
as well.  The incident is a prime example of Preble‟s use of the resources at hand, in this case an 
unassuming little ketch, to accomplish his goals. 
With the Philadelphia burned, Preble turned his attention to obtaining for his use some 
gunboats and bomb vessels.  Preble believed that such vessels would be a key in his summer 
attacks and was confident that Tripoli “may easily be destroyed or taken in the summer with Gun 
& Mortar Boats.”172  After Cathcart broached the subject in a letter, Preble wrote back requesting 
“two or three Gun Boats, and two Mortar Boats with Guns, and 10 inch Mortars complete,” as 
well as skilled bombardiers to work the mortars as no one in the American squadron had 
experience with that weapon.
173
  Cathcart wrote to numerous ports around the Mediterranean 
inquiring into the loan or purchase of these vessels, and even forwarded Preble plans of his own 
devising to build them if it should prove impossible to obtain them otherwise.
174
  Preble had 
previously viewed several craft of the type he wanted in the harbors of Messina and Palermo, 
both then ruled from Naples, and he asked Cathcart to make a trip there, even planning a 
personal visit to that port.
175
  The vessels proved harder than suspected to acquire, however, for 
both governments and merchants feared retaliation from Tripoli or the other Barbary States.
176
  
Still, Preble preferred buying or leasing to building, and decided to make his firmest push with 
the Neapolitans.
177
 
The Neapolitan government, reasoned Preble, was the best choice because he had 
observed that nation‟s vessels at Palermo, and they too were at (nearly constant) war with 
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Tripoli.  To get the boats, however, the case had to be made to John Acton, Neapolitan prime 
minister, as the military commanders of the ports lacked the power to strike such a deal on their 
own.
178
  While Preble was busy off Tripoli and with other plans, Cathcart forwarded the 
American effort, writing to Acton, and arranging a trip to Naples.
179
  Preble could afford to 
attend to other matters first, because while the weather moderated in the spring enough to allow 
the squadron to resume cruising, gunboats were too frail to be risked until the end of May.
180
  As 
his plans for the gun and mortar boats coalesced, Preble became increasingly convinced that they 
were the correct implement for ending the war and expected “the Bashaw to sue for Peace as a 
favour in three days after I reach his Coast.”181  Fortunately, in applying to Naples, Cathcart and 
Preble had made the correct choice, and Acton, after conferring with the king of Naples, believed 
that “if the Commodore could take a trip to Naples, he would be accommodated.”182  With the 
blockade tightening and a visit to Tunis, it was 9 May before Preble could to visit Naples.
183
  
Though it took nearly a week to put his request through proper channels, the Neapolitans finally 
granted Preble the use of six gunboats, two bomb vessels and all their associated gear “under the 
Title of a friendly Loan,” to be returned or replaced after the summer sailing season.184 
Preble, as evidenced above, made the best use of the stormy season of any of the 
commodores during the Tripolitan War.  He alone maintained a blockade, though a weak one, 
and undertook an offensive operation, the burning of the Philadelphia.  In the time between 
cruises, his vessels had a chance to repair damages and prepare themselves for summer.  
Additionally, he added to his force the gunboats that each of the previous commodores deemed 
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so important.  In this operation he was even able to make use of James Cathcart, a man who had 
proven too abrasive to be much help to either Dale or Morris, though perhaps never meeting 
face-to-face facilitated this cooperation.  While he lost the assistance of Danish Consul Nissen, 
Preble gained an ally in French Consul Beaussier; likewise, though deprived of Consul Lear‟s 
presence, he gained the assistance of Richard O‟Brien.  As if to re-enact Morris‟s term, rumbles 
of discontent arose from Tunis.  Additionally, perhaps because of the easy success of the 
Intrepid, Preble developed an overconfidence that characterized his letters in the spring of 1804.  
Tunis should “not be humoured but beaten,” and “Tripoly would soon be brought to any terms 
we might please to dictate.”185  This overconfidence in his own squadron‟s abilities may also 
have induced him to halt any plans he had to cooperate with Hamet, though perhaps he simply 
did not judge himself possessed of enough force to dispatch a vessel for this purpose.  Either 
way, despite Preble‟s efforts, he still had much work to do before the gunboats ever fired a shot 
in anger. 
Preble‟s first task as the weather cleared was to step up the blockade of Tripoli.  Preble 
increased his force off Tripoli, leaving Syracuse in the Constitution for that port in March.
186
  
Even before this, the smaller ships were active off Tripoli, prompting Malta‟s British 
government to ask Preble for a special favor.  The war with France had cut traditional supply 
lines to the island, and before Preble‟s blockade notice the British had paid for a large amount of 
cattle to be imported from Tripoli, a food source now blocked by Preble‟s squadron.187  Preble 
agreed to let the cattle out provided that the ships entered the port without cargo and left with 
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only the bullocks.
188
  The agent the British contracted with to purchase the bullocks, however, 
was Gaetano Schembri, the Tripolitan consul in Malta who had given the Americans so much 
trouble.  The first ship to sail with Preble‟s passport was the brig St. Cruicifisso, which Nautilus 
intercepted bound into Tripoli, not in ballast, but rather with a full cargo including “Hemp, 
Linens, Plank, Building Stone, … and 8 Tripoline Passengers.”189 That capture in February was 
followed quickly by two more in March in similar circumstances, of the merchantmen Transfer 
and Madona di Catapoliana, laden with military stores to be sold to Tripoli.
190
  Despite a plea 
from Schembri, the three vessels were adjudicated as fair prizes, and one, Transfer, was taken 
into American service renamed Scourge.
191
  Constitution’s First Lieutenant John Dent became 
Scourge’s commander, and Preble made acting lieutenants of two of his favorite junior officers, 
Midshipmen Ralph Izard Jr. and Henry Wadsworth.
192
   
Stopping these vessels not only halted commerce with Tripoli, but also added another 
useful vessel to the American squadron.  Though Preble‟s orders required him to send prize ships 
home, he instead, as with Mastico, had the prizes adjudicated in the Mediterranean, saving the 
cost in manpower requisite in sending these vessels to America.  Later, when the vessels‟ owners 
disputed their status as legal prizes, Preble hit on another expedient to reduce the time and 
manpower necessary to deal with the prizes.  One vessel, the Madona di Catapoliana, while 
sailing under Schembri‟s order, was a registered Russian.  The representative of that nation in 
Naples, when Madona’s captain relayed a slanted version of his capture, petitioned Preble to 
release the vessel.
193
  Preble returned that the captain had certainly “made many 
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misrepresentations,” about his capture, which Preble was sure was justified.194  Though he 
continued to assert his right of capture, Preble thought “to pay a Compliment to the Russian 
flag,” by giving the vessel up, and did so.195  He also relinquished the St. Cruicifisso, “the Vessel 
of little value in Order to prevent litigation and expence.”196  As summer drew nearer, Preble was 
less and less willing to see the squadron‟s men, money, and time wasted in European prize 
courts, or the attempt to reach American ones. 
Preble‟s cruise off Tripoli in March was not simply to establish a firmer blockade either.  
He fully believed that after a successful attack, the bashaw would negotiate on reasonable terms, 
and with this in mind he needed to open his negotiations.  Preble had already gleaned some 
useful information on the characters of the main Tripolitan players.  After Decatur burned the 
Philadephia in Tripoli harbor, the bashaw revealed his vengeful side, depriving the prisoners of 
any sort of comfort.
197
  Only the intercession of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidi Muhammed 
Dghies could persuade the bashaw to soften their captivity.
198
  Not only, reported Bainbridge to 
Preble, was Dghies the correct man, because of his office, to negotiate with, but he was also the 
most reasonable high official in Tripoli.
199
  On his arrival off Tripoli, Preble contacted the two 
men who would most influence his negotiations.  First, he sent ashore his greeting to French 
Consul Beaussier, along with Tallyrand‟s letter ordering Beaussier to assist with negotiations.200  
Next, he wrote to Dgheis, thanking him for his kindness to the American prisoners, and assuring 
him of the comfort of the Tripolines who had fallen into American hands.
201
  The next day, after 
reviewing the letter Preble had delivered and making some enquiries, Beaussier visited the 
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Constitution and later sent a letter to the Commodore outlining the diplomatic situation.  
Beaussier advised Preble to release one of his Tripolitan prisoners, allowing word to reach shore 
that the Americans had treated their prisoners well.
202
  The French consul also informed Preble 
that the bashaw was uninterested in prisoner exchange, would only agree to ransom the prisoners 
at the same time as negotiating for peace, and even that the bashaw reported himself aware and 
unafraid of American preparations for war.
203
  Finally, Beaussier added his own comments on 
the situation: “Whatever be the success of your efforts to chastise the regency, your Government 
will have a great addition to the expence … and the more damage you cause to be done to the 
Country, the higher will be their pretentions, be it from Avarice or from obstinacy.”204 
This letter, because the perspective was so radically unlike Preble‟s, certainly came as a 
shock to the commodore, and poisoned his relationship with his only friendly contact in Tripoli.  
That Tripoli refused to contemplate a prisoner exchange should not have been a surprise, for 
each American was worth a handsome ransom, while each Tripoline prisoner was a liability to 
the Americans who had nowhere to house them and limited funds to feed them.  Preble‟s belief 
that the bashaw would release the prisoners before a peace settlement, throwing away Tripoli‟s 
only real advantage in the war, is questionable.  The bashaw would only allow a neutral vessel, 
rather than one of the squadron, to land food, clothing, and other stores for the American 
prisoners.  Despite the fact that Beaussier thought that landing a captured Tripoline would gain 
this concession, Preble refused to do so.  “I am confident,” wrote Preble in his diary, “that the 
French, English and Swedish Consuls are all in the Bashaw‟s Interest. … We must therefore 
depend wholly on our own exertions for effecting a peace.”205  This was Preble‟s greatest point 
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of contention with Beaussier.  Preble‟s utter conviction that every ball he lobbed into Tripoli 
brought him closer to victory and that the Bashaw was a tyrant petty enough to be cowed by any 
determined assault was irreconcilable with Beaussier‟s fear that bombardment would prolong the 
war and increase the price of peace.  With his conviction unshaken, Preble sailed northward to 
deal with Tunis and to gather his forces. 
Since Morris‟s tenure, the bey of Tunis had lodged numerous complaints with the 
Americans, only one of which, the misdeeds of William Eaton, had Morris resolved.  The bey 
also demanded the gift of a frigate as an increase in the annual stipend the Americans paid, and 
continued to insist that he deserved reimbursement for Tunisian property on a prize taken during 
Morris‟s command.206  In the spring of 1804, the Tunisian fleet, a far more powerful force than 
that of Tripoli, began to fit out hastily, with the rumored object of capturing American 
merchantmen.
207
  As Preble himself wrote, the American squadron was “quite inadequate to 
carry on the Blockade of Tripoli, & watch the coast of … Tunis.”208  War with Tunis would not 
only create problems for American merchantmen, but also constitute a danger to the squadron 
itself.  The Tunisians had four small frigates, which in combination would be a match for any of 
the American vessels.
209
  Preble therefore, as he did during the Moroccan trouble, requested a 
further reinforcement.
210
  To keep an eye on the situation, Preble periodically dispatched one of 
his smaller vessels to Tunis, and one of them, Enterprise, had the happy coincidence of arriving 
there just after a Tripoline cruiser.
211
  Though his arrival convinced the Tripolines to sell their 
ship and return overland to Tripoli, the Tunisian‟s actions remained threatening.212 
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Despite his conviction that the Tunisians should “not be humored but beaten,” in Tunis 
Preble faced the possibility of a war that would ruin his offensive plans and place his squadron 
on the defensive.  Taking the Siren with him “to display some forces before Tunis, in order to 
check their intention of hostilities,” Preble opened communication with the bey.213  Preble 
responded to the bey‟s demands for payment in recompense for the capture of Tunisian vessels 
by forwarding the complaints to the United States, claiming that he lacked enough information 
about the incident which took place during Morris‟s command.214  Additionally, because of his 
eagerness to be on the attack, and certainly remembering Morris‟s horrible experience in Tunis, 
Preble wrote that he could not come ashore.
215
  The bey refused to even read Preble‟s offering, 
instead ordering that Preble settle the matter before he left port and without delay.
216
  Preble 
refused to be detained, reasoning that the bey “must have already resolved on [war], without this 
frivolous pretext,” and that whether he complied with the bey‟s demands or not, the Tunisians 
would do as they wished.
217
  Then, despite a letter from the bey, again insisting that Preble come 
ashore, the commodore weighed anchor and departed.
218
  Preble‟s decision, though risky, was 
sound, for acceding to the bey‟s demands, in Morris‟s case, brought only more demands, and the 
payment of a small sum of money would certainly not keep the peace if the bey had already 
resolved on war.  As it turned out, the bey suspended his call for immediate indemnification, 
extending the deadline to six weeks.
219
  Preble, a more reasonable thinker when he was not being 
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threatened, later decided that better relations with Tunis were worth the cost of the missing goods 
and ordered Consul Davis to pay.
220
 
Both the meteorological and political climates, nice weather and peace with Tunis, were 
now right for an attack on Tripoli, but problems persisted.  Preble, visiting Messina, source of his 
borrowed gunboats, found that though the six gunboats were ready, the two mortar vessels would 
not be serviceable until the end of June.
221
  Preble used sailors from the Enterprise, then under 
repair, to transport the gunboats to Syracuse with the help of nearly one hundred hired 
Neapolitans.
222
  Once in Syracuse, manned in part by the crews of Enterprise and Nautilus, 
Preble left the gunboats under the command of Stephen Decatur and Richard Somers.
223
  There, 
the crews practiced maneuvers with their new vessels and waited for the mortar boats to be 
delivered.
224
  Leaving most of his smaller vessels off Tripoli, Preble used Constitution to supply 
them while he shuttled back and forth between Tripoli and Tunis.   
At Tripoli, little changed, but the bey of Tunis was not long pacified.  As with Morris, 
Preble‟s acquiescing to one demand redoubled the bey‟s efforts to gain another.  Consul Davis 
reported that “the Bey, „tho silent is far from being, in a better humour, than when you left us,” 
and that “his demands, on the Government of the U. States far exceed, any thing anticipated.”225  
Especially prevalent was the bey‟s continued desire for the gift of a ship of war.226  
Unfortunately now that Preble had caved to one of the Bey‟s requests, his supposition that Tunis 
would not start a war received corroboration in evidence uncovered by Consul Davis.  Tunis was 
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preparing for a defense against a suspected Russian attack, and also apparently on the bad side of 
the government now in power at Constantinople.
227
  Additionally, a mild drought had rendered 
grain scarce, and food prices were very high in Tunis.
228
  Finally, Davis at least believed that 
Tunis would examine the results of the American attack on Tripoli before acting, and wrote 
Preble that, “on your success there; be assured Sir depends our future respectability here.”229  
And, though it was the opinion of the American consul rather than of the bey himself, Preble‟s 
frequent visits to Tunis also helped to keep that regency from declaring war.  At the least, Consul 
Davis was able to use Preble‟s visits to dissemble to the bey that America had “the full means in 
those Seas, of checking and punishing, any hostile measures.”230 
As relationships with Tunis appeared to stabilize, Preble‟s inability to work with 
Beaussier rendered the situation in Tripoli even worse.  The commodore was far from alone in 
his classification of the other consuls at Tripoli as deceitful.  Consul Lear noted that “the present 
State of things makes it politic for other nations that we should be at war with Tripoly,” because 
once the Americans made peace, the bashaw would move on to a different victim.
231
  Bainbridge, 
too, though acknowledging France‟s influence in Tripoli, believed that it would be best coming 
“direct from France and not through their consul.”232  Not trusting Beaussier, Preble decided to 
use Richard O‟Brien in his next effort to sound out the bashaw.233  Preble, as a final attempt to 
remove the prisoners before his offensive, allowed O‟Brien to offer $40,000 for their release, 
sending no word of negotiating for peace at the same time.
234
  This offer was so low as to be 
perhaps naive if we are to believe that Preble wished it to be accepted at all; indeed, at the 
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commencement of the war Consul Cathcart had offered the same sum just to suspend hostilities 
for ten months, and Consul Lear had authorized Preble to pay a much larger sum for the 
prisoners.
235
  What is worse, after an absence of nearly two months, Preble did not attempt to 
gain information from Beaussier or anyone in Tripoli, sending O‟Brien straight into negotiations 
without meeting the French consul.
236
  And while Bainbridge agreed that Beuassier was not on 
the American side, he, in an earlier letter, outlined a negotiating strategy that corresponded with 
Beaussier‟s suggestions.  Namely, that the negotiator should not rush ashore uninformed, but 
“remain on shore, and take them [the Tripolines] when they appear in best humour,” negotiating 
through the foreign minister.
237
  Indeed, he even agreed that to effect peace, “the United States 
must pay or attack him by land,” rather than any naval bombardment, even condescending to 
grease a few palms to get the deal done.
238
  Preble, happy to agree to Bainbridge‟s assessments 
of Beaussier as far as they agreed with his own thoughts, was just as happy to discard the advice 
of the American closest to Tripolitan affairs. 
Indeed Preble, not content merely bypassing Beaussier, wrote a particularly nasty letter to 
the French consul.  Preble promised to forward their correspondence to Paris where, he believed, 
“the First Consul [Napoleon] expected his mediation would have had more weight with the 
Bashaw of Tripoly than it appears to have had.”239  Beaussier, for his part, replied that Preble, by 
making such an insignificant and unrealistic offer as $40,000, expecting prisoners to be 
exchanged, and expecting the peace and ransom to be negotiated separately, was not only 
expecting more than even France could assist with, but insulting France, who had the “right to 
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expect to be seconded by the two Parties,” Tripoli and the United States, involved.240  As soon as 
he learned that the bashaw had rejected O‟Brien‟s offer, Preble immediately set sail for Tunis, 
using Constitution’s stores to resupply his smaller vessels, allowing them to maintain the 
blockade.
241
  Preble sailed quickly enough that he did not receive Beaussier‟s reply, giving him 
occasion to write another nasty note to the consul when next he visited the port.  Believing that 
Beaussier failed to meet with O‟Brien on purpose, Preble wrote that Beaussier “would not give 
yourself any concern in our Affairs at Tripoly,” not realizing that the bashaw had prevented just 
such a meeting and it was only Preble‟s hasty departure that prevented him from receiving 
Beaussier‟s note explaining the situation.242  Preble also carried out his threatened tattling and 
forwarded his correspondence with Beaussier to the American minister in Paris.
243
  Even if 
correct in his estimation that Beaussier was playing a double game, Preble was unwise to 
distance himself from anyone who could facilitate talks with the bashaw.  Unwilling to place 
trust in any opinion but his own, Preble resolved to try it his own way, making “a general attack 
by Cannonading & Bombarding the town” and remained confident “that we shall soon have 
Peace on conditions that we may not blush to acknowledge.”244 
Preble returned to Messina, collected the bomb vessels, rendezvoused with the gunboats, 
and prepared for the attack.  The bomb-vessels were readied for service on 5 July, a date which 
Preble correctly calculated would leave only about eight weeks before the weather turned too 
heavy for the small craft.
245
  Wanting to make the most of the good weather season, Preble hit on 
a method to keep his ships on station even longer.  He sailed from Syracuse accompanied by a 
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store ship that would ferry supplies from Malta or Syracuse to the squadron.
246
  The first such 
vessel was the hired St. Guisseppe, laden with water and stores, under command of one of the 
squadron‟s midshipmen.247  Though he had earlier used Syracuse, Malta was far closer to 
Tripoli, and Preble relied on William Higgins, the navy agent he appointed there, to hire further 
ships, especially to carry fresh water.
248
  Water, the squadron‟s greatest need, was hard to obtain.  
Casks had to be begged or borrowed, sometimes from merchants, but more often from the British 
military at Malta, and the squadron nearly ran dry by mid-August.
249
  Preble even pressed the 
tiny ketch Intrepid, used in the winter to burn the Philadelphia, into service to carry water, and 
on reduced rations the squadron was able to scrape by.
250
  While the British navy was expert at 
supplying large squadrons on blockade, the Americans had little to no previous experience.  
Despite the close call, Preble maintained his entire squadron, plus the extra hands in the gunboats 
which could carry almost no supplies, in front of an enemy port for two full months.  This feat is 
yet another demonstration that Preble‟s preparedness in extra-military functions created the 
opportunity for traditional military success. 
Though the season was right, the weather remained unfavorable, and the gunboats 
struggled accordingly.  The small craft were only able to make the journey to Tripoli under tow, 
and the heavy seas delayed their arrival until the 25 July.
251
  To undertake a successful attack, 
Preble needed a favorable combination of environmental conditions.  The current could not be 
too fast, because the gunboats were poor sailors and heavy to row, and neither could they stand 
heavy seas, during which they became useless as gun platforms.  The wind could not be directly 
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off-shore, or the squadron would be unable to get on station, nor could it be directly on-shore, for 
an on-shore wind would drive any damaged American vessel toward the rocky shore and the 
Tripolitan cannon.  Only on 1 August, did the winds and waves subside enough to make an 
attack practicable, and two days later the squadron stood inshore for Tripoli to make the first of 
five general assaults.
252
   
The relative success of each of these attacks greatly influenced the negotiating practices 
that Preble employed.  Each assault‟s success can be measured by the favorable influence it had 
the negotiations that occurred simultaneously.  Even before the attacks began, Preble again 
initiated negotiations.  Though the bashaw refused his offer of $40,000, Preble asked captured 
Captain Bainbridge to keep the offer on the table.
253
  The Tripolines refused to negotiate through 
prisoners, and even if they had, the offer was still far below their expectations.  Preble‟s hopes 
for this small ransom were “too extravagant,” believed Beaussier, “to be listened to unless you 
put yourself in a situation to distress very sensibly this town.”254  This action on Preble‟s part, 
allowing a prisoner to attempt a negotiation rather than Beaussier certainly bred even more 
distrust between the two when the Frenchman found out.
255
 
Preble launched his first general attack on 3 August.  As the two mortar boats began to 
lob shells into the town, the six American gunboats engaged nineteen similar Tripolitan craft.  
The American gunboats closed and boarded the enemy, capturing three, and the brigs and 
schooners covered them as they retreated with their prizes, while the Constitution blazed away 
from close range at the forts on shore.
256
  This action was a considerable success for the 
Americans, who damaged many of the gunboats they failed to capture, and at least a few of the 
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bombshells found their mark within the walls.  As the squadron buried their dead, Preble thought 
the moment opportune to reopen negotiations, sending letters, along with the most badly 
wounded of the Tripoline prisoners, into town the following day via a French privateer that 
happened to be visiting.
257
  Beaussier was surprised at the “Efficacious means that you [Preble] 
have adopted,” and expected that they also had an impact on the bashaw and “will certainly 
hasten a cessation of hostilities.”258 
Despite his brilliance in carrying out this first attack, Preble‟s attempt at negotiation 
afterwards was ill considered.  Though Preble sent the wounded prisoners on shore that they 
“may be soothed by the presence of their friends, and by them furnished with fresh provisions,” 
his letter also included the suggestion that Tripoli release an equal number of Americans.
259
  
Though Preble probably did have magnanimous intentions, the gesture was misunderstood.  The 
Tripolines believed either that Preble cared too little for the prisoners to bother treating them, or 
was callously using injured men as bargaining chips in forcing a prisoner exchange.
260
  Preble 
had assembled his fleet, attacked to the utmost of its ability, and promptly checked to see if the 
bashaw would accept $40,000.  This provided a demonstration to the enemy that Preble had 
already done his worst.  Preble, in the eyes of his biographer and Beaussier, should have been 
“reinforcing the shock of 3 August with attack after attack until the Pasha [bashaw] himself 
asked for a parley.”261  The French privateer left the harbor two days later with the news that, 
while the bashaw “ardently desired to be at peace,” he could not accept terms that were so 
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humiliating.
262
  Beaussier urged Preble to make a more generous offer, but after waiting several 
days for better weather, Preble went back on the offensive. 
On 7 August, the mortar and gunboats went into action once more.  This time, they 
attacked the opposite side of the city from the harbor, the gunboats engaging the more limited 
batteries in the area to protect the mortar boats which shelled the town itself.
263
  Though the 
bombardment damaged the Tripoline defenses and wrecked part of the town, the Americans lost 
one of their captured gunboats when it exploded spectacularly, killing half the crew.
264
  Though 
the Tripoline loss certainly was greater than the American, some small consolation could be 
taken by those on shore, and the idea that they had won some sort of victory was surely 
compounded when Preble sent onshore a letter doubling his earlier offer of ransom.
265
  Though 
Preble continued to couch his offers in the language of an ultimatum, his offers of ransom 
continued to rise.  While Preble‟s military skill allowed him to attack and damage the town from 
the sea more effectively than Bainbridge, Beaussier, or the bashaw though possible, his 
negotiation seemed to indicate weakness.  By doubling his ransom offer, Preble appeared to be 
beginning to come around to Tripoli‟s demands even as his fleet continued their attacks.  Despite 
Preble‟s higher offer, Dghies, who was consulted by Beaussier, considered it to be “still 
inconsiderable” and that the bashaw still wanted “two or three hundred thousand dollars.”266  
But, Dghies told Beaussier, with the minister‟s influence combined with that of France, an offer 
of $150,000 may be accepted, despite the bashaw‟s determination to fight on.267 
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Preble certainly did not realize the potential effect of his weakening stance on the 
ransom; his mind instead was focused elsewhere, not only on his attacks, but on reinforcements 
due from the United States.  More than Preble‟s repeated reinforcement requests, the news of the 
Philadelphia‟s capture had galvanized Jefferson into sending out a more powerful force.268  Not 
yet aware of Philadelphia‟s destruction, this squadron consisted of four large frigates, plus the 
John Adams, equipped as a store-ship without most of its armament.
269
  As Preble‟s squadron 
retired from its 7 August attack, the John Adams appeared on the horizon, with much needed 
supplies and men for the squadron, and with upsetting news for Commodore Preble.
270
  With 
four ships that each needed captains, there were too few captains junior to Preble to fill each 
position.  In fact, two vessels of the new squadron sailed under captains senior to Preble: Samuel 
Barron and John Rodgers.
271
  The sluggish nature of communication between the Mediterranean 
and United States meant that Secretary Smith was unaware of Philadelphia‟s burning until 22 
May, after he had already decided to replace Preble, rather than merely augment his squadron.
272
  
The John Adams informed Preble that these four vessels were not far behind, and thus of course, 
he would not be in command much longer.   
Preble renewed both his attacks and his offers for peace, using the impending 
reinforcements as a further threat to the bashaw.  “I expect them at every moment,” wrote Preble 
to Beaussier, “such a force … will enable us to destroy all the Sea Port Towns in Tripoly – After 
their arrival it will not be in my power to offer a single dollar.”273  That Preble‟s previous 
ultimatums had gone for little, and his offers for ransom continued to climb, blunted the force of 
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this new threat.  Preble‟s desire for personal glory must have been a strong motivation to push 
for a peace before the reinforcements arrived.
 274
  Certainly the squadron‟s other officers were 
anxious that Preble should have that success for himself.
275
  Whatever compulsion Preble felt to 
finish the deal, he still refused to raise his offer to the $150,000 that Dghies wanted.  Instead, 
though he believed “that we shall not be able to obtain them [the prisoners] for a less sum,” he 
approved Beaussier to offer $100,000, believing Dghies‟s offer might not please the American 
government.
276
  Willing to offer some amount of money, and authorized to offer more than was 
requested, it is unclear why Preble believed that $150,000 would be so much more offensive to 
his government than the $100,000 he was willing to pay.  Preble continued to use thinly veiled 
mistruths in his attempt to gain a peace.  “On the arrival of our whole force,” Preble wrote, “one 
of our frigates is ordered by the president of the United States to proceed to Alexandria to assist 
the Bashaw‟s brother.”277  Not only was this merely a guess on Preble‟s part, it was also, 
essentially, an admission of his realization that he had neglected the most effective way of 
defeating the bashaw, and that the force he had at his current disposal was inadequate for the job.  
As Preble waited for his answer, the attacks continued. 
The weather failed to cooperate, and contrary winds and currents convinced Preble to 
abort several attempts to attack.  As night fell on 24 August, however, the winds moderated and 
the squadron towed the gunboats and bomb vessels into position for a night bombardment.
278
  
The bomb vessels lobbed shells toward the town from two in the morning until daylight.
279
  Four 
days later, the wind again came fair and the squadron made another attack, this time without the 
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bomb vessels, which had begun leaking after seeing so much heavy use.
280
  Again at night, this 
attack saw the gunboats close with the forts and, with Constitution, batter them considerably.
281
 
 The loss of the bomb vessels as offensive weapons was a significant loss to the squadron 
in battle, and Preble also suffered a loss in the area of negotiation.  Preble allowed Richard 
O‟Brien, anxious to get back to his family, to return to Malta.282  Perhaps the absence of 
O‟Brien‟s council persuaded Preble that he would now be able to obtain a prisoner exchange for 
the forty-two Tripolines he had earlier captured.  Though he represented his motivations as 
“founded in reason and humanity,” his squadron would clearly benefit from such an exchange.283  
Preble would no longer have to feed his prisoners and his thinly manned ships would gain the 
service of the released American seamen.  In reply to Preble‟s letters, Beaussier sent notice that 
not only was the exchange refused, but the general situation was much less favorable for 
negotiations.  Not one of the bombs from the first night attack had even entered the town, and as 
for the battering of the gunboats, “the Bashaw seems to care little about the injury done to the 
Houses … which is easily repaired.”284  Only the exploding bombs, which through fire could 
destroy the town, actually fazed the bashaw, while Preble‟s threats and “Menaces have no other 
effect than to inflame the mind of the prince.”285  Considering the inconsequential effect of these 
two attacks, Preble‟s decision to negotiate once again appeared as weakness in the eyes of the 
Tripolines, and the bashaw upped his demands to $400,000.
286
  Preble, having failed to tender a 
lower payment after his successful attacks, could not now achieve peace without a much more 
considerable sum. 
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 Preble‟s only recourse was to continue his attacks, but time worked against him, and in 
more than one way.  The rest of the reinforcements had sailed soon after the John Adams, and 
would surely arrive soon.  Additionally, as September arrived, each day brought the threat of 
heavy weather that would force the withdrawal of the unseaworthy gunboats.  As the squadron 
waited for favorable winds, the damaged bomb vessels were repaired in time to take part in 
another general attack on 3 September.
287
  The American gunboats advanced, as in the very first 
attack, but the Tripolines chose to back water into the harbor rather than fight hand to hand.
288
  
As he should have from the beginning of his attacks, Preble, rather than sending in an offer after 
a successful attack, sought to follow it with another, this time with a new tactic that he hoped 
would shock the bashaw into peace.  The Americans readied the well-used ketch Intrepid for a 
final daring attack; loaded with gun-powder and the remaining shells from the bomb vessels, 
Intrepid would become a fire ship, rigged to blow up in the harbor amongst Tripoli‟s fleet.289  
The Intrepid never reached its destination, however, and exploded at the entrance to the harbor 
before the crew was able to abandon the ship.
290
  The weather then interceded to end Preble‟s 
attacks, with the wind and waves growing too dangerous for the gunboats by the middle of 
September.
291
  Gradually, Preble disarmed the gunboats, making them more seaworthy, and had 
them towed to Syracuse, where they were returned to the Neapolitans.
292
  While the weather had 
won the race, the next squadron was close at hand, arriving in Malta on 6 September.
293
 
 In deference to Preble, his new orders allowed him to choose between staying in the 
Mediterranean in command of a single ship or returning home.  Perhaps, speculates his 
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biographer, he may have conceded to serve as second in command to Barron, but to also find 
himself under Rodgers, a man he had been barely able to work with for a month off Morocco, 
made it certain he would return home.
294
  Preble maintained the blockade with Constitution and 
two of the smaller vessels until Commodore Barron arrived, when he handed over both 
command and all the information he had before leaving for home in the John Adams.
295
  While 
this conference is largely a subject for the next chapter, it should be noted that Preble did at least 
two good turns for Commodore Barron.  He had learned the limits of bombardment and 
encouraged Barron to use Hamet to force a peace, and he agreed to assist in leasing the gunboats 
and bomb vessels again for the next summer‟s campaign.296  Transcending his own 
disappointment at his supercession and inability to force a peace, Preble should be commended 
for the assistance he rendered to Barron. 
 Preble, on arriving home, justly received the accolades of a nation that regarded him as a 
naval hero.  When Thomas Jefferson received Preble‟s account of the attacks on Tripoli, he 
relayed it to Congress, writing, “The energy and judgement displayed by this excellent officer, 
through the whole course of the service lately confided to him … cannot fail to give high 
satisfaction to Congress.”297  Those accolades came not just from America, but from those he 
impressed in his time in the Mediterranean.  Alexander John Ball, governor of Malta, regretted 
“that an officer whose Talents and professional abilities have been justly appreciated,” should be 
replaced.
298
  Neither are his admirers confined to Preble‟s own time, for his daring attacks 
continue to gain him the praise of historians.  “Truly,” wrote one, “the U.S navy under Preble … 
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had a glorious beginning.”299  Though Preble died before the War of 1812, nearly all of the 
American commanders that gained fame and victory in that war were “Preble‟s Boys,” men who 
had served under and learned from him.  Indeed, Preble “stamped his wing of the service with a 
pattern of conduct that became of infinite benefit to the whole.”300 
But, in concentrating on the military actions that Preble undertook, historians have 
overlooked both Preble‟s greatest successes and failures as a commodore.  Preble‟s feats in his 
extra-military roles were numerous.  At the end of his account of his actions, Preble took great 
“satisfaction to observe that we have neither had a duel nor a court martial in the squadron since 
we left the United States,” a considerable accomplishment, as demonstrated by the infighting of 
the subordinate officers of Morris‟s squadron.301  This was not to say there were no problems.  
Desertion was enough of a problem that it forced Preble to change his desired anchorage from 
Malta to Syracuse.  Additionally, Preble exchanged numerous midshipmen that he found 
unworthy for those of the previous squadron during the cooperation off Morocco.  A few 
additional junior officers resigned their commissions while in the Mediterranean, a testament to 
Preble‟s hard discipline of both officers and crew.  Though hard, there was no question that 
Preble melded his crews into excellent fighters, most of whom became fiercely loyal.  
Preble, more than either of his predecessors, adapted to the situation at hand.  Off 
Morocco, Preble combined vessels of two different squadrons, under two different commands, to 
affect a lasting peace, while Morris squandered a similar opportunity.  When the Tripolines took 
Philadelphia, Preble still created a plan to mount effective attacks.  This adaptability combined 
with his decisiveness to create Preble‟s greatest strength: maximizing his force at a specific time 
and place to achieve his goal.  He had the ability to exploit every resource to the fullest, making 
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the most of what he had.  The clearest example of this was the tiny Intrepid.  Preble first used it 
to burn the Philadelphia and it ended its life as a fire ship, but in between, it served as a message 
carrier, hospital, prison, and supply ship.  These actions were not simply makeshift expedients, 
however.  Preble‟s questions about hiring craft in the Mediterranean before he even left the 
United States foreshadowed the disguise that Intrepid would adopt.  That he began negotiations 
for the gunboats well before they were needed, at the same time repairing and refitting his other 
vessels, proves that it was no accident that his squadron remained concentrated to exert as much 
force as possible in each attack.  Clearly, Preble‟s successful attacks were dependent on this 
planning.   
Preble had other tasks to undertake to ensure his force operated at full efficiency.  Dale 
could not maintain his squadron off Tripoli for any length of time, while Morris failed even to 
establish a base of supply east of Gibraltar.  Preble, however, despite the increased scarcity of 
supplies because of the Napoleonic Wars, established an effective forward base of supply and 
even kept his entire squadron in supply off Tripoli for the two months when it could do the most 
good.  These extra-military exploits allowed Preble to mount effective attacks in which his 
military performance was also exemplary.  That Preble was superior to any of the other 
commanders in military skill is uncertain, for no one else even attempted a bombardment.  The 
fact that engaged in extensive offensive operations is a testament to his skills in his duties outside 
of combat. 
Preble brought the same confident aggressiveness and decisiveness to all of his functions 
as a commodore, and these traits generally served him well. The very traits, however, that helped 
Preble to be so effective in some functions, hampered him in others.  Preble believed so strongly 
in the power of naval force that it blinded him to other actions that could achieve his goal.  
  
115 
 
Through the winter of 1803-4, Preble worked on numerous ideas to bring peace with Tripoli.  
When his favorite, using gunboats and bombards to batter Tripoli, came to fruition, he 
concentrated all his resources on that one and dropped any plan to assist Hamet in a landward 
assault.  These actions were essential to Preble achieving the success he did with the gunboats.  
He concentrated his energies and force behind one idea, but he chose incorrectly.  Here, Preble‟s 
confidence in himself and in naval force led him to believe that bombardment was the answer, 
and this conclusion was especially pleasing to him because he could undertake and oversee the 
operations himself.  Without his confidence and single-minded determination, his attacks would 
have been sure failures, if they would have occurred at all, but those same traits were equally as 
responsible for his failure to reason out the most effective way of threatening Tripoli, despite 
both Beaussier and Bainbridge‟s opinions to the contrary. 
This single mindedness also led Preble to pick and choose the orders he wished to follow.  
Preble was specifically authorized to purchase or borrow vessels while he was in the 
Mediterranean, but not to hire crews.  Preble, short of manpower, borrowed not only the 
gunboats from the Neapolitans, but a portion of their crews as well, incorporating them into the 
crews of his vessels and Americans into the gunboat crews.  Preble‟s orders concerning prizes 
were equally as clear and equally disobeyed.  Ordered to send prizes to American courts to be 
adjudicated, Preble returned one to Morocco, two to their merchant owners, brought Transfer 
into service as Scourge, and made similar use of the Mastico/Intrepid.  While he did make one 
abortive attempt to send one of the vessels across the Atlantic, it proved more expedient to return 
the vessel to its owner rather than spending time and money on litigation or time and manpower 
sailing the vessel to the United States.  Though Lear authorized him to negotiate with Tripoli, 
this certainly exceeded Preble‟s original orders.  Preble‟s single-mindedness, that trait which 
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allowed his attacks to be successful, also justified him, in his own mind, to ignore parts of his 
orders to accomplish his own goals.  In fact, Preble seems justified in doing so, for his victories 
far outweighed any irregularities in the eyes of the government, and he received nothing but 
praise. 
It was Preble‟s self-confidence and single-mindedness, again, that convinced him that 
Beaussier was working for his own self-interest or in league with the bashaw.  While both 
Bainbridge and Lear seemed to confirm that Beaussier had other motives, diplomats that had 
been longer in the Mediterranean had different views.  Robert Livingston, American minister in 
Paris, would certainly not have enlisted French aid if he thought that their consul would be of no 
service.  The American consul in Leghorn, Thomas Appleton, believed Beaussier to be “a person 
of much discernment and solid understanding,” even noting that Beaussier, during the last 
outbreak of hostilities between England and France, had been delivered by the bashaw as a 
prisoner to an English admiral.
302
  Indeed, he wrote to Livingston, “it requires a singular 
confusion of ideas to imagine that Mr. Beaussier should … prefer the interests of the 
Bey[Bashaw] to the positive instruction of his Sovereign.”303  Various historians have taken each 
side on the question of Beaussier‟s motivations, but it is certain that even if he was not the best 
choice for a negotiator, he was the only choice available.  Beaussier, a diplomat tasked by his 
government to help ransom the prisoners and restore peace between the United States and 
Tripoli, attempted to do just that.  Other powers, including France, paid Tripoli handsomely, and 
even with all the skill in the world it seems impossible that he could be expected to force the 
bashaw to accept only a paltry ransom.  Preble, so certain of his ability to force a peace with 
bombardment, was far too willing to discard Beaussier‟s cautions that a bombardment would not 
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be enough.  As it turned out, Preble achieved far more with bombardment than Beaussier ever 
thought possible, but eventually even Preble realized that the force at his disposal was inadequate 
to reduce the ransom below $150,000. 
In addition, Preble‟s attempts at negotiation were similarly hampered by his “good” 
qualities.  “The same qualities” notes Preble‟s biographer McKee, “that made him a strong 
executive and field commander, handicapped him in his duties as a diplomatist.”304  He was so 
confident that one great attack would gain victory, that even before he attacked, he sent in an 
offer for a paid peace, believing that surely those ashore would share his views.  After each 
attack, confident of the destruction he had wrought, Preble sent in new offers, sure that the 
bashaw would want peace.  These tactics of negotiation made Preble appear to be anxious for 
peace, to be negotiating from a position of weakness, although the wording of Preble‟s offers 
made it clear that the commodore believed himself to be in the driver‟s seat.  His forceful 
language, in turn, came across as bluster.  The squadron‟s attacks would have caused much more 
alarm if they had been unaccompanied by any sort of offer, making Preble appear to have the 
resolve to knock the whole city apart before he settled for a dishonorable peace.  How ironic, 
then, that Preble in fact did posses the resolve to do anything to garner a peace with little or no 
price, and that this determination led him to sabotage his own efforts.  When the bashaw‟s 
ransom dropped to $150,000, Preble finally gave extended thought to the consequence of his 
haggling.  This price was well below the maximum established by Lear and, confronted with an 
offer which he was empowered to accept, Preble realized that different tactics could have forced 
this number even lower.  From that point on, Preble‟s attacks came unexpectedly, sometimes at 
night, sometimes during the day, testing and battering each point of Tripoli‟s defenses, and 
without any overtures of peace from the Americans.  Faced with a reasonable offer, Preble‟s 
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desire to make an honorable peace for his nation outweighed his personal desire for recognition 
as the commander who subdued Tripoli.  When he realized he had not chosen the most effective 
way to reduce the Bashaw‟s demands, Preble refused to raise his offers and made sure that 
Commodore Barron‟s squadron would have access to the most effective means possible. 
It is to Preble‟s great credit that he came to realize his earlier mistakes.  Despite 
criticizing Beaussier earlier, Preble later came to follow his advice in attacking without 
negotiation.  Despite realizing near the end that either the weather or reinforcements would keep 
him from the glory of forcing Tripoli to peace, he did not compromise his ideals, but changed his 
tactics to the next squadron‟s benefit.  Despite dropping the plan to cooperate with Hamet, when 
he grasped its full merit Preble eventually advocated the use of that avenue to enforce a peace.  
For these reasons, as much as for his positive qualities, despite his initial failures off Tripoli, 
Edward Preble deserved every word of credit he garnered during the Barbary Wars and every 
word he continues to earn.  This final positive quality, to learn from his own mistakes, makes it 
doubly a shame that he was superseded.  There can be little doubt that the experience Preble 
gained during his first summer off Tripoli would have led him to sure victory in his second, and 
having learned a bit of negotiation, perhaps have secured a peace without price.
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: SAMUEL BARRON 
 While Preble busied himself in heating up the Tripolitan War, Jefferson‟s Federalist 
adversaries followed suit in the election fight of 1804.  Federalists used each set-back in the war 
to advance their position.  When news of the largest set-back of all, the capture of the 
Philadelphia and its crew, reached the United States, the Federalist outcry was strong enough 
that Jefferson had to counter the event with bold action.
1
  He decided to send to the 
Mediterranean an overwhelming force to end the war on favorable terms.  The secretary of the 
navy ordered into commission four frigates: the President, Congress, Constellation, and Essex.
2
  
Of course, the rationale was more than purely political.  By sending a larger force and hopefully 
achieving military success, the Americans could command a cheaper price for the ransom of the 
Philadelphia’s crew, or perhaps no price at all.  Success against Tripoli could also influence the 
aggressiveness of the other Barbary Powers, which would certainly view a large ransom to 
Tripoli as an invitation to attack American vessels themselves.  The new squadron, consisting of 
those four frigates and all of the small ships of Preble‟s squadron, was to combine so much force 
“as to leave no doubt of our compelling the existing Enemy to submit to our own terms, and of 
effectually checking any hostile dispositions … by any of the other Barbary Powers.”3 
 Though word of the Preble‟s daring attacks did not reach the United States until the 
fourth squadron had sailed, his previous accomplishments already made him the most successful 
commander to date: concluding the Moroccan crisis, burning the Philadelphia, averting war with 
Tunis, and blockading Tripoli.  This fact clouded the administration‟s decision to send more 
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frigates.  Both naval tradition and Congressional regulations dictated that frigates be commanded 
by full captains.
4
  There were only three captains on the navy list junior to Preble, and one, 
Bainbridge, was in a Tripolitan prison.
5
  Thus, of necessity, Preble was superseded, despite the 
reluctance of Secretary of the Navy Smith to oust an effective commander. 
 Captains, it seems, were not nearly as scarce in 1804 as they had been the previous two 
years, for not only were captains found for the four vessels, but the commodore, Samuel Barron, 
was permitted to have a flag captain to serve under him on the vessel of his choice, the 
President--strongest and fastest of the four.
6
   
Samuel Barron and his brother James, in command of the Essex for this cruise, were 
products of a nautical family.  Their father was the commander of the Virginia State Navy during 
the Revolution.
7
  Perhaps the fact that Barron hailed from Jefferson‟s home state, and was 
perhaps the most prominent Southerner in the navy, made him a more appealing pick to be the 
next commodore.  Second in seniority of the squadron‟s officers was John Rodgers, perhaps the 
only captain to retain respectability from Morris‟s squadron, and certainly experienced in dealing 
with the Barbary States.  The other captains were Hugh Campbell, another veteran of Morris‟s 
squadron, and George Cox, serving under the commodore on the President.
8
  These four ships, 
rather than being replacements for Preble‟s vessels, were additions, and the Constitution and the 
brigs and schooners would stay in the Mediterranean.  In addition, Barron received the secretary 
of the navy‟s authorization to obtain as many gunboats as Barron wanted.9   The heavy frigates, 
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the versatile brigs and schooners, and the potential to add gunboats made Barron‟s command the 
largest, most powerful, and most capable fleet dispatched from the United States. 
 Barron received a part of his instructions, his authorization to capture or destroy Tripoline 
property, direct from President Jefferson.
10
  In light of Morocco‟s abortive war and Tunis‟s 
threats, Barron also received authorization “to proceed against any other of the Barbary Powers 
which may commit hostilities against the United States, in the same manner, and to the same 
extent.”11  The bulk of his orders, however, as before, came from Secretary of the Navy Robert 
Smith.  By this time, Smith had issued orders to underachieving Morris and zealous Preble, and 
his orders reflected this, defining for Barron the upper and lower levels of acceptable conduct.  
Barron‟s instruction in dealing with neutral nations provides a good example.  Smith repeated his 
warning that the government would “scrupulously and without Indulgence examine that conduct 
which shall bring us into Collision with any other power.”12  Smith also, because he worried 
about the legality of Preble‟s blockade, warned Barron that only a port which was blockaded in a 
way “to create an evident danger of entering it,” constituted a legal blockade under international 
law.
13
  Vessels attempting to enter a less than scrupulously blockaded port were not valid prizes.  
The strongest measure the squadron could take was to turn them away.  As previously noted, 
however, Jefferson himself made sure that Barron had no misgivings about his power to respond 
to the actions of any Barbary State, whose ships were most likely to attempt to squeeze past the 
blockade, with whatever force he felt necessary. 
 In other areas, Secretary Smith must have felt either Preble had overstepped his bounds, 
or just neglected to change an unfortunate order.  Despite Preble‟s difficulty in doing so, he 
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ordered Barron to send every vessel he captured “into some port of the United States.”14  Preble 
had been unwilling, and essentially unable, to sacrifice any of the crew of his short-handed 
vessels to send his captures across the Atlantic to the United States.  Additionally, the most 
common type of craft that attempted to run the blockade was small and useful only in the 
coasting trade, barely even able to make an Atlantic crossing.  As for prisoners, Smith suggested 
that Barron “effect an exchange,” or, if that be refused, to give them to another nation at war 
with Tripoli, “with a reservation that they shall be restored to the United States,” in the event of 
peace, or failing any of this, to dispose of them “so as not to be at any Expence to the United 
States.”15  Though most of Preble‟s attempts to trade his prisoners were then in the future, he had 
already failed to exchange those captured with the burning of the Philadelphia, as Dale and 
Morris had failed at the same object previously.  The second option seems naive in the extreme, 
for it was unlikely that any nation would care for prisoners at their own expense merely to give 
them up when they could benefit the Americans in negotiations for exchange or peace.  That 
there was still no provision made for effective care of prisoners is a bit remarkable, but Barron 
suffered no more than the other commodores on this count. 
 Most of Barron‟s orders were very similar to those given to earlier commodores, with the 
exception of those addressing the capture of the Philadelphia.  Preble had used the funds 
available for the squadron to help allay the material wants of the Philadelphia’s crew by sending 
them food and clothing.  Various American consuls in the Mediterranean pitched in as well.  
Under Barron‟s command, Secretary Smith decided to formalize the process, directing Barron to 
open communication with the Philadelphia’s purser, Richard Spence.16  As ship‟s purser, Spence 
knew the situation of each of the prisoners and, in captivity with them, could adequately judge 
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their needs.  This order removed a task from Barron‟s responsibility, and made sure that he could 
concentrate more closely on planning than on providing for American prisoners.  Additionally, 
anxious to be cleared of personal wrong-doing for the loss of his ship, Captain Bainbridge wrote 
to the secretary of the navy, requesting an official court of enquiry to establish his culpability.  
Secretary Smith directed Barron to accommodate this wish as soon as Tripoli released the 
American captives, with Captains Rodgers, James Barron, and Campbell as members of the 
court.
17
  While this added very slightly to Barron‟s list, the bashaw‟s conviction to ransom the 
prisoners only as part of the peace agreement meant that Barron would be unhindered with this 
duty until the war ended. 
Barron‟s orders were neither unnecessarily confining, nor did they overburden him with 
ancillary tasks.  Where Preble‟s orders were the consequence of Morris‟s ineptitude, Barron 
benefited from Preble‟s handling of the war.  As had been the case during Preble‟s command, 
only Tobias Lear, American consul to Algiers, had the authority to negotiate, allowing Barron to 
concentrate his efforts on more martial pursuits.  Lear, ordered to gain peace without a price and 
only “in the last instance” to pay, was in his second year in Algiers and more likely to be free to 
take time away from his consular duties.
18
  Preble had also dealt firmly with both Morocco and 
Tunis, and while there was no guarantee of continued peace, it seemed much more likely that 
they would present no trouble than they had when Preble sailed.  These were not the only 
weights lifted from Barron‟s shoulders either.  With an officer to run the daily workings of his 
flagship, Barron was relieved of the duties associated with that role.  Additionally, the situation 
allowed him to transfer his person between the squadron‟s ships as necessary without tying him 
to his flagship, as Preble had been bound to Constitution.  Three of the four frigates of Barron‟s 
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squadron, the Essex being the exception, were heavy enough to mount the large cannon needed 
to batter the Tripolitan fortifications.  Added to this force was the Constitution and all of the 
smaller vessels already in the Mediterranean, making Barron‟s force both more powerful and 
more versatile than any previous squadron.  The crews of the vessels already in the 
Mediterranean were both experienced and battle hardened.  Of the new captains, all had served 
in previous squadrons, and Rodgers had experience both on the blockade and in negotiation with 
Morocco.  Below the rank of captain, however, “the ships going out are not officered agreeably,” 
wrote Secretary Smith.
19
  This was balanced by the fact that among the junior officers already on 
station ranked some of the most enterprising and competent men in the navy, all of whom had 
seen action under Preble.  In all, Barron‟s balanced orders and the power of the squadron he 
commanded made him the commodore best equipped not just to blockade, but to batter Tripoli 
and coerce peace. 
 The only real drawback that Barron faced was the government‟s expectations.  “All that a 
sound mind, an ardent Zeal and daring valor could achieve with the force committed to 
Commodore Preble, has been performed by him,” wrote Secretary Smith in Barron‟s orders.20  
He continued, outlining Barron‟s duty: “[Preble‟s] force, however is not adequate to the 
accomplishment of our purposes, we therefore have put four additional Vessels in commission. 
…  With this force it is conceived that no doubt whatever can exist of your coercing Tripoli to a 
Treaty upon our own terms.
21
  There is no question, especially with Preble achieving so much 
with so little, that Secretary Smith and the government expected much of Barron and his 
squadron.  If they had predicted Preble‟s August and September attacks, the expectation for a 
quick peace would certainly have been even more overwhelming.  Thankfully for Barron, at least 
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these events were still in the future, and he would not have to sail with another commander‟s 
victories looming over his head.  Even so, the goal of Barron‟s squadron was not blockade, or 
even bombardment, but the establishment of a treaty of peace “without any price or pecuniary 
concession whatever.”22  Smith finished his orders by instructing Barron to provision and man 
his vessels and “proceed off Tripoli with all practicable dispatch,” and ended by registering his 
“wishes for your success and glory.”23 
 A final and perhaps most important addition to Barron‟s squadron was William Eaton.  
Eaton had earlier served as American consul to Tunis, where his dealings with both that regency 
and the American navy had been less than cordial.  The bey of Tunis grew weary of Eaton‟s 
undiplomatic conduct and expelled him from his post.  The bey also compelled Eaton to repay 
his large, and mostly private, debt, accrued in failed and allegedly underhanded personal 
business dealings: a debt that fell largely upon the public funds of Morris‟s squadron.  Despite 
his personal failings in business and diplomacy, Eaton did not hesitate to criticize the navy‟s 
actions.  Eaton firmly believed that the path to victory against Tripoli was to install on the throne 
the bashaw‟s deposed brother, Hamet.  Secretary of State James Madison sent him to the 
Mediterranean to gain Hamet‟s cooperation in just such an attempt.  Eaton‟s use, however, and 
whether to cooperate with Hamet at all, was left entirely to Barron‟s discretion.24  Eaton‟s brief 
orders to “receive instructions from and obey the Orders of Commodore Barron,” were certainly 
clear in defining his position in the chain of command, however, the same tenacity that allowed 
Eaton to succeed in goading Hamet into action also made him abrasive and hard to work with.
25
  
                                                 
22
 Secretary of State to Tobias Lear, 6 June 1804, Naval Documents IV, 155. 
23
 Secretary of the Navy to Samuel Barron, 6 June 1804, in Naval Documents IV,, 154. 
24
 Secretary of the Navy to Samuel Barron, 6 June 1804, Naval Documents IV, 153. 
25
 Secretary of the Navy to William Eaton, 30 May 1804, in Naval Documents IV, 121 
  
126 
 
In Eaton, Barron held a wildcard; if used properly, Eaton could significantly help the squadron, 
but he had already proven himself capable of making delicate situations very much worse. 
 Before leaving the United States, however, Barron ran into problems even more serious 
than a cranky diplomat.  The vessels of his squadron, plus the John Adams rigged as a supply 
ship, converged at Hampton Roads singly during the month of June, from whence they were to 
sail as a squadron for the Mediterranean.
26
  The John Adams took on supplies for Preble‟s 
squadron and set off on 26 June, but the rest of the squadron faced delays in preparing the ships 
for sea.
27
  Captain Rodgers of the Congress, never one to quibble with words, became incensed 
with the lack of both the material he required and the cooperation of the shore establishment.  
Addressing a dock-yard supervisor, he wrote, “It is your Interest to pray that my Head may be 
Knock‟d off before I return, for be assured if you are not punished before that period I will 
revenge the Injury you have done me, with my own hands.”28  The extra time in port gave the 
recently enlisted sailors extra time to think about their decision to sign on board for two years of 
service.  Tensions in the flagship‟s crew grew to such a height that an anonymous letter, 
complaining of unfair and hard usage, and signed “Unhappy Slaves” found its way to 
Commodore Barron.
29
  After ferreting out the author, Barron convened a court martial to try the 
man on the charge of inciting mutiny.  Headed by Rodgers, the court ordered the mutineer 
flogged around the fleet, receiving “three hundred & twenty lashes” and his shaved head branded 
“with the Word MUTINUS.”30  These difficulties delayed the squadron, supposed to be ready to 
sail as soon as they arrived at Hampton Roads, until the end of that month.  Finally, on 30 June, 
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the squadron was ready to depart for the Mediterranean, and did so a few days later when the 
wind came fair.
31
 
 The delays did not stop after the squadron left port, however, and their outward passage 
serves as a reminder of the dependencies of naval operations upon the wind.  It was not until 12 
August that the first vessel of Barron‟s squadron touched at Gibraltar, a passage of thirty-eight 
days.
32
  For two weeks the squadron made good time, and passed the Azores after only fifteen 
days, a point far more than half of the journey by distance.
33
  Thereafter the wind blew 
consistently from the east, forcing the Americans to tack back and fourth, sailing many miles 
north and south to gain eastward progress.
34
  The wind was so uncooperative that Barron decided 
to split the squadron, allowing each captain to use his ship‟s best point of sail to make it to 
Gibraltar.
35
  While the tactic sped the voyage to some extent, the contrary wind and the delays in 
outfitting prevented any possibility of the squadron arriving off Tripoli in time for offensive 
operations. 
 Though the squadron made poor time on the crossing, their arrival at Gibraltar was 
timely, for Morocco seemed once again on the verge of hostilities.  The emperor of Morocco, in 
a charitable mood, gathered the surplus wheat of his nation‟s harvest and proposed to send it to 
Tripoli as a gift to that city‟s poor.36  While James Simpson stopped this enterprise by refusing to 
issue a passport for any ship bound to Tripoli, Alcayde Hashash, once again in the emperor‟s 
favor, used threatening language in demanding Simpson‟s compliance.37  Once again, the 
American squadron met with the Moroccan frigate Maimona at sea, this time bound to the port 
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of Larache, where the Moroccans seemed to be gathering their force as if in preparation for an 
attack.
38
  Altogether, however, the situation was not nearly as serious as the one Preble faced, for 
while the emperor “expressed great concern at not being able to send this Wheat to Tripoly,” he 
did not commit to military action because of it.
39
  Simpson remained convinced that the 
Moroccans still desired peace, and so informed Barron, who thanked the consul for the 
information and confirmed Simpson‟s judgment in refusing a passport for any vessel bound to 
Tripoli.
40
  Still, Barron believed that the concentration of Morocco‟s navy was adequate proof of 
“hostility against some commercial nation,” and a threat that could not be ignored.41  Barron 
chose Rodgers to stay on the scene with Congress and Essex “until it is ascertained whether his 
measures are hostile, or Friendly towards the U‟States,” and if it proved friendly to proceed to 
rejoin the rest of the squadron.
42
  While two frigates constituted a large force to leave behind, 
Barron cannot be faulted for being wary of the Moroccans after the events of the previous year.  
In leaving command in Rogers‟s hands, he made a wise choice, for not only had Rodgers dealt 
with the Moroccans once before, but his aggressive nature made it certain that he would not stay 
away from the action off Tripoli even a day longer than required. 
 Barron himself realized that the situation with Morocco, while tense, was not so pressing 
as to delay his own progress towards Tripoli.  After very quickly replenishing at Gibraltar, 
Barron proceeded up the Mediterranean, his decision made before Essex even made port.
43
  As 
soon as the wind was fair, on 16 August, Barron, with President and Constellation, left port.
44
  
Barron‟s quick decision in this situation is admirable, for only by moving quickly could he hope 
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to assist an offensive off Tripoli during that summer.  As soon as the Essex arrived, Rodgers also 
departed Gibraltar and headed down the Moroccan coast to find the Moroccan fleet and discern 
their motives.
45
  The Essex, meanwhile, patrolled the straits, defending American commerce in 
case of hostilities.
46
  Rodgers arrived at Larache only to find that the single warship inside, the 
Meshouda, was far from ready for sea, with most of its rigging disassembled.
47
  The Maimona 
and Mirboka lay in Sallee “apparently ready for sea,” but “within the bar” suggesting they were 
not immediately prepared to leave.
48
  After cruising off the port for a few days, Rodgers, 
convinced that no hostilities were imminent, sailed to Tangiers.
49
 
 At Tangiers, Rodgers communicated with Consul Simpson to determine the most 
appropriate course for the future.  During Rodgers‟s absence, Simpson received more 
encouraging news.  A letter from Muhammed Selawy had arrived which indicated that while the 
emperor was “exceedingly displeased, at having been prevented from sending their ships to 
Tripoli,” he also had no immediate intention “to Act against us.”50  Simpson, who was familiar 
with Sallee, believed also that with the warships inside the bar there, it was not “likely they will 
come out again this season.”51  Even Simpson, who always appreciated a naval force nearby, 
thought that at least one of Rodgers‟s frigates could leave the station without any danger.52  
Rodgers concurred and, leaving the Essex at Gibraltar to make minor repairs and watch the 
Moroccans, sailed to meet the squadron off Tripoli.
53
  Rodgers‟s decision was a good one.  
Nothing, wrote Simpson, short of peace with Tripoli could completely bring to rest issues with 
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Morocco, as the Moroccans had a certain affinity for their co-religionists.
54
  The watch of one 
frigate was enough to ensure Morocco did not take entering a war lightly, but the only way to 
ensure permanent peace was to end the war with Tripoli.  For that objective, the Congress would 
be of far more use elsewhere. 
 The voyage from Gibraltar to the east was nearly as frustrating as that across the Atlantic.  
“It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the arrival of the squadron had not been more seasonable,” wrote 
William Eaton after arriving at Malta in the President, but even Eaton could admit, “it is the fault 
of the elements alone.”55  There were headwinds and calms aplenty to navigate, and Barron‟s 
two ships did not reach Malta until September, just as Preble made the last of his attacks and 
decided to suspend offensive operations for the year.  This extra time in transit gave William 
Eaton the opportunity to pitch his ideas to Commodore Barron.  Eaton made sure that Barron 
understood the “advantages of cooperating with Hamet Bashaw against Tripoli: and the probable 
disadvantages of acting without his cooperation.”56  Upon arrival at Malta, Eaton quickly 
established contact with Hamet‟s friends there and wrote that despite Hamet‟s flight to Egypt, 
“the advantages calculated to result from a co-operation with him seem not to have diminished,” 
since last Eaton was in the Mediterranean.
57
  The long passage since Gibraltar also meant the 
squadron needed water before proceeding to meet Preble, and had to suffer a period of 
quarantine before gaining access to the port, delaying them even more.
58
  It was only on 10 
September that Barron finally met Preble off Tripoli.  Preble, in no mood to serve as third in 
command of the new squadron, requested instead that Barron grant him leave to return to the 
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United States after returning the gunboats and balancing his accounts.
59
  Barron complied with 
Preble‟s request, giving him the use of the John Adams to conclude his business and return 
home.
60
   
Preble, however, did render Barron a service before his departure.  Mindful of the limited 
effects of his actions, Preble encouraged Barron to use every weapon at his disposal, including 
Hamet.
61
  Preble‟s testimony combined with Eaton‟s overtures convinced Barron of the 
importance of using Hamet, and he immediately dispatched “Eaton to Alexandria in search of 
Homet Bashaw,” to cooperate with naval attacks the following summer.62  Eaton embarked on 
the speedy Argus for the passage to Malta, where he gained contact with Hamet‟s supporters 
there.
63
  Richard Farquhar, still in Hamet‟s service at Malta, was delighted with the prospect and 
confirmed that the time still seemed ripe for the operation.
64
   Salvatore Bufuttil, Hamet‟s 
representative at Syracuse, agreed and promised that Hamet had even already recruited a large 
army.
65
  Though Barron did give Eaton permission to seek out the bashaw, and a ship with which 
to do so, he did not allot a large sum of money for the expedition.  This suspected slight 
encouraged “extreme mortification” in Eaton who claimed to be “destitute of commission, rank, 
or command: and, I may say, consideration or credit.”66  Eaton later solved most of these 
problems on his own, styling himself a general, recruiting an army, and paying for the whole 
thing, as he had before in Tunis, by drawing from government funds, himself directing the 
secretary of the navy to set up a fund of $50,000 at Malta in order to finance the expedition.
67
  
                                                 
59
 Edward Preble to Samuel Barron, 10 Sep. 1804, in Naval Documents V: 13. 
60
 Samuel Barron to Edward Preble, 11 Sep. 1804, in Naval Documents V: 15. 
61
 William Eaton to Secretary of the Navy, 18 Sep. 1804, in Naval Documents V: 33. 
62
 Samuel Barron to Isaac Hull, 13 Sep. 1804, in Naval Documents V: 20. 
63
 Journal of William Eaton, 15 Sep. 1804, in Naval Documents V: 26. 
64
 Richard Farquhar to Samuel Barron, 15 Oct. 1804, in Naval Documents V: 85. 
65
 Salvatore Bufuttil to Samuel Barron, 1 Nov. 1804, in Naval Documents V: 110. 
66
 William Eaton to Secretary of the Navy, 18 Sep. 1804, in Naval Documents V: 33. 
67
 Ibid. 
  
132 
 
Promises from Hamet‟s representatives to repay any expenses after Hamet took the throne even 
encouraged Barron to relent in part, ordering Isaac Hull of the Argus, to provide from that ship 
whatever support Eaton required in the way of stores, ammunition, and money.
68
 
Eaton left for Alexandria in the Argus on 14 November on a trip that took him many 
months to complete, but which ended in possession of the Tripolitan city of Derne.
69
  For much 
of this journey, Eaton was beyond contact, and even when in contact rarely condescended to 
follow orders, and so the legendary march across the desert largely falls outside the scope of this 
thesis.   
It is possible, then, to examine this decision now.  Along with the wildly positive 
outlooks of Eaton and Hamet‟s messengers, Barron also received negative comments about the 
viability of the scheme.  Tobias Lear was perhaps the loudest detractor of the Hamet enterprise.  
“He is now in Egypt, driven by his brother from Derne, where it is presumed he might have 
made a stand had he been a man of any force or influence; which, from the best account I can 
collect, he is not.”70  William Bainbridge, imprisoned in Tripoli, wrote that if his freedom hung 
on Hamet‟s success, “I am decidedly of an opinion that our Country had better abandon us to our 
unfortunate fate,” and that it would be wasteful to provide any aid to “the poor effeminate 
fugitive Brother of the Bashaw.”71  Barron, taking into account these opinions decided to go 
ahead with the measure anyway for, he reasoned, “it may have a good effect … it cannot I think, 
have an ill one.”72  Though his reasoning boiled down to a simple argument, it was still well 
considered and proper.  In the stormy winter season, bombardment and close blockade were 
impossible.  It was precisely then, therefore, the squadron could spare a vessel for this duty.  
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Barron had only to invest the time, money, and stores of one of his vessels to achieve what could 
be a monumental success and which, even if it failed, could not probably result in any terrible 
loss. 
With Argus on its way to Egypt, Barron had to consider the situation in the other Barbary 
States.  From Tangiers, Consul Simpson had largely favorable news about the attitudes and 
abilities of the Moroccans.  Though Alcayde Hashash, again in the emperor‟s favor, had raised a 
large sum to build and equip new gunboats, these vessels would not be ready for many months, 
and the larger Moroccan vessels remained inactive.
73
  Some of these same vessels later left port, 
but their mission proved to be a period of repair in Lisbon rather than further attempts to 
intercept American commerce.
74
  To ascertain the Moroccans‟ object, James Barron followed 
them to Lisbon in Essex.
75
  Assured that the Moroccan fleet would not soon be ready for 
offensive operations, the younger Barron left the Straits and sailed east, where he joined the fleet 
at Malta on 29 October.
76
  Moving eastward along the Barbary Coast, Algiers was quiet enough 
that the consul there, Tobias Lear, felt justified in leaving his post to join the squadron and 
facilitate negotiations with Tripoli.
77
  Preble, reporting to Barron that he had returned all the 
gunboats, saw fit to added that the bey of Tunis “requires good looking after.”78  That very bey, 
however, had his own country to look after at that moment, for the harvest of that fall of 1804 
was meager, and he devoted the government‟s full resources to feeding the people rather than to 
any warlike pastime.
79
  With blockade nearly impossible, and with all of the Barbary Powers 
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unusually complacent, fate presented Barron with the time and means to plan and prepare for his 
offensive of next summer. 
Barron‟s efforts to ready his squadron for the next summer‟s action largely confined 
themselves to three different problems.  First, Barron needed to ensure that the squadron could 
once again have access to gunboats for his own summer operations.  Though Barron had 
authorization to obtain and use gunboats and bomb vessels, his instructions did not inform him 
how to do so.  Additionally, Barron needed to maintain the squadron‟s good standing at the 
convenient ports of Malta and Syracuse.  Finally, Barron‟s vessels needed to be in prime material 
condition and served by full, experienced crews when good weather returned.  All the smaller 
vessels would be well into their second year of continuous service by the summer, and needed 
refit and repair, most especially the Enterprise, veteran of every single previous squadron.  At 
the same time, he established a rotational blockade of the squadron‟s vessels in sections 
consisting of a frigate and at least one smaller vessel.
80
  This approach was one of the more 
cautious open to Barron at the time; he kept only enough vessels off Tripoli to ensure there 
would be no repeat of the Philadelphia disaster, but not nearly enough for a full blockade.  While 
cautious, this decision was also prudent, and if followed ensured that his crews would be fresh, 
and his vessels would have ample time to refit over the winter months. 
Despite the docility of the Barbary States, other factors lined up against Barron as he 
began his preparations.  During his time in charge, Preble, because the business of supplying the 
American squadron and caring for its sailors ashore was brisk, came to exercise a great deal of 
influence over Syracuse‟s government.  The squadron often ignored laws, especially those 
requiring incoming ships to perform a period of quarantine, and only Preble‟s discipline kept the 
Americans from further abusing their status.  In Preble‟s absence off Tripoli, the governor of 
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Syracuse reported that all discipline was lost, and his subjects made constant complaints of 
American abuses.
81
  In light of these difficulties, Barron left the initial blockade of Tripoli to 
John Rodgers, departing himself to visit Syracuse and Malta to ensure he could still supply the 
squadron.
82
  Further, war between England and France resumed, threatening to expand into the 
Mediterranean again, and this war could easily involve some or all of the ports the Americans 
used.
83
  Even if the ports themselves were not under blockade, commodities would certainly be 
in shorter supply.  Additionally, in British ports the old issue of British deserters seeking refuge 
in American ships could flare up at an instant, making Syracuse more attractive, for as Tobias 
Lear put it, “the Americans are in fact commanders of the Town.”84  Though the city‟s residents 
may not have shared Lear‟s sentiment, it was true that American influence still extended further 
in Syracuse than in Malta. 
Even as Commodore Preble returned the gunboats he had used so effectually, Barron 
confronted uncertainty about regaining their services in the next summer.  The looming threat of 
a wider European war, which could choke off supplies to Malta or Syracuse, could also produce 
a need for the borrowed gunboats in their home country.  Nevertheless, Preble met with 
assurances that there would be plenty of gunboats available the next summer, and reported to 
Barron that “the Neapolitan Government are disposed to render you every assistance in their 
power.”85  Pleased, Barron replied to Preble asking him to apply at Naples for “fifteen Gun and 
Six Mortar vessels.”86  Preble, accordingly, put forward his request to the head of the Neapolitan 
military on 15 December, but faced an unusual wait of six days before receiving any reply.
87
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The reply was even more discouraging than the wait.  “The Coasts of the Two Kingdoms being 
continually molested by … the Barbary Regencies,” came the reply, the king of Naples had 
elected to use the gunboats “for the safety of the coasts,” rather than lend them again to the 
Americans.
88
  After dispatching the bad news to Barron, Preble departed immediately for the 
United States, where he hoped to find an alternate solution to providing the squadron with the 
gunboats that he considered so crucial to success.
89
  Even before leaving the Mediterranean, 
Preble hit upon a scheme to hire local craft from Sicily and mate them with cannon and mortars 
purchased from the British at Gibraltar or Malta to function at least as make-shift gun vessels.
90
  
Unwilling to take this initial no for an answer, Barron wrote to Neapolitan Prime Minister John 
Acton, the man who had helped Preble the previous summer, and repeated his request for 
assistance, noting that gunboats involved in offensive actions would certainly help to make the 
Italian coast safer.
91
  Prospects for receiving help from this quarter, however, suddenly seemed 
bleak.  Preble could only assume that “some Interest more powerful than ours, has been working 
against us,” and believed that both the English and French had ample reason to keep the 
gunboats out of American hands.
92
 
With the promise of ready gunboats evaporating, Preble represented Barron‟s need for 
gunboats to the Navy Department upon his return to the United States.  Even before his arrival, 
one naval officer, John Shaw, had applied to the secretary of the navy for permission to lead 
American built gunboats against Tripoli, believing that a large model with certain modifications 
could make the trip.
93
  Naval architect Josiah Fox also believed that a properly constructed 
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gunboat could make an Atlantic crossing, and had an example, one of ten separately building 
around the nation, ready to be launched by 23 February.
94
  Preble met with Secretary Smith soon 
after, and added his weight to the matter, convincing the secretary to order the hastening of the 
construction of each of the ten gunboats to a state of readiness to cross the Atlantic.
95
  The 
secretary anticipated that the boats could be in the Mediterranean by the beginning of July, 
shepherded across the Atlantic by John Adams, again equipped as a supply ship, and relayed this 
information to Barron.
96
  Armed with the experience of using gunboats in combat, Preble agreed 
to assist in the construction of two gunboats and two bomb vessels at Boston.
97
 
Problems with securing additions to his fleet aside, Barron used the fall and winter to 
make sure the whole of his fleet was well manned and sea-worthy.  After Preble left the fleet, 
command of the Constitution devolved on newly promoted Stephen Decatur, but he soon 
swapped his larger command for Captain Rodgers‟s smaller vessel.  After being a year on 
station, Constitution was well short of its full complement of crew and lacking in some vital 
stores.  Accordingly, Barron directed Rodgers to take Constitution to Lisbon, “and there Ship as 
many good Men as you can procure.”98  On his return, Rodgers was to stop at as many ports as 
necessary to bring back the required crewmen and to speak with Consul Simpson to check on the 
situation in Tangiers.  Typically stormy winter weather accompanied Rodgers‟s journey to 
Lisbon; by the time he reached his destination, the Constitution stood in need of “three new 
Topsails, a new Foresail & Mainsail & Bowsprit,” though Rodgers estimated that these could be 
procured in the time occupied in finding sailors.
99
  Even before serving a week of Lisbon‟s 
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mandatory fifteen day quarantine, however, Rodgers began chaffing at the delay and received the 
bad news that the renewed European warfare had convinced most of Lisbon‟s seamen to enlist in 
the British navy.
100
  A few days more delay convinced Rodgers that the American consul to 
Lisbon was playing him false, and the captain even went so far as to threaten a duel, effectively 
ruining any prospect that remained of obtaining a sufficient number of men.
101
  The resumption 
of the Napoleonic wars rendered seamen in short supply in most of Europe, and even had 
Rodgers been able to reconcile his differences with the consul, it is likely that the squadron 
would still lack men.  Barron needed a second source of sailors for his fleet. 
While Rodgers did succeed in meeting at least his vessel‟s material needs in Lisbon, his 
poor relations with Consul Jarvis led Barron to seek other locations for his ships to receive refits.  
In search of friendlier aid, Barron sent the schooner Enterprize, commanded by Master 
Commandant Robinson and worn down by continuous service in the Mediterranean since the 
first squadron, to the Adriatic.
102
  Venice, the best equipped Adriatic port at that time, fell under 
the rule of Austria, a nation that showed every indication of pursuing a neutral course in the war 
engulfing the continent, and whose main effort, even if it did enter hostilities, would be on 
land.
103
  American Adriatic trade, however, was heaviest with Trieste, so that port rather than 
Venice maintained an American consul, and was Robinson‟s first stop.  He found “every Art 
particularly ship-building in infancy” and only “one Yard of any consequence in that place & in 
that not season‟d timber sufficient for our use.”104  To facilitate the ship‟s repair, William 
Riggins, American consul to Trieste, procured a berth for Enterprzse in the famous Arsenal of 
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Venice.
105
  Robinson‟s reception there was all that the Americans could have wished.  
Immediately upon Enterprise’s arrival, the commander of the shipyards met Robinson for a tour.  
The professionalism of the officers and artisans at work, and the profundity of supplies greatly 
impressed the Americans.  Within three days, the arsenal‟s hundreds of laborers had hauled 
Enterprise out of the water and a thorough examination revealed rot so deplorable that Robinson 
wrote, “to sum up all, it‟s only necessary to inform you that in addition to building a new 
schooner we have to pull to pieces an old one.”106  Despite the poor condition of the vessel, to 
Robinson‟s satisfaction, work began immediately.  By 13 April, only three months after work 
began, Robinson reported that the Venetians had re-launched the Enterprize (“in very great stile 
indeed”), and the vessel was ready to rejoin the squadron by 1 May.107  In addition, knowing the 
squadron‟s lack of gunboats, Robinson fixed a large 24-pounder cannon on a swivel mounting on 
Enterprise’s center-line, an armament that would allow his ship to participate effectually in any 
close bombardment of Tripoli.
108
  By seeking new outlets for supply and repair work, and 
perhaps by sending a more temperate commander, Barron succeeded in forging new 
relationships that helped keep his squadron in fighting trim. 
Barron viewed Robinson‟s reports of cooperation and abundance in Venice with 
satisfaction, and decided to make an effort in that region to procure gunboats for the fleet.  After 
Preble‟s earlier negations failed, he recommended that Barron attempt to jury rig a fleet of gun 
and mortar boats from small local craft (Preble recommended sparonaras or trabaccaloes), 
wedded with weapons borrowed from the British at Gibraltar or Malta.
109
  While the small craft 
were available, the likelihood of the Americans finding extraneous weaponry, especially 
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valuable mortars, in British ports was essentially nil.  Robinson‟s descriptions of the supplies and 
material in the Arsenal induced Barron to renew his search for gunboats from that quarter.  He 
dispatched his brother James to Venice “to procure the loan from the Government of that place 
of two Bomb Vessels,” at least.110  Failing in this effort, the commodore ordered James Barron to 
procure armaments that could be fitted onto the local Sicilian craft and the ammunition and 
accoutrements necessary to use them in battle.   
James Barron arrived in Venice, was as impressed as Robinson with the facilities, and 
soon struck up a correspondence with Robinson, while Barron shuttled between Venice and 
Trieste in his efforts.  Initial inquiries found that suitable craft for gunboats and bombards, and 
large caliber canon were available.  The one weapon the Commodore most desired, however, 
large mortars, presented a difficulty.
111
  Only the Austrian government in Vienna could authorize 
the sale of any weaponry, and while there was both shipping and some large cannon in private 
hands, the only mortars were those of the Austrian military.
112
  By April though, Robinson and 
James Barron made some progress even with the mortars, and Robinson reported that if time 
allowed, these weapons also could be obtained.
113
  James Barron, through a contact of 
Robinson‟s, purchased two gunboats, though unarmed, on 20 April, with funds provided by the 
commodore through Consul Riggins.
114
  At Trieste, despite some problems with the local 
authorities, who perhaps thought it imprudent to be seen helping the Americans in their ventures 
against Tripoli, James Barron purchased even more vessels suitable for gunboat conversion.
115
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In addition, the younger Barron found the small American merchant vessel Franklin, former 
prize of the Barbary Pirates, and bought it, believing it capable of carrying a mortar.
116
 
Besides the difficulties with readying his squadron, Commodore Barron had another 
problem of a more personal nature, his own health.  Almost as soon as Barron arrived in the 
Mediterranean, Eaton recorded “The Commodore in ill health,” in his diary.117  Already, his 
captains reporting hard weather, Barron had settled on his plan of rotating blockade, so his ship 
was not immediately needed off Tripoli, and when it was, his flag captain could certainly take 
command, making Barron‟s illness a concern more distant than immediate.118  Indeed, Barron 
was able to go ashore to facilitate his recovery, an action that may have been justifiable just as an 
administrative measure for the winter as well.
119
  He appointed Captain Rodgers to the role of 
commander at sea, and authorized Rodgers to “hoist the broad pendant on board the Constitution, 
& give such orders for the safety of the squadron, from time to time, as may be most 
proper.”120As the autumn wore on, Barron‟s health deteriorated, and it appeared that his recovery 
might be so slow as to inhibit even his logistical duties over the winter.
121
  Indeed, at the end of 
November the disease, “a complaint of the liver,” threatened Barron‟s very life.122  His 
indisposition forced Barron to delegate some of his tasks; for some time, Captain Rodgers wore 
the commodore‟s broad pennant as officer in charge of the blockading portion of the squadron.123  
Barron also issued orders through his subordinates, especially his brother James, after the 
younger Barron joined the squadron from Gibraltar.
124
  While this delegation of duties, and his 
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earlier decision to rotate the squadron before Tripoli, allowed the squadron to continue its 
minimal blockade, by far the most important winter tasks were administrative, and these must 
have suffered.  Only in February was the commodore even fit to sail from Syracuse to Malta, and 
this only to “try the air” of a new place and hope for healthful benefits.125  The move provided at 
least some benefit, for by the middle of February, though his aide still assisted in issuing orders 
to the fleet, “the commodores health [was] visibly improving.”126  Not all on-lookers agreed with 
that diagnosis, and even at the end of April Tobias Lear observed that Barron still suffered.
127
 
In addition to making ready for the military aspects of the upcoming summer‟s campaign, 
Barron also needed to plan his diplomatic strategy for ending the war and retrieving the 
Philadelphia‟s crew.  Nearly every literate American in the Mediterranean was willing to, and 
did, offer advice on dealing with the bashaw: much of it contradictory, almost all of it tainted 
with overconfidence despite four years of failure.  Certainly, Preble had learned the previous 
summer that offering to treat after every military encounter was a poor way to deal with the 
problem. George Davis, temporary American consul at Tunis, echoed these sentiments.  In a 
letter to Secretary of State James Madison, Davis explained that any negotiator should make but 
a single offer, for “every offer that is made him [the bashaw], not only adds to his Insolence; but 
increases his pretensions in a double ratio.”128  Davis was also the principal conduit for 
information between the fleet and Captain Bainbridge in Tripoli, and he and Bainbridge 
commonly exchanged secret messages written in lime-juice, which only became visible when 
heated.  By this means, Bainbridge and other sympathizers with the American cause in Tripoli 
made known their opinions on the subject.  Almost alone, perhaps understandably due to his 
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situation, Bainbridge advocated that the Tripolines be treated with the same courtesy as any 
nation.  He believed that while the bashaw was changeable and greedy, his advisor “Sidi 
Muhammed Deghies … has a just idea of conducting negotiations in a respectable manner.”129  
Any American negotiator, in Bainbridge‟s view, must be properly empowered and prepared to 
stay in the city for a few days, qualifications possessed by Tobias Lear.  Unlike the previous 
summer, Consul Lear was available for direct negotiations with Tripoli.  His presence ashore was 
a boon to the Americans because they no longer needed to rely on foreign agents to act as go 
betweens.  Indeed, Bainbridge believed “that an American will answer much better than any 
Frenchman” in negotiations.130  Lear, who remained with Barron through the winter, was 
confident “that our Force will readily bring the Bashaw to terms of peace without any 
pretensions to payment” and even thought it “possible that the Bashaw hearing of the formidable 
preparations against him,” might treat for peace even before military actions commenced.131  
Bainbridge was far more skeptical of obtaining a cost-free peace.  Hearing estimates from 
American newspapers that his crew could be ransomed for four hundred dollars apiece, he 
expressed surprise, believing “four times the sum” to be more accurate.132   
As divided as opinion was, Tobias Lear remained convinced that the Americans could 
gain peace without much effort.  Though acknowledging Bainbridge‟s fears, Lear maintained his 
favorable outlook and wrote to Barron that conditions in Tripoli, namely that the bashaw “was 
greatly distressed for money and everything else necessary for carrying on the war,” seemed 
favorable.
133
  As the spring approached, while the bashaw remained obstinate, others in the 
Tripolitan government seemed as disposed to treat for peace as Lear had thought.  Sidi 
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Muhammad Dghies, Tripolitan foreign minister, extended feelers through Danish Consul 
Nicholas Nissen to persuade the Americans to negotiate.  “Dghies has personally too much 
Interest in the tranquility and Security of the trade of Tripoli not to” seek peace, Nissen wrote.134  
If a negotiator would come ashore for talks, the method Dghies believed would be most 
favorable, then Dghies would personally guarantee the representative‟s safe return.135  Dghies 
also met with Bainbridge, who through invisible ink, conveyed the same message to Barron, and 
added his recommendation that negotiations begin even before any attack take place.  “Peace 
could be effected” Bainbridge thought, for $120,000 even before an attack was made, “but if the 
attack should not prove as successful it is very probably that such a sum would not release us.”136  
The Tripolitan perception of the size of Barron‟s fleet, wrote Bainbridge, was so exaggerated that 
the “apprehension I believe is worse than the attack itself would prove.”137  Secretary of State 
Madison disagreed.  Reviewing his earlier orders to Lear, Madison found no reason in April to 
change them, noting that the squadron could renew its attacks on Tripoli “when the season 
opens, with equal animation on a much larger scale.”138  Lear, too, was determined that the offer 
to treat for peace come from the bashaw himself, for Lear considered the American force 
imposing enough that the bashaw would be inclined to make the first move.
139
  Indeed, Lear 
believed the Americans could “not again hazard a rejection,” an indication that he wanted, and 
thought it possible, to gain through force the upper hand in any negotiation.
140
  It took until 
April, with the beginning of summer‟s good weather, for the bashaw to finally make such an 
offer.  Tripoli wanted $200,000 combined to provide for peace and ransom, a sum that Lear 
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deemed “inadmissible, as we shall never pay a Cent for peace,” though he was willing to discuss 
paying a ransom for the prisoners in the Bashaw‟s hands.141  Payment for peace, effectively 
paying the first installment of a yearly tribute, and paying for the ransom of prisoners, had long 
been separate in the minds of the Barbary States, who expected both.  Clearly, however, 
American intent in the beginning of the war was to pay no sum whatever: an intent that was now 
banished from the mind of the nation‟s chief negotiator. 
While Barron considered each of these disparate dimensions of his duty, the passive 
blockade of Tripoli continued throughout the winter.  Rarely was more than half the squadron 
actually off the coast, and generally their blockade was distant unless a spell of calm weather 
allowed them inshore.  In one such stretch of calm weather on 19 October, Captain Rodgers 
rowed inshore at night and sounded some of the approaches to the harbor.
142
  In general, 
however, the winter blockade was far more tedious, and despite effectively interdicting trade 
while the weather was fair, regular periods of fog, wind (or lack of it), and storm allowed vessels 
to enter or leave Tripoli with good odds of slipping past the Americans.  Indeed, later during the 
same patrol during which he sounded the coast, Rodgers had to report, “four small coasting 
Boats loaded with Wheat” made an escape, “which they effected in consequence of light Winds 
& hazy Weather.”143  In addition to stationing vessels off Tripoli, for the first time Barron also 
ordered members of his squadron to patrol off the eastern ports including Benghazi and Derne.
144
  
Additional vessels patrolled northward, often stopping at Tunis to receive news from that 
quarter, and waiting off Cape Bon, a logical landfall for Tripolitan raiders bound for the western 
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Mediterranean.
145
  Despite these patrols, it was not just merchant vessels that escaped Tripoli.  In 
March, two small corsairs escaped, later touching at Tunis where George Davis reported their 
presence to the commodore.
146
  Though those vessels took no American prizes, they certainly 
illustrated the blockade‟s porous nature.  The escape also hinted at the advancing season, for the 
Tripolitans generally kept their ships laid up, sometimes even hauled up on shore, during the 
stormy winter.  Off Tripoli, Captain Rodgers also observed evidence that the weather had begun 
to turn favorable.  By 19 March, he reported, “the weather was generally very fine which enabled 
us to preserve a close Blockade.”147 
Even as the naval action appeared ready to commence, William Eaton, transported to 
Egypt the previous fall, marched back into the scene at the head of a motley, mutinous, and 
miserable army.  Though Eaton received most of the credit for bringing Hamet and his followers 
into the fight, his success would scarcely have been possible without the naval support rendered 
him by Commodore Barron and the rest of the squadron.  Isaac Hull in Argus conveyed Eaton to 
Alexandria where he left the ship to find Hamet, using all of Hull‟s discretionary funds in the 
process and borrowing against the credit of the United States for even more.
148
  By the time 
Eaton actually left Alexandria, the expedition was nearly $20,000 in debt: it is no wonder that 
one of Barron‟s more prominent quibbles with Eaton grew out of the issue of funding, especially 
since no express money for the expedition was included in the squadron‟s budget.149  Perhaps 
more serious, and certainly a result of an even more egregious example of Eaton‟s disregard for 
authority, was the disagreement arising from a formal treaty that Eaton enacted, joining the 
causes of Hamet and the Americans.  In return for Hamet‟s promises of reimbursement and good 
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relations after the war, Eaton agreed that the United States would return Hamet to power in 
Tripoli.
150
  This treaty represented a sham both politically and practically as Eaton possessed 
neither the authority to enter into a treaty nor the military force necessary to topple the current 
Tripolitan regime. 
The correspondence between Barron and Eaton slowly devolved into argument, though to 
his credit, Barron still provided much of the support that allowed Eaton to succeed.  Barron‟s 
initial reaction to Eaton‟s spending and signing of treaties was uneasy.  He cautioned Eaton to 
“tread with the utmost circumspection” for the true object of contacting Hamet was to gain 
mutual support, “not to fetter [ourselves] by any specific or definite attainment as an end.”151  
Barron also correctly foresaw that installing Hamet on the throne would be disaster for the 
American prisoners in Tripoli, and was probably an unattainable goal anyway.  In a report to the 
secretary of the navy, Barron confessed “some uneasiness arising out of an apprehension that 
[Eaton] has taken a wider scope in his Engagements … than is compatible with the ideas & 
intentions of Government.”152  Despite his misgivings, Barron loaded both Argus and Hornet 
with all the necessary supplies, dispatching those vessels to Bomba, a small port about sixty 
miles east of Derne, the most eastward of Tripoli‟s major ports and Eaton‟s first objective.153  
Eaton recorded that word of the navy‟s appearance at Bomba instantly changed the mood of his 
army “from pensive gloom to inthusiastic gladness.”154  Perhaps the only implement that Eaton 
desired more than the food and money delivered by Argus and Hornet was a pair of field pieces 
which arrived later on board Nautilus.
155
  On 27 April, as the ships bombarded the town‟s 
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seaward defenses, Hamet and Eaton stormed Derne‟s fortifications, capturing the city after a 
short but sharp fight that culminated in a charge by Marine Lieutenant Presley O‟Bannon upon 
the main enemy position.
156
  This signal victory, an astonishing feat considering the difficulties 
involved, gave a boost to the American cause, which had been relatively inactive since Preble‟s 
departure.  While the victory at Derne remains associated with Eaton, only the navy‟s 
interventions on at least three separate occasions prevented the entire enterprise from failure.  
First, Barron loaned Eaton a ship and money to begin the journey, then he prevented mutiny and 
starvation with the supplies at Bomba, and finally he provided Eaton with the firepower 
necessary to capture Derne.  
Unfortunately, the victory also gave Eaton some perceived political capital, which he 
immediately brought to bear on Commodore Barron.  Immediately after the battle Eaton renewed 
his call for money, falsely representing that the secretary of the navy had promised $50,000 to 
support the venture.
157
  On the subject of unilaterally signing a treaty with Hamet, Eaton wrote: 
 I think it is not presuming too far to conclude, that the unlimited discretion vested in the 
Commander in Chief in regard to all the exigencies of the War, and particularly as it 
relates to the object in view, extends to every matter necessary to its accomplishment.  
The instructions of the Secretary of the Navy, certainly cannot mean to tie him down to 
any limited application.
158
 
 
In reality, of course, the secretary of the navy certainly did mean to limit the power held by both 
Eaton and Barron.  As earlier noted, Eaton‟s orders clearly placed him under Commodore 
Barron‟s command, with only such discretionary powers as Barron himself saw fit to give him.  
Barron too, outside of military matters, answered to Tobias Lear and lacked the authority to 
honor Eaton‟s treaty. 
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Eaton‟s protestations were even more incredible considering his opinion of his own Arab 
allies.  “I can not conceal my apprehensions,” he wrote, “that without more military talent & 
firmness, than exists either in himself or the Hordes of Arabs who attach themselves to him,” 
Hamet could have further impact on the war.
159
  On the long march from Alexandria, in fact, 
Hamet‟s followers succumbed to “frequent fits of despondency, amounting sometimes to 
mutiny.”160  This, perhaps, was an understatement, for outright mutiny confronted Eaton on 
numerous occasions during the march.  In one of the more dramatic incidents, Eaton, O‟Bannon, 
and the Christian mercenaries stood to their arms in the face of a charge from Hamet and two 
hundred of his followers.
161
  The situation was only resolved when cooler heads amongst 
Hamet‟s inner circle rode their own horses between the two opposing forces allowing Eaton, 
ostensibly Hamet‟s subordinate, to regain control of the situation.  In spite of such incidents, 
Eaton believed that his own honor and that of his country demanded that the Americans place 
Hamet on the throne.  “It wou‟d seem incumbent on the honor of the Government,” Eaton 
suggested to Barron, to place Hamet “out of the power of an incens‟d and vindictive enemy.”162  
While it was certainly an honorable sentiment that Hamet and his followers, whom Eaton 
dragged from safety through the Libyan dessert, not be sacrificed after the Americans had gained 
the peace they desired, it certainly overlooked the object of both Eaton‟s expedition and the 
entire war.  Eaton even went so far as to write, “If Hamet Bashaw is to be used solely as an 
instrument, to the attainment of an Object, exclusively to the advantage of the United States … I 
cannot persuade myself that any bonds of patriotism dictate to me the duty of having a Chief 
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Agency, nor indeed any, in so extraordinary a Sacrifice.”163  Of course, having already 
guaranteed by treaty that he would place Hamet on the throne, Eaton had essentially passed the 
buck to Barron and Lear to decide Hamet‟s fate.  Though the capture of Derne was an undoubted 
testament to his fortitude and bravery, Eaton‟s insistence on the impossible goal of toppling the 
current Tripolitan government certainly added to Barron‟s difficulties, and just when offensive 
naval action should have been commencing. 
 Though the season was still early, the Americans clearly needed to transition from 
preparation to action.  With this in mind, Rodgers began to draw down the blockade, sending his 
vessels to port with orders to submit “your requisitions for such Stores, as the [vessel] may 
require for this Summers Expedition.”164  The disadvantages of a minimal blockade paled in 
comparison to the advantages of concentrating force during the decisive summer season.  Even 
despite the smaller blockading force, at times consisting of only his own Constitution, the finer 
weather allowed Rodgers to make a few captures.  On 24 April, he took an armed xebec trying to 
enter Tripoli with two prizes of its own, and sent them in to Barron for reasons “two obvious to 
require commentations.”165  Rodgers‟s Constitution, which had already received a partial refit 
earlier at Lisbon, remained in fighting trim, and the rest of the squadron approached that standard 
of readiness as well.  Of the frigates, President and Constellation had traded shifts off Tripoli, 
but each received plenty of time in Malta or Syracuse to prepare for the season, as did Congress.  
Essex returned from the Adriatic newly ready for service in May.  Of the smaller vessels, only 
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Siren, which patrolled the Straits of Gibraltar, and Enterprize, scouring the Adriatic for gunboats 
after its refit, were unavailable by late spring.
166
 
 In addition to the force already in the Mediterranean, the government, prodded and then 
assisted by Preble, had already prepared reinforcements to bolster Barron‟s forces.  Because of 
the success of his efforts the previous year, Preble gained popular acclaim and the ear of the 
government, meeting with navy officials and even President Jefferson.
167
  In response to Preble‟s 
praise of the gunboat as an ideal platform for use against Tripoli, the navy began planning the 
construction of a squadron for service in the Mediterranean to be ready by the summer of 
1805.
168
  In all, construction began on ten gunboats, built in different American ports, and all to 
the designs of various naval commanders.  Preble himself superintended the construction of two 
of these boats, and two bomb vessels besides, at Boston and Portland.
169
  Work progressed 
quickly, and by March the secretary of the navy issued orders for the commanders of nine of 
them (the other he deemed unable to cross the Atlantic) to enlist crews for the voyage to the 
Mediterranean.
170
  Shortages in skilled labor sufficiently delayed the construction of the bomb 
vessels, so that they could not be finished “in season to reach the Squadron in the Mediterranean, 
before the last of August,” perhaps too late to contribute to that summer‟s fighting.171  Also 
taking advantage of early summer‟s fine weather to join the squadron were a pair of store ships, 
the Ceres and Ann, carrying general provisions as well as shot and powder for the gunboats.
172
  
A final addition, the small frigate John Adams, its guns stored in the hold to facilitate carrying 
almost five hundred sailors to distribute to the squadron, also readied to sail.  Each of these ships, 
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in addition to the nine gunboats, had departed singly or in small groups for the Mediterranean by 
mid-May.
173
  By 4 July, the first of the gunboats, shepherded by John Adams, reached Syracuse 
and the rest of the squadron.
174
 
 These craft, however, arrived only in time to bear witness to one of history‟s great anti-
climaxes.  The Americans had already agreed to pay Tripoli to end the war.  Barron‟s rise from 
his sick bed proved to be too slow; as days of calmer weather slipped by, Barron completely 
relinquished command of the squadron to Rodgers on 22 May after a conference with Tobias 
Lear.
175
  Rodgers had resumed his command of the blockade, and was off Tripoli in Constitution 
when he received the news upon the arrival of Essex with Tobias Lear on board on 26 May.
176
  
Lear received, a month earlier through the Spanish consul in Tripoli, an offer from the Bashaw to 
end the war for $200,000 to include both peace and ransom.  Though he remarked, “these terms 
are inadmissible,” at the time, he must later have come to believe that they provided a solid 
foundation for beginning negotiations.
177
  During the same conference, Lear convinced Barron 
not simply to pass on his command, but also to authorize Lear to proceed with negotiations with 
Tripoli; at least one historian believes that Lear had a far easier time coaxing this order out of 
Barron because of the commodore‟s illness.178  Despite earlier writing that, before negotiation, 
the bashaw should be made “more sensible of our Force, and demonstratively convince‟d of our 
capacity to use it,” Rodgers apparently made no objection to Lear immediately opening 
negotiations.
179
  Barely a week after arriving off Tripoli, three days of which the parties spent 
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waiting for a storm to die down, Lear had signed the preliminary articles of the peace treaty, 
bargaining the bashaw down to $60,000 in exchange for encouraging Hamet to withdraw from 
Derne.
180
  Though this act ended the war, Barron, two weeks before, had ceded his influence 
over the outcome. 
 Opinion concerning the end of the war varied widely, even at the time of the treaty‟s 
signing.  Though the treaty did not mention future American tribute, both sides understood that 
gifts, especially “the custom of giving a present upon the appearance of a new consul” would 
continue, writes historian Ray Irwin.
181
  In addition, while Lear could claim that the United 
States had not bought peace, but only ransomed the Philadelphia’s crew, the war‟s end was 
certainly dependent on payment taking place.  Despite this, the loudest detractor of the peace 
objected for entirely different reasons.  Having already taken the time to sign his own treaty with 
Hamet, William Eaton was incensed that the interests of the United States, in Lear‟s eyes at least, 
counted for more than his own ideal ending to the war.  Though Eaton‟s complaints about the 
abandonment of Hamet provided ammunition for later Federalist attacks on Jefferson‟s 
government, the treaty passed by a comfortable margin in the Senate.
182
  Outside of political 
alliances, the passage of time is responsible for the most dramatic shift in views concerning the 
treaty. 
 Though originally viewed favorably, more recent opinions have largely denounced the 
payment rendered for peace.  Obviously, Lear viewed the treaty as sufficiently honorable, and 
Barron gave his approval while Rodgers made no argument.  William Bainbridge, almost from 
the beginning of his imprisonment, viewed a ransom as the only possible way to end the war.  In 
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1821, S. Putnam Waldo (an early Stephen Decatur biographer) remarked that not only the 
“politician who is governed solely by money logic,” but also the “dignified and patriotic 
statesman … would unhesitatingly give his assent to this treaty.”183  James Fennimore Cooper, 
writing in 1839, remarked simply “thus terminated the war with Tripoli.”184  Considering 
Cooper‟s willingness to extol the virtues of his subjects, and even forgive their mistakes (such as 
Preble‟s with the fireship) this is perhaps a case of damnation by faint praise.  Later opinions 
consider the treaty everything from “unwise” to proof that “Lear in his zest for a treaty 
conveniently forgot” the actual aims of the war.185  The treaty was certainly less beneficial than 
could have been hoped for, considering the size of the American force present, the imminent 
reinforcements and Eaton‟s success at Derna.  Of more import in this study than the terms of the 
treaty is the temerity that Barron displayed in ceding his responsibility to Rodgers and Lear. 
 Barron certainly made the wrong choice in sending Lear to begin negotiations at the same 
time as he passed control of the squadron to Rodgers.  In the first place, if Barron believed that 
his health was so compromised that he needed to pass full command of the squadron to Rodgers, 
then certainly he was in no fit state to instruct Lear to begin negotiations.  Even if his health 
forced a change in command, Barron could have just as easily left the decision of when to begin 
negotiations with Rodgers.  Lear‟s orders made it clear that only should “adverse events and 
circumstances … render the campaign abortive” was he authorized “in the last instance” to offer 
a price for peace.
186
  The campaign was far from abortive; Derne was perhaps its greatest 
success.  Time was also far from a pressing matter.  At the end of May, the entire summer of fair 
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weather for naval operations lay ahead; Preble‟s operations lasted until the end of September.  
Barron, then, should have been under no illusion that Lear had the authority to insist on offering 
money to the bashaw, and certainly must have known that peace could not have been secured at 
this time without payment.  Though, unlike previous commodores, Barron did not himself have 
authority to negotiate, his orders dictated that he and Lear should “cordially co-operate … to 
effectuate a termination of the war.”187  Perhaps his illness so weakened Barron that he forgot the 
power of his position and succumbed too quickly to Lear‟s arguments to treat.  Realizing that 
even if he retained overall command, he would not lead the squadron off Tripoli that summer, 
perhaps Barron felt enough self-pity to forget that the honor of the nation hung on the outcome 
of the war.  Historian Glenn Tucker describes Barron‟s leadership as so “enfeebled” that it 
surpassed even Morris‟s ineptitude.188  While this is not true of most of Barron‟s tenure, even 
when he lay sick in bed, it was certainly true of this, Barron‟s last act as commodore. 
 Though this was undoubtedly a poor end for Barron, his actions at the beginning of the 
campaign were largely praise-worthy.  Barron correctly divined that the Moroccan situation in 
1804 was far less serious than the crisis the year before.  Leaving Rodgers behind, he pushed on 
to the main theater of war.  His orders for Rodgers ensured that the two frigates left behind 
would catch up with the main force as soon as possible.  Marked by quick decision making and 
cooperation with Consul Simpson, this effort provided a good model for Barron‟s future dealings 
with Tripoli.  Upon arrival off Tripoli, the stormy season had advanced so much that even Preble 
had already decided to suspend full-scale operations for the winter.  Though Preble wanted to 
leave the Mediterranean, Barron was perceptive enough to mine his predecessor for information, 
                                                 
187
 Secretary of the Navy to Samuel Barron, 6 June 1804, in Naval Documents IV: 153. 
188
 Tucker, Dawn Like Thunder, 420. 
  
156 
 
and have Preble lobby the Kingdom of Naples for continued use of the gunboats.  These 
beginnings demonstrated the capability and decisiveness necessary in a successful commander. 
 A final decision, also made at the beginning of his command, led to America‟s most 
signal victory of the entire campaign.  Against the judgment of Tobias Lear and others, Barron 
sent William Eaton to Alexandria to search for Hamet.  Just as important as sending Eaton in the 
first place was Barron‟s continued support for the operation.  There is no doubt that this success 
lay primarily with Eaton‟s force of will.  Without the navy, however, Eaton would have faced 
sure failure on several occasions.  The Argus carried Eaton to Alexandria and financed his 
expedition up the Nile to find Hamet.  At Bomba, the first convenient port along the march to 
Derna, two vessels met Eaton with the supplies and money necessary to prevent mass desertion 
and mutiny among Eaton‟s army.  The firepower to take Derna came in the form of field pieces 
obtained by Barron and transported to Eaton onboard Nautilus.  While several vessels 
bombarded the town from seaward, the core of the force that stormed Derne‟s defenses was a 
marine detachment from the fleet.  Barron‟s material support, including the field pieces, 
continued even after Eaton had severely overstepped his responsibilities by signing his accord 
with Hamet.  Smart enough to separate the military benefit of supporting Eaton from his personal 
misgivings over the man‟s conduct, Barron walked an admirable middle ground.  Without 
conceding too much authority, or allowing himself to be bound by Eaton‟s promises to Hamet, 
Barron still gained Eaton‟s valuable service.  Eaton himself and many a historian later have 
vilified Barron for dishonorably using Hamet only to further American aims, then discarding him 
after the war.  Against this must be set the military reality that a complete overthrow of Bashaw 
Yusef would probably have been impossible.  Additionally, Secretary Madison made it clear in 
his orders that the cause of the United States was not to be tied to the cause of Hamet.  Only 
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Eaton, who had also at least once compelled Hamet forward on the march at gunpoint, had 
actually, though illegally, promised Hamet the throne of Tripoli. 
It was only as the enforced inactivity of the winter season set in that Barron confronted 
his first adversity.  Barron‟s largest problem was the lack of the gunboats that Preble had 
previously used.  After a brief peace, war between England and France had reopened the year 
before, and threatened to expand to include other Mediterranean nations.  Though the real reason 
for the Neapolitans to withhold their gunboats is unclear, American speculation fell upon the 
diplomatic influence of both France and England.  Whatever the cause, Barron had to act quickly 
to ensure that his fleet would have these necessary craft for the summer‟s campaign.  The 
commodore‟s in-theater response was not entirely successful.  Barron tasked his brother James 
with finding suitable craft and weaponry in the Austrian ports for cobbling into a makeshift 
gunboat fleet.   While these efforts did not bring gunboats to Syracuse promptly at the start of 
the season, the Americans could likely have fielded some sort of gunboat force given the 
ordnance and hulls purchased by that time.  Preble‟s efforts in America, however, rendered 
Barron‟s limited success in the gunboat search largely moot.  Though Barron wrote in support of 
the idea, the activity of Preble and Secretary of the Navy Smith produced a flotilla of nine 
gunboats as well as two bomb vessels.  These vessels began arriving in July, and considering that 
Preble‟s own operations the year before had not begun until August, they certainly arrived in 
time to play an immediate role in any fighting. 
Gunboats were far from Barron‟s only troubles.  The unease of public opinion in 
Syracuse demanded immediate smoothing, that Barron accomplished successfully enough to 
retain that port as a base.  This was fortunate, for though Malta continued to serve as a base, the 
war between France and England rendered supplies scarce at that port.  This forced Barron, like 
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the commodores before him, to seek out new points of supply.  Barron was particularly 
successful in this regard.  He and the navy agents in Syracuse provided for all but the most 
haggard of the squadron.  The Constitution, under Captain Rodgers, Barron dispatched to 
Lisbon.  Though the venture, through either Rodgers‟s impatience or Consul Jarvis‟s 
mismanagement, did not prove entirely successful, the effort at least rendered Constitution 
battle-ready once more.  Not content with this middling result, Barron sent Enterprize up the 
Adriatic to the Austrian controlled port of Venice.  Then neutral, the city‟s officials were more 
than obliging and completely overhauled the American warship.   
During the winter, Barron also decided to pursue a policy of limited blockade.  The 
squadron‟s ships rotated between Syracuse and Tripoli, with one frigate on station at all times, 
accompanied by one or more smaller vessel.  The advantages of this strategy were clear.  The 
rotation meant that ships had plenty of time to resupply between deployments without hiring 
tenders to ferry supplies.  The system was also flexible.  If a special task, like assisting Eaton‟s 
march or searching for gunboats, called for dispatching a ship, then the ship was available.  If a 
ship needed more significant repairs, Barron could withdraw it from the rotation altogether as 
needed.  Those ships in good order remained that way because they were not strained by long, 
continuous service.  That this plan allowed for less than a complete blockade is also true, 
however.  For this reason, historian Glenn Tucker sarcastically writes that Barron‟s great 
achievement was “to keep the ships always separated and never once concentrated in a show of 
force off Tripoli.”189  In fairness, however, it should be noted that for much of the winter the 
weather was foul enough that two ships were barely worse than twenty.  None of the 
commodores maintained their entire squadron off Tripoli in the winter, and Barron cannot be 
condemned for this.  Additionally, the circular blockade, combined with his success in finding 
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refits for his vessels, meant that Barron could have decisively concentrated his squadron during 
the decisive season. 
Barron‟s final act, however successful his earlier actions, must be the basis of the final 
word on this commodore‟s time in command.  That Barron suffered from a debilitating illness 
for much of the winter and could not recover in time for operations in the summer was not his 
fault.  In the winter, even despite the illness, Barron still issued the necessary commands to keep 
the squadron running.  Summer operations demanded a leader to command from the quarterdeck, 
and as Barron felt he could not undertake this duty, his decision to abdicate in favor of Rodgers 
was the correct one.  In yielding the squadron to Rodgers, Barron should also have yielded the 
full duties of the squadron‟s command.  Instead, he ordered Rodgers simply to assist as Lear 
negotiated an end to the war.  Barron took this decision after a series of meetings with Lear, who 
apparently persuaded the commodore to adopt the strategy of negotiation.  That Lear, responsible 
for the diplomatic side of the conflict, should also have been involved so heavily on the military 
side is a sign of Barron‟s weakness in that moment. 
The decision to negotiate ran contrary to orders from the government, and also contrary 
to plain logic.  It was true that Eaton and Hamet almost certainly could not have taken Tripoli 
itself, and true too that their victory at Derne provided a boost to the Americans.  It is equally 
true, however, that Eaton‟s force could have accomplished more.  With naval support, there was 
no reason that Tripoli‟s other eastern ports, like Benghazi, would not have fallen as well, 
increasing the pressure on the bashaw.  On the naval side, even without gunboats, a more 
complete blockade was now possible.  If, for the second straight summer, Tripoli‟s raiders had 
gone without prizes then the Americans‟ negotiating status would have improved even further.  
Under Preble, the Constitution had ranged close enough to some of Tripoli‟s fortifications to deal 
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them significant damage.  Barron had not only that same ship, but also three more heavy frigates 
capable of similar exertions.  The presence of brigs and schooners leant a measure of safety to 
the big ships as the frigates operated in shallows.  With the smaller ships present to chase away 
enemy gunboats, a repeat of the Philadelphia disaster was unlikely.  Finally, gunboats 
themselves, nine built in the United States and perhaps more cobbled together from purchases in 
the Adriatic, were available long before the end of the summer.  About the same time of year in 
1805 as Preble‟s attacks commenced the year before, two bombards had even arrived from the 
United States, well ahead of expectations.  Even with half this force on station, Barron‟s fleet 
would have been just as powerful as Preble‟s.  Using Preble‟s success in supplying his fleet on 
station as a blueprint, the fleet could have mounted similar attacks in 1805.  That Lear was able 
to negotiate the price from $200,000 to $60,000 is an illustration of the weakness of the bashaw‟s 
position even at the beginning of the summer.  It is likely that the balance of power could only 
shift even further in the Americans‟ favor. 
In the light of Barron‟s final decision, it is hard to consider his command a successful 
one.  Barron‟s mission was to end the war, so it seems superficially odd that his decision to 
negotiate a peace should be the act that condemns his tenure to mediocrity.  This outcome must 
be balanced against all the factors that favored Barron‟s success.  Despite commanding the most 
powerful fleet of all the commanders, a fleet that would have grown only more powerful as the 
campaign season wore on, Barron‟s fleet did not lob a single ball at Tripoli‟s defenses.  Unlike 
the other commanders, Barron‟s fleet had the assistance of a land force, Eaton and Hamet‟s 
army.  These advantages can be added to the fact that Barron‟s responsibilities were often less 
onerous than those of his predecessors.  Barron had a flag captain to run his ship, a negotiator to 
handle the diplomacy, and the support infrastructure established by Dale and honed by Preble.  
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In this light, the payment of any price for peace constituted a failure, and it was Barron‟s 
decision that facilitated that failure.
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5: STEPHEN DECATUR 
 If former officers of the United States Navy held court in some afterlife, Stephen Decatur 
could not be other than their chief justice.  Decatur‟s rise to fame occurred during the Tripolitan 
War, when in 1803 he received his first command, and when during the same year he led the 
expedition that burned the USS Philadelphia.
1
   
Despite his earlier successes, his “greatest triumph” came during the last stage of this 
conflict, when in 1815 he “not only secured peace with Algiers, but also ensured that the other 
Barbary States would remain quiescent.”2  There can be little doubt that Stephen Decatur had a 
mind for tactics, and this, combined with his skill and luck in battle, has made his stature 
legendary.  But the triumph referred to above by Decatur biographer Spencer Tucker, Decatur 
secured with only a modicum of battlefield heroics.  He secured victory with quick thinking and 
clever negotiation.  In 1815, the opponent was Algiers, not Tripoli.  America, and her navy 
especially, enjoyed a more prominent reputation abroad after the successes they scored against 
the British in the War of 1812.  Despite these differences, Decatur faced many of the same 
challenges as the commodores that sailed against Tripoli.  With little naval presence in the 
Mediterranean since the remnants of Barron‟s squadron sailed home, Decatur‟s challenges 
mirrored those of his predecessors enough that comparison between them is possible. 
Stephen Decatur Jr., like many American naval officers of the day, came from a sea-
faring family, grandson of a French naval officer who emigrated to England‟s American 
colonies.  Stephen Sr., a privateersman in the Revolution, took his son on several merchant 
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voyages before both accepted positions as midshipmen in the new Unites States Navy on the eve 
of the Quasi-War with France.
3
  While the elder Decatur had a much more active war than his 
son, the navy‟s success against France and the far-sighted policies of Secretary of the Navy 
Benjamin Stoddert assured that Stephen Jr. could continue in the navy as a profession, an 
opportunity unavailable to previous generations of American officers.
4
  Decatur gained 
promotion to lieutenant after only a year as a midshipman.  Despite the pairing down of the navy 
under the Jefferson administration, Decatur preserved his rank through the short peace until the 
outbreak of war with Tripoli. 
Decatur first sailed to the Mediterranean in Dale‟s squadron as first lieutenant of the 
Essex, under Captain Bainbridge, then in Morris‟s squadron as first lieutenant of the New York.  
Neither of these billets offered much in the way of naval action, because the main duty of each 
ship was convoying friendly merchantmen.  Despite the unwelcome inaction, Decatur used his 
“practical skill [as] an accomplished naval disciplinarian,” judged by an early biographer to be 
the basis for his later success, to remake each of the crews under his command into an effective 
unit.
5
  The squadron‟s idleness under Morris insured the constant mixing of American sailors and 
officers with local citizens during extended stays in port.  These stays often produced tension that 
the commodore failed to curb.  One duel between two American junior officers ended in the 
death of marine Captain James McKnight, the husband of Decatur‟s older sister.6  In another 
instance, an experienced duelist provoked an American midshipman into a duel and then 
challenged.
7
  Hearing of the upcoming duel, Decatur installed himself as the boy‟s second and 
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insisted on a firing distance of but four paces, perhaps hoping that the challenge would be 
dropped.  The duel went ahead, however, resulting in the death of the English opponent and the 
wrath of Malta‟s governor.8  In response to the governor‟s complaints, Morris stripped Decatur 
of his duty.  Decatur returned home with Morris when Secretary of the Navy Smith recalled the 
commodore. 
 Morris‟s board of inquiry resulted eventually in his dismissal.9  For Decatur, being on the 
wrong side of Morris was no condemnation in the eyes of the government.  Preble‟s squadron, 
now fitting out, included a handful of smaller vessels, and Decatur gained command of one, the 
brig Argus, soon after his return.
10
  Decatur directed the launching and fitting out of this vessel 
and saw it manned and equipped.  When he arrived in the Mediterranean, however, Decatur 
exchanged the larger Argus with Isaac Hull‟s schooner Enterprize, giving the senior Hull the 
larger command.
11
 Decatur arrived to find a squadron that bore little resemblance to the one he 
left only months earlier.  According to historian Fletcher Pratt, Commodore Preble recognized 
that “wars are won by fighting,” and focused the energy of the squadron‟s young officers toward 
the enemy.
12
  Gone were the long stays in ports and the duels that such stays occasioned.  It was 
Preble, more than any other early American naval figure, who shaped the officer corps of the 
young navy, and it was Decatur, more than any other officer, who embodied those principles and 
carried them throughout his career. 
 On the last day of October 1803, the frigate Philadelphia ran aground on the shoals in the 
mouth of Tripoli harbor.  As the tide went out, the ship‟s deck tilted at an extreme angle 
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rendering its guns ineffective.  Tripolitan gunboats encircled the frigate and forced its 
surrender.
13
  It was at this point, more than at any other during his career, that simple luck played 
a part in Decatur‟s advancement.  Preble‟s squadron had separated.  Preble himself focused on 
Morocco, while some of the smaller ships convoyed merchantmen past the threat of Morocco‟s 
raiders.  As the squadron reunited to proceed to Tripoli, Enterprzse was the first ship to rejoin the 
commodore after Preble received the news of Philadelphia’s capture.14  Preble and Decatur 
together formulated a plan for the frigate‟s destruction.  Though William Bainbridge, 
Philadelphia‟s former captain, now prisoner of Tripoli, suggested in a letter to Preble a plan for 
the frigate‟s destruction, it is probable that the idea sprang from the active mind of Preble or with 
Decatur himself.
15
  
Wherever the plan originated, the commodore had refined and finalized it by the 
beginning of spring‟s fair weather.  Preble directed Decatur to take command of a small vessel of 
a familiar Mediterranean type that had earlier fallen into the squadron‟s hands.  With the support 
of the schooner Syren, he directed Decatur to use his “Intrepidity and Enterprise” to effect the 
Philadelphia’s destruction.16  Decatur‟s supply of these two attributes was immediately 
necessary to maintain control of his volunteer crew through numerous unexpected hardships: 
gales and putrid rations.
17
  It is a testament to Decatur‟s presence of command that, despite these 
additional difficulties, his crew remained loyal and executed the boarding and burning of the 
Philadelphia with precision.  Decatur gave the credit for this accomplishment to his crew, 
“who‟s coolness and intrepidity was such, as I trust will ever characterize the American tars.”18  
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At home in America, Decatur was the primary focus of the attention of the public and 
government.  The secretary of the navy promoted Decatur immediately to the rank of full 
captain, a move that catapulted him ahead of many of his erstwhile seniors.
19
  Congress, equally 
pleased and not to be outdone, awarded Decatur a ceremonial sword for his “gallantry, good 
conduct and services” in the attack on the Philadelphia.20 
 Unaware of his blossoming stardom in the United States, or even of his promotion, 
Decatur continued his service with the Mediterranean squadron under Commodore Preble.  
Despite losing his second most powerful vessel, the commodore remained determined to take 
offensive action against Tripoli, rather than merely maintain a blockade.  To position heavy guns 
within close range of the harbor‟s defenses, Preble hired gunboats: shallow-draft vessels 
mounting a single large cannon in the bows.  These craft did “not sail or row even tolerably well 
… and cannot be navigated with safety,” and in fact their only real virtue was that their draft 
allowed them to approach Tripoli Harbor without the danger of grounding, as the Philadelphia 
had.
21
  Preble entrusted command of the squadron‟s six gunboats to Decatur who led them into 
action on 3 August. 
While assaults on Tripoli continued throughout August, this first action remains the most 
famous, and was Decatur‟s most important.  As the gunboats approached the harbor, the 
Tripolitans deployed nineteen gunboats to oppose the Americans‟ six.22  Leading the charge, 
Decatur caught one enemy gunboat, boarded, and took it a prize before it could retreat to the 
safety of the harbor.
23
  Decatur‟s brother, Lieutenant James Decatur, also captured an enemy 
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gunboat in the fighting.  After surrendering, however, the captain of that vessel shot Stephen, 
delivering a mortal wound.
24
  This treacherous act prompted Decatur to cast off his tow, turn his 
gunboat back toward the entrance to the harbor, chase down the offending captain, and kill him 
personally in hand-to-hand combat, taking his second enemy gunboat of the day.
25
  Barron 
brought word that the navy had confirmed Decatur‟s promotion, and he assumed command of 
the ship Preble left behind.  Though he remained in the Mediterranean for much of the remaining 
campaign, Decatur‟s next real activity came when he returned home, where he and Preble were 
received with parties, dinners, and formal balls in cities up and down the east coast. 
There can be no question that the experience Decatur gained under Preble‟s command 
helped his own later efforts.  Decatur‟s two successful battles were founded on Preble‟s military 
aggressiveness and resourceful planning.  First, Preble recognized the importance of offensive 
action.  Where his predecessors often failed to maintain a blockade, Preble bombarded the city‟s 
defenses.  Preble also used every possible resource in his planning.  The greatest blows the 
Americans struck during the Tripolitan War came from a tiny, captured merchant vessel and a 
fleet of borrowed gunboats and mortar vessels.  Even Preble‟s failures provided valuable lessons.  
By negotiating far too readily with the bashaw, Preble squandered the negotiating advantages 
that his attacks had won.  Military action could not be an end in itself, for even a successful 
action could hurt a war effort if coupled with poor diplomacy.  In Preble‟s actions, Decatur found 
an outstanding blue-print for military success and several lessons to learn in diplomatic 
negotiation. 
As Decatur‟s career continued its upward course, America‟s position in the 
Mediterranean and in the world declined.   The invalid, Barron, left his squadron to Captain, now 
                                                 
24
 Richard Somers to Edward Preble, 4 Aug. 1804 in Naval Documents IV: 344. 
25
 Stephen Decatur to Edward Preble, 3 Aug., 1804, in Naval Documents IV: 345. 
  
168 
 
Commodore John Rodgers who sailed his fleet from Tripoli to troublesome Tunis.  The bey of 
Tunis took every opportunity to harass the Americans during the Tripolitan War, and Rodgers 
deemed that with the current concentration of American force, the time was right settle relations 
with that nation.  He sailed into harbor, queried peace or war, and the bey promised peace.
26
  
Certainly the American fleet was impressive, and though Tripoli made $60,000, it took them four 
years to do so, time they could have spent extorting money from easier marks.  Even with 
Barbary assurances of peace, the government determined to leave some presence in the theater, 
and Rodgers‟s return in 1806 prompted the fitting out of a new fleet the next year under the 
command of James Barron, previous commodore Samuel‟s younger sibling.27   
Barron‟s flagship, the frigate Chesapeake, had scarcely left harbor before the British 
vessel Leopard compelled it to stop with three broadsides before hauling off four British 
deserters who had signed on board.  The Chesapeake-Leopard affair not only sent the United 
States farther down the road to war with Britain, it also ended the American presence off the 
Barbary coast and caused problems for Decatur as well.  By this time, he commanded naval 
operations in Norfolk, the port Chesapeake limped to in tatters.  Secretary Smith passed 
command of the battered frigate to Decatur, who saw the ship repaired.  After fears of imminent 
war receded, Decatur served on the court of inquiry that found Barron partially responsible for 
the calamity, suspending him from service for five years and beginning a life-long animosity.
28
 
Decatur could spare little thought for a personal quarrel, however, because he was 
absorbed in naval duties in the run up to the War of 1812.  When war finally arrived, Decatur 
commanded the frigate United States.  If he thought the round of social engagements after the 
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Tripolitan War were excessive, the celebrations that followed his capture of the British frigate 
Macedonian proved him wrong.
29
  In his next command, Decatur was less fortunate.  The frigate 
President, itself a Tripolitan War veteran, fell prey to a superior British squadron, and both the 
ship and its disheartened captain became British captives.  The President’s capture occurred only 
a few months before the war‟s end, and the successful negotiation of a peace with Britian 
overshadowed this loss.  Before even standing before the usual court of inquiry into the loss of 
his last vessel, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Crowninshield offered Decatur the command of 
a squadron outfitting for the Mediterranean.  While this was unusual, historian Frederick Leiner 
points out that he was the obvious choice.  Of the five captains more senior, one was too elderly, 
one occupied a cabinet position, one was overseas and in disgrace, and the next, Captain 
Bainbridge, accepted the command of the second Mediterranean squadron and the new 
Independence, the first line of battle ship in the United States Navy.
30
  After building his career 
fighting against one Barbary state, Decatur now readied to fight another. 
 With its bright moments of success against the British in the War of 1812, the American 
navy was popular with the public and growing quickly.  In the Tripolitan War, there is no 
question that the balance of the action went in the Americans‟ favor.  The peace largely 
mitigated those military victories, and the Americans not only paid for peace, but mounted no 
concerted attack for almost a year before beginning negotiations.  These actions hardly 
constituted a deterrent to the other, stronger Barbary nations.  Algiers, courted by Britain, 
declared war on the United States in 1812 and began pursuing American shipping.  Competing 
against the entire Royal Navy for prizes proved difficult, and the Algerines captured only the 
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brig Edwin.
31
  The peace with England did not include Algiers.  With a fleet of American 
merchant vessels ready to take to the seas, the Algerine fleet represented a danger.  Even apart 
from this problem, the Algierines held Edwin’s crew and believed they could demand both 
ransom and the tribute the Americans failed to pay during the War of 1812.  To subdue the 
Algerines and protect American commerce in the Mediterranean, President James Madison 
dispatched a pair of squadrons.  Congress agreed, and voted for war on 2 March 1815.
32
   
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Crowninshield formed two well-balanced forces to send 
against Algiers.  During the Tripolitan War, the Americans proved the value of small craft and 
the virtues of the heavy American frigates.  The first squadron‟s composition reflected perfectly 
the service requirements of the North African station.  It consisted of the “Guerriere and 
Constellation Frigates, the Ontario and Epervier Sloops, and the five small vessels [Flambeau, 
Spark and Firefly Brigs, Torch and Spitfire Schooners] … together with the Frigate Macedonian 
if she can be equipped in time.”33  The Macedonian was, in fact, ready in time for Decatur‟s 
departure and joined the first squadron.  The Epervier and Ontario, moreover, were not sloops in 
terms of their rigging, but rather ship-rigged sloops of war (miniature frigates), and as such were 
not counted as „small ships.‟ The squadron had substantial firepower; the Constellation and 
Macedonian were both conventional frigates of 36 and 38 guns respectively, while the flagship 
Guerriere was a brand new 44-gun ship built to similar specifications as the famous earlier 
frigates Constitution, President, and United States.  The small craft could work close in shore to 
interdict light vessels traveling near the shoals.  They also packed enough fire power by 
themselves to serve as convoy escorts; the Enterprize that Decatur had commanded under Preble 
                                                 
31
 Ibid, 22-3. 
32
 “A Bill for the Protection of the Commerce of the United States against the Algerine Cruisers”, Annals of 
Congress, 13
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., (Washhington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1854), vol. 28: 284-91. 
33
 Benjamin Crowninshield to Stephen Decatur, 15 Apr. 1815, from The National Archives Record Group 45, T829, 
Confidential Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy.  Hereafter cited as Confidential Letters. 
  
171 
 
had earlier beaten the Tripolitan raider Tripoli, and was similar in size to the schooners and brigs 
included in the first 1815 squadron.   
 Of all the American squadrons fitted out for the Mediterranean, this one represented both 
the most balanced and powerful force of the lot.  The first two squadrons, under Commodores 
Dale and Morris, contained only one smaller vessel each and failed to maintain a choking 
blockade.  Preble‟s squadron had numerous shallow draft vessels but only two frigates.  When 
Philadelphia ran aground, his squadron‟s firepower was halved.  Only Commodore Samuel 
Barron‟s squadron was similar in size and balance, a similarity that allows comparison between 
the success of the two commanders. 
 The instructions Crowninshield issued to Decatur were concise and clear.  The secretary 
of the navy “authorized and directed [Decatur] to subdue, seize and make prize of all Vessels, 
goods and effects, belonging to the Dey or subjects of Algiers.”34  Additional and more specific 
orders directed Decatur to “use your utmost exertions to intercept and capture the [Algerine] 
cruising vessels which may be at Sea” for the purpose of protecting American commerce.35  With 
these two directives, Decatur received direction as clear and concise as any previous 
commodore.  Earlier commodores often used fleet assets to convoy merchant vessels rather than 
focusing on the enemy fleet and port.  Earlier, Secretary of the Navy Smith waited until his 
second commodore, Morris, to issue such orders.  Crowninshield understood this danger from 
the first and drafted his orders to leave no doubt about the fleet‟s objectives. Knowing that the 
best way to defend American commerce was to remove Algerine raiders from the sea, 
Crowninshield made sure that Decatur would not be tempted to remain passive.  Decatur‟s 
aggressiveness perhaps renders this point moot, but the distances involved in such an operation 
                                                 
34
 Benjamin Crowninshield to Stephen Decatur, 15 Apr. 1815, from Confidential Letters. 
35
 Ibid. 
  
172 
 
forced Crowninshield to draft orders that would stand against time, distance, and any surprises 
that may have awaited Decatur beyond Gibraltar.  
Crowninsheild was also adamant that the squadron establish a blockade of Algiers as 
early as possible.  The timidity of both the commodores and American foreign relations often 
combined to thwart effective blockade during the Tripolitan War.  A lack of small vessels had 
rendered earlier blockades of Tripoli ineffective, but Crowninshield had already removed this 
possibility by sending a well-balanced squadron.  Decatur was not only to lay his ships off of 
Algiers, but to publicly “declare the Port of Algiers in a State of Blockade.”36  This, 
Crowninshield hoped, would forestall the diplomatic questions of legality that plagued the 
blockade of Tripoli.  Before his famous trek across the Libyan desert, William Eaton as 
American consul in Tunis, issued a “paper blockade” by refusing to sign passports for Tunisian 
vessels headed for Tripoli.  Eaton‟s counterpart at Algiers, Consul O‟Brien, refused to do the 
same for fear of provoking a response, and the Tripolitan blockade fell apart after a successful 
start.
37
  Later in that war when Preble seized the initiative and put Tripoli back under blockade, 
he circulated a declaration of blockade to both the Barbary nations and to the consuls of the 
European Mediterranean nations.  This drew the ire of numerous nations, especially France, and 
in the end the United States government refused to recognize Preble‟s complete authority to 
prevent neutral vessels not carrying contraband from entering Tripoli.
38
  It seems the government 
at the time was especially wary of provoking the ire of any other nation, but this was not as true 
in 1815.  Whether the United States as a nation had matured or whether Crowninshield was 
simply more aggressive (and probably for both reasons) there was no ambiguity about the 
blockade that Decatur was to effect.  The American blockade would strictly prohibit “the 
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intercourse by ingress or egress of all Vessels of any nation whatever,” after the blockade had 
been established and publicly declared.
39
  While Crowninshield did caution Decatur to proceed 
fairly with other nations, in 1815 the United States would not curry favor with the European 
powers, but instead expect “of them no more than justice.”40 
Decatur, like the other commodores, still received his share of discretion.  Crowninshield 
gave Decatur free reign to pick the port of rendezvous for the squadron in the Mediterranean.  
While he recommended the port of Cagliari on Sardinia, a port that welcomed the Americans 
during the Tripolitan War, he directed Decatur to “be governed by circumstances and your good 
judgment” as this decision would be better made in the Mediterranean than “here in the 
Department.”41  Decatur could also have established a hospital on shore if he chose, and in 
making this decision he was to be “governed by the actual State of things in Europe.”42  In 
general, and in all things, Decatur was to use his “own discretion in directing the operations of 
[his] squadron in such a manner as to produce the most effect upon the Enemy.”43 
Finding a base for supply and establishing a hospital are tasks given with a long war in 
mind, and this is where Crowninshield made his largest miscalculation.  He wrote, in fact, that “it 
is considered that the squadron at present under your command is not sufficiently strong to 
attempt offensive operations against the town and Batteries of Algiers.”44  The American 
experience against Tripoli supported his reasoning.  Only one commodore, Edward Preble, 
undertook real bombardments of Tripoli‟s battery and though the attacks reduced the bashaw‟s 
asking price for peace, they did not encourage capitulation.  While Decatur‟s squadron included 
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more large ships than Preble‟s, it lacked the mortar-equipped bomb vessels and the gunboats that 
Preble used so effectively in inshore bombardments.  Crowninshield‟s answers to the 
fortifications at Algiers were the 74-gun Independence and the bomb vessels of the second 
squadron under Bainbridge.  Decatur was to make the Mediterranean safe for American 
merchants by capturing those Algerine vessels then at sea and bottling the rest in Algiers, a task 
for which his fleet was ideally suited. 
Crowninshield had also learned from the past in other areas.  Earlier commodores spent 
at least part of their time dealing with money matters.  Each commodore, and often each ship‟s 
commander, sailed with funds to use in the squadron‟s business.  Sometimes the funds went to 
good uses, like funding Eaton‟s desert offensive.  Sometimes, however, they were not, as when 
the Bey of Tunis extorted squadron funds from Commodore Morris.  Instead of leaving money 
matters to Decatur, Crowninshield appointed the American Consul Richard McCall in Barcelona, 
to be the Navy Department‟s Mediterranean financial representative.45  Decatur also received 
assistance with negotiations.  Instead of relying on the friendly consuls of other nations in 
Algiers, as the first three commodores had, Decatur‟s fleet included a professional diplomat, 
William Shaler.  He cooperated with Decatur to achieve a treaty, further lightening the 
commodore‟s duties.46   
The fleet only began preparing for deployment in the late spring of 1815.  On 21 April 
the schooner Torch shifted its anchorage within New York harbor to ride next to the Macedonian 
where these two ships, whose logbooks are the only surviving ones from this squadron, waited 
until 18 May for the rest of the fleet to assemble.
47
  On 20 May, at 3 PM, Decatur ordered the 
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squadron to get underway; within half an hour the fleet was under sail, and within another half 
hour had crossed the bar and assumed sailing stations.
48
  The Atlantic crossing was not smooth; 
only a few days out of New York, a gale overtook the squadron which separated some of them 
and forced the Firefly to turn back.
49
  The squadron‟s first rendezvous was Gibraltar, and the 
Torch, Spitfire, and Ontario, the three ships separated from the squadron arrived there 
independently.  As the main body of the fleet neared the Straits of Gibraltar the Americans began 
to encounter European traffic.  In hopes of some news of the Algerine fleet, Decatur stopped and 
spoke to a Portuguese schooner on 12 June and a Spanish vessel the next day.
50
  In Cadiz, 
Decatur received the news he hoped for.  The enemy was out: “three of the enemy‟s frigates are 
off Alicante,” a point not far eastward along the Spanish coast.51 Meanwhile the Torch, with the 
Spitfire off Gibraltar, learned that the Algerines were cruising off Cape Trafalgar in the other 
direction, patrolling the Atlantic approaches to the straits.
52
  With the squadron reunited the next 
day off Gibraltar, Decatur hesitated only long enough to gather his ships into sailing order.   
Decatur turned east, into the Mediterranean, trusting his intelligence from Cadiz and the 
eyes of the American lookouts who had spotted nothing suspicious in the Atlantic.  After only 
three days cruising near Alicante, the squadron sighted a large ship during the afternoon of 17 
June.
53
  When approached by the squadron, this vessel, though wearing neutral English colors, 
quickly increased sail to run.  The squadron, which also hoisted the Union Jack, just as quickly 
sailed in pursuit.
54
  The chase proved to be a large, though slow, warship.  Within an hour, the 
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fleet, with Constellation in the lead, drew close enough to open fire after their quarry refused to 
stop.
55
  The Torch and Ontario came up and began their own cannonades, and the latter “raked 
her [the chase] severely.”56  Soon the Guerriere and Epervier did likewise and, severely 
outgunned, the “enemy struck to the squadron … prove[ing] to be an Algerine Frigate mounting 
46 guns.”57  Of the Americans, Epervier deserved the most honors for it “ran up close to her [the 
chase] and poured in her broadside very gallantly,” the close range fire doing more damage than 
the larger ships in the American squadron.
58
  The real credit was due, however, to Commodore 
Decatur, for with odds of nine against one the outcome of the fight itself was never in doubt.  By 
hunting for intelligence, making a quick decision upon evaluating that intelligence, and keeping 
his squadron concentrated where he determined the enemy would be found, Decatur won this 
fight before the first shot had even been fired.  The rewards were great.  The prize proved to be 
the Meshouda, flagship and most capable vessel in the Algerine navy, under the command of 
Algiers‟s most capable officer, Rais Hamidou, who perished in the battle.59 
Only a few days later, Decatur had a chance to strike another blow.  Shipping was 
abundant just inside the straits and, while the Macedonian towed the prize slowly eastward, he 
sent the small ships inshore to investigate strange sails.  Only two days later, the squadron 
sighted a suspicious brig close to shore.  When approached, the vessel “came to anchor, hoisting 
Algerine Colors.”60  The brig was so close to the shore that the water was too shallow for the 
frigates, or even Ontario, largest of the sloops of war, to approach.  Indeed, the brig lay close 
enough to shore to be within Spanish waters.  Decatur, before taking action, recalled the Torch, 
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closest of the squadron‟s small ships, sending it closer to shore to seek sure “intelligence of the 
strange sail.”61   
When confronted with a similar situation in 1801, two enemy vessels anchored in 
Gibraltar Bay, there was never any question of Commodore Dale cutting them out.  He instead 
left a frigate there to keep them in port, an action that deprived Tripoli of their vessels, but which 
also deprived Commodore Dale of one of his squadron‟s ships.  In fact, during that conflict, it 
was the Spanish who infringed on the neutral rights of the United States by interning American 
vessels that passed the Straits of Gibraltar.
62
  Perhaps because he witnessed these unwelcome 
Spanish interventions, perhaps because his orders did not instruct him to yield to every nicety 
demanded by foreign nations, or perhaps because he was merely more aggressive, after 
confirming the brig was an Algerine, Decatur ordered the small vessels of the squadron to “stand 
in for the Enemy and if he would not come off to commence an action with him.”63  The 
Epervier led the way, anchored close to the Algerine brig, and opened the action.  The Torch, 
just behind, “came to anchor within Musket shot … immediately commenced firing,” and it was 
not long until the other vessels joined in.
64
  The Algerine brig Estedio struck its colors after being 
boarded by the squadron‟s boats and joined the Meshouda on the way to a prize court in 
Cartagena.
65
  The Macedonian missed this action; employed in towing the Meshouda, it was 
quite a distance away when the log recorded “cannonading to the N.E.”66  The rest of the 
squadron‟s large ships also missed the engagement.  Still, as in the last action the Americans held 
enough of an advantage in numbers that the outcome was never really in doubt. 
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While Decatur‟s orders instructed him to send prizes to the courts in the island of 
Sardinia, he had no intention of going even that far into the Mediterranean.
67
  His next stop was 
Algiers, for with two impressive bargaining chips already safely stored in a neutral harbor and 
his squadron between the rest of the Algerine raiders and their home port, Decatur believed he 
had a chance to end the war quickly.  On 27 June, Decatur‟s squadron, still together as a 
concentrated force, arrived off of Algiers, anchoring there the next day.
68
 
Upon anchoring, the Guerriere hoisted the flag of Sweden, a signal for Swedish consul 
Norderling, who handled American affairs in Algiers since the American consul‟s ejection.69  
Norderling rowed out with an Algerine official who carried a letter ashore from President 
Madison.  Though the letter made it clear that the United States would continue the fight until 
Algiers ceased any demand for tribute, Decatur added a finer point with a verbal message, saying 
“my officers have come out to fight and put themselves in practice.”70  The Algerine 
representative, captain of the Algerine marine, was surprised at the confidence of the American 
negotiators and opined that there was little Decatur‟s fleet could do to injure Algiers.  Pointing 
out strength of Algiers‟s batteries, he also expressed confidence that his fleet was safe in some 
neutral port when Decatur, with the same impeccable timing that allowed him success in battle, 
led out the senior surviving officers of his prizes.
71
  This induced the Algerine to ask the 
Americans‟ terms, suggesting a cease-fire during which the two sides could negotiate a treaty.  
Knowing the bargaining advantage he held by being between the Algerine fleet and their home 
port, Decatur refused a cease-fire “declaring that should a vessel appear off the harbor, and had a 
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boat with the American prisoners not been on board” his flagship, that the enemy vessel would 
be taken.
72
 
After only a short wait, just such a situation as the commodore had foreseen arose; a sail 
crept over the horizon, clearly making for Algiers.
73
  As the squadron prepared to sail and 
intercept this vessel, a boat put off from shore, pulling fast for the Guerriere with the Edwin’s 
crew huddled on board.  After Decatur was satisfied that all the American prisoners were 
present, and that the treaty, with no tribute, had been signed, “peace was announced to be 
considered between the Dey of Algiers and the President of the United States.”74  Lamenting the 
potential prize that was sailing toward them, Peter Potter, surgeon aboard the Spitfire, wrote, 
“how unlucky that this peace was not delayed one day,” so that the Americans could make 
another prize.
75
  Decatur, though, had gained his objective and certainly weighed the loss of a 
single prize lightly against the gain of a treaty without American payment. 
In fact, Decatur‟s achievement was far greater.  The treaty included an Algerine 
indemnity for the seizure of American property, $10,000 in return for the Edwin and the 
suffering of its crew.
76
  After gaining this spectacular result, Decatur sailed immediately to 
Tunis, and then Tripoli in turn.  These nations had not attacked American vessels themselves, but 
each fell on the British side of neutrality during the War of 1812.  When an American privateer 
sent British prizes into each of those ports, the local authorities detained them and turned them 
over to the British.
77
  In each of these ports Decatur demanded and settled similar treaties, 
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without American tribute, and each treaty included recompense for these nations‟ misdeeds.78  
This difference in the American attitude on each side of little more than a decade is marked.  
Diplomatic historian Ray Irwin especially noted the “tremendous difference” between sending 
“representatives, cap in hand, to the governments of Europe to beg protection, to that later date 
when Decatur … dictated to the rulers of Barbary the sole conditions upon which they could 
avert hostilities.”79  Though certainly, America had a higher international standing in the world 
in 1815 than 1805, most of the credit for this change rests with the negotiator. 
In the course of four months, Decatur had achieved against all the Barbary States what 
four squadrons and four years could not accomplish against the weakest of those states.  Decatur, 
alone of all the commodores, proceeded to a negotiation with his own demand, rather than 
answering that of a Barbary prince.  Decatur proved himself able to recognize diplomatic 
advantages as well as military ones, and he seized both.  Perhaps no cleaner, clearer, or quicker 
victory has ever been achieved by American arms.  
Decatur did, in some ways, sail to the Mediterranean in a more favorable position than 
some of the other commodores.  Crowninshield‟s orders provided Decatur with a balance of 
direction and discretion.  With the squadron‟s finances provided for by someone else and an 
official diplomatic representative assigned to the fleet, Decatur was closer to a pure military 
commander than any of the previous commodores.  The government‟s new position in the world 
after the War of 1812 meant that Decatur also had the discretion he needed in dealing with 
European powers.  As opposed to Dale, who historian Spencer Tucker notes, sailed with orders 
that “virtually ensured that he would accomplish nothing,” Decatur could not have asked for 
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clearer or more aggressive orders.
80
  His short time in the Mediterranean meant that he did not 
have to struggle to find friendly ports or supplies for the squadron.   Decatur, one astute 
biographer noted, was absent from the United States only 187 days, but this makes his 
achievements all the more remarkable; “We may fruitlessly search the annals of navigation, from 
the time the magnetic needle was discovered … down to this period and discover no parallel.”81   
One other factor certainly assisted Decatur; the Barbary States‟ place in the world had 
declined.  The year of 1815 saw the end to Britian‟s war with the United States, but also the end 
to the Napoleonic Wars, and, indeed, the end to an entire century of near-constant European 
warfare.  Historian Frank Lambert, who examines the Barbary Wars from an Atlantic World 
perspective, notes that the great powers of Europe not only condoned the system of Barbary 
tributes, they encouraged it.
82
  The Barbary States restricted trade competition from nations 
which were too weak to oppose them, allowing the larger powers to reserve this trade for 
themselves.  The Barbary States survived amongst, and even received tribute from, large 
European nations that could have destroyed them by being masters of playing those nations 
against each other.
83
  With Europe constantly at war, the Barbary States negotiated an ever-
shifting series of treaties making sure to demand large tributes only from nations that were too 
preoccupied to do something about the Barbary threat.  With the final defeat of Napoleon came 
an end the Barbary States‟ happy situation.  Though the British had encouraged the Algerines to 
declare war on the United States in 1812, the dey must have known that the British would not 
now offer support.  In fact, only a year after Decatur secured peace with Algiers, the citiy was 
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reduced almost to rubble by the bombardment of a combined British and Dutch naval force.
84
  
Only fifteen years later, Algiers‟s fortunes sunk low enough that the nation succumbed to 
invasion and became a French colony. 
Even the several advantages that Decatur enjoyed over the previous commodores cannot 
reduce his achievement.  That Secretary Crowninshield judged Decatur‟s squadron too weak to 
compel Algiers to peace is proof that Decatur did not enjoy every advantage he could have.  
Decatur‟s force, though ideally suited for its mission of running down Algerine raiders and 
blockading Algiers, did not have the power to compel Algiers to capitulate to bombardment.  
The bomb vessels and gun boats needed for an effective assault sailed later with Bainbridge.  
Further, Algiers had long been the largest Barbary state, commanding more raiders than Tripoli 
and protected by stronger fortifications.  Decatur‟s goal was no less daunting than his 
predecessors‟, and his achievements of six months outshone all of theirs of five years. 
This war, like the Tripolitan War, encompassed few actual engagements, and even more 
than in that previous war there was never any doubt that the Americans would win those fights.  
Taking one ship with an entire squadron did not tax Decatur‟s military skill, and neither Morris 
nor any other American commodore could have failed to take these prizes.  Additionally, his 
force was not strong enough to destroy Algiers by naval bombardment and did not carry a large 
enough force for a land assault.  Almost no amount of ineptitude could fail in those two 
engagements, and no amount of military genius would allow a few frigates to level the defenses 
of Algiers.   
Decatur had only one way to force the enemy to sign the treaty and he found it.  Instead 
of leaving a few ships here and there to convoy merchants, Decatur concentrated his force.  
Instead of blockading the Algerine brig in Spanish waters, Decatur cut it out.  Instead of offering 
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to begin negotiations, Decatur made demands and prepared to back them with force.  By then 
inserting his concentrated fleet in a position to capture the Algerine fleet as they returned to port 
singly, this threat of force was enough to compel Algiers to submit.  It was Decatur‟s grasp of the 
situation that allowed him to win the most decisive victory in war that had been yet achieved by 
the United States, and to win it “in the way which reflected honor on the United States … the 
way the American people wanted it done,” the way that only he, of all the officers of the early 
United States Navy, could have done it.
85
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CONCLUSION 
 Other historians have used their own evaluations of the progress of the Barbary Wars to 
evaluate each of the commodores.  Almost universally, they raise Preble and Decatur into the 
pantheon of early American naval heroes, while ignoring (and sometimes ridiculing) the 
remaining commodores.  An evaluation of all of these men based on a complete picture of their 
decisions, and not solely their combat with the enemy, reveals more subtle delineations.   
One commodore stands apart from the others at each end of the spectrum.  Clearly, the 
most successful was Decatur.  While he faced only one opponent, Algiers, that nation in 1815 
was far better equipped than any of the United States‟ earlier Barbary foes, yet he established a 
permanent treaty on the best possible terms within months of his departure from the United 
States.  The least successful, clearly, was Morris.  Though he spent as long in the Mediterranean 
as anyone, he accomplished the least, probably making the situation worse for his successor.   
The other three officers require more careful scrutiny.  Dale, Preble, and Barron achieved 
some level of success but ultimately fell short of a completely positive outcome.  None of these 
commanders faced entirely similar conditions or exercised control of the same resources, and any 
comparison must be subjective.  One important condition, the Jefferson administration‟s 
expectations for the war, changed in a way to make the jobs of each subsequent commander 
easier than the preceding commodores.  As the war continued, the government became ever more 
eager for it to reach a successful conclusion.  Each fleet the navy dispatched, therefore, was more 
capable than the last.  In general, each commodore had greater powers or resources than the 
previous commodore to prosecute the war.  Dale, for example, sailed with orders so limiting that 
he believed he did not even have the authority to capture Tripolitan warships.  On the other hand, 
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Barron sailed with the administration‟s blessing to attempt to install a different ruler in Tripoli if 
he so chose. 
With these factors in mind, Barron has the least to recommend him, despite the fact that 
he finally forced Tripoli into a treaty after four years of warfare.  Even with all the advantages of 
a large fleet and liberal powers to make war, Barron settled for a peace treaty without even using 
much of his military force.  Both Dale and Preble arrived in the Mediterranean only to learn that 
an unanticipated state of war existed: Dale with Tripoli, and Preble with Morocco.  Preble‟s 
force was shorter on firepower, though probably more capable, and his orders more liberal 
without requiring too much of him.  He used these factors to force peace with one opponent and 
successfully attack the other, actions that rank him above the first of the Barbary commodores, 
Richard Dale, whose failure to be more aggressive lessened the effect of his efforts.  Dale had a 
poorly balanced fleet, constricting orders, and held command for only a limited time.  Despite 
these factors, Dale did lay the groundwork for the future success of naval operations in the 
Mediterranean.   
 The efforts each commander devoted to extra-military affairs were directly related to 
their overall success in the war.  Interestingly, this pattern holds no relevance when considering 
simply the military side of the action.  Decatur captured only a few vessels, always with 
overwhelming superiority in force; these were not actions that required much in the way of 
military skill or extreme heroism.  Engagements in which the outcome was in little doubt 
reflected little martial glory on their commander.  Dale‟s fleet, on the military side, was nearly as 
successful as Decatur.  He blockaded the enemy‟s two largest ships until their abandonment, and 
then Enterprize captured a third vessel, ensuring it was not useful to the Tripolitans before 
releasing it.  The parallels between the two commodores‟ arrivals in the Mediterranean are 
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interesting.  Each almost immediately met the two largest of the enemy‟s vessels.  Decatur, with 
the luck to meet his foes at sea, gained a pair of bargaining chips, while Dale found his quarry 
secure in a British port.  The vagaries of chance gave Decatur an opportunity for successful 
negotiation and forced Dale to split his force, leaving some vessels to guard the enemy in 
Gibraltar.  It seems unlikely, based on Dale‟s other actions, that he would have attempted a 
diplomatic move as inspired as Decatur‟s, but the scale of the military victory was essentially the 
same in each case.  Both commodores deprived the enemy of the use of two warships, yet 
Decatur is the military hero.  It was Decatur‟s daring outside of combat that sealed his victory 
and his fame. 
 Preble‟s case is an almost exact reversal of Decatur‟s, but just as surely illustrates the 
importance of those duties outside of combat.  Preble first demonstrated his resourcefulness by 
using a tiny prize vessel to destroy the captured Philadelphia, and then in acquiring gunboats and 
bomb vessels for use off of Tripoli.  With such a small force, any attack required the presence of 
Preble‟s entire fleet, but only his flagship had the capacity to carry months‟ worth of stores.  To 
keep the supplies coming, Preble appointed representatives ashore to hire private supply ships to 
ferry essential goods to the squadron.  Though hardly a giant leap in thinking, no other 
commodore made similar arrangements.  It was this decision that made Preble‟s attacks possible.  
Once made, however, Preble‟s failures in negotiation mitigated the impact of his assaults.  To 
follow every attack with a request for peace eventually convinced the bashaw that the Americans 
had already done their worst.  In the end, Preble offered a similar amount of money to that which 
Lear eventually included in the final treaty.  It is perhaps fortunate for Preble‟s reputation that 
the bashaw rejected this offer, for now historians can focus on Preble‟s attacks while still 
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criticizing the final treaty.  The record of the one commodore resourceful enough to actually 
mount attacks on Tripoli makes clear the importance of a fleet commander‟s other duties. 
Each commodore, from best to worst, proved over and again the importance of the full 
range of tasks entrusted to naval commanders.  Not only did a commander have to make 
effective decisions outside of combat just to undertake, and succeed in, military operations, but 
those decisions often superseded the importance of those military operations.  While the military 
victories of the Barbary War remain fresh in historical memory and public imagination, the real 
victories over each of the Barbary States were the treaties eventually signed with each one.  
Decatur gained these victories, and proved that victory in the earlier war with Tripoli was 
possible, by making daring decisions in the more mundane areas of his duties, outside of combat. 
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